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ABSTRACT
This thesis is concerned with the patterns of work and employment within foreign
owned multinationals operating in the UK's consumer electronics industry. The focus
is on evaluating current debates on whether there has been any changes or shifts in
relations between capital and labour, which constitute a new paradigm.
There is a growing set of literature which argues that Japanese capitalism is providing
new paradigms for work relations which result in highly cooperative associations
between worker and employer. Much of the evidence for such claims comes from
studies of Japanese owned plants operating in the UK and US. However, there is little
depth to such studies, which mainly consist of interviews with managers or
questionnaires. Through selection of a case study methodology and by critically
assessing the nature of Japanese managerial techniques, this research challenges
fundamentally the 'Japanisation' school. Moreover, the thesis provides contradictory
findings concerning 'flexibility'. More tentatively, the thesis contributes to debates
on labour segmentation based on gender, and on the wider debate around 'new
industrial relations'.
The research was based on four case studies, three Japanese and one European, but
not British, owned plants of large multinational corporations. The headquarters of the
Japanese plants were also visited, as were plants in Japan. More than 50 taped
interviews were conducted with over 100 managers, workers and trade union officials
from the UK and Japan. In addition, factory visits were made at each plant more than
once and often with a almost a year between visits.
The main findings are that the plants did not display any of thefeatures attributed to
'Japanisation', except with the marginal exception of the European plant. Techniques,
such as 'just-in-time' and direct participation between employees and management to
the exclusion of unions, were not in evidence. Instead, management was concerned
with maximising production runs, minimising change and constantly trying to control
workers, who were themselves conscious that for most of them, their work was
repetitive boring and, especially for the women, deskilled.
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PREFACE
This thesis is about the process of television manufacture in the UK, a relatively
uncertain industry in the 1980s and 1990s. The thesis consists of a study of four cases
of manufacturing plants, owned by multinationals. Three of the plants belong to
Japanese multinationals, the fourth being European.
In December 1991, less than a year and a half after the field research was completed
the European owned plant closed. The reason given by headquarters management in
a press release, was that television production was to be rationalised by transferring
manufacture to the Continent. A deciding factor for moving out of the UK was the
failure of the BSB satellite television broadcasting company, under whose licence the
plant had produced satellite receivers. These receivers, and the development of
satellite television within the UK were seen as important reasons for maintaining
production in the UK. The decision to invest heavily in technology and production
organisation to produce BSB receivers was in contrast to the three Japanese
companies which were studied, as they held back from manufacturing either BSB or
Sky receivers, to see the market size potential and which of the two broadcasting
companies would be dominant. This difference in management decisions cost over a
thousand workers their jobs, and perhaps ensured the security of the workers at the
three Japanese plants, as another competitor went to the wall.
This thesis was researched and largely written before news of the closure of the plant
was announced, and, therefore, the reasons for closure will not be developed in the
v
thesis. Nevertheless, the nature of competition, divergent strategies to cope with the
pressures and the impact this has on workers goes some way to explaining the crisis
of capitalism in which such capitalist entrenchment takes place.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
The thesis seeks to review and further develop arguments about the changing
character of industrial and employment relations in contemporary Britain, particularly
with reference to widespread debates about 'Japanisation'. A central feature of these
debates has been the claim that there have been substantial changes in managerial
strategies and consequently work and employment relations following the
'Japanisation' of industry (Turnbull; 1986). This argument is examined in this thesis
through case studies of inward investing Japanese firms, for such firms can be taken
to exemplify these developments. The intention is to examine these debates through
a systematic case study analysis of three such firms within the television
manufacturing industry, alongside a comparison with a European firm within the same
sector. However, what has became apparent from my fieldwork is that much of the
evidence from the four cases runs counter to the literature. Rather than substantial
change in managerial and work relations, the evidence for continuity is quite marked.
The extent of this divergence calls into question much of the argument that there is
a trend towards 'new era' employment relations. Thus, although this thesis is first and
foremost a study of employment practices and relations within an important industrial
sector, it might also be read as a contribution to wider debates.
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This thesis looks at television assembly, a product produced for a saturated market.
Ten years ago the market for televisions in the UK was one where there was
international competition, with local producers competing with other European
countries and some from East Asia. At the time of the research the local producers
disappeared and competition focused among foreign owned multinationals slugging
it out in the fiercely competitive UK market and, increasingly, the EC generally. Two
European giants, Thomson and Phillips compete mainly with several Japanese
companies and increasingly, Samsung from South Korea and Tatung from Taiwan.
This study examines work relations and employment practices within the context of
this fiercely competitive situation, focusing on four case studies. The aim is to
understand the connections between the production of a specific good, colour
televisions, management practices arid strategies, and the character of the 1aoo'ir
process, within the context of these market relations. This draws attention to two
related points which are examined in the thesis. First, that one can only understand
the employment relationship and management's wish to control it within a context of
capitalist needs for profits. Under competitive circumstances this requires economies
of scale from cheap production and the ability to maintain shares in mass markets.
Second, this implies that management strategies or practices towards employment are
largely about achieving predictability through maintaining stability, not initiating
change.
Japanese capital is generally seen as very 'good' at making profits, and even if no
academic wants to work in a television factory, we all might buy a television made
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by others who must work in the factory. There is a style of thought, located in
regulation theory, flexible specialisation analyses and some proponents of
'Japanisation', that working on the factory floor of a Japanese owned company is
more satisfying than elsewhere. The argument is that workers are employed in
meaningful work which is intrinsically satisfying. The theoretical focus of this thesis
is a critical analysis of such assumptions and of the wider notion of the importance
of new labour process paradigms through empirical case studies of specific firms and
labour processes.
THE CASES
The discussion draws on case studies of four multinational corporations, with
production facilities spread throughout the world: Burg, Orki, Kuda and Hashi. These
are pseudonyms for the companies real names, which are withheld as a condition
stipulated by management for gaining research access to their sites.
Part of the production activity of each of these corporations was television
manufacture. Three of the multinationals were Japanese in origin and the fourth,
Koburg, was European, though not British owned. The pseudonyms used for the
plants located in the UK are the same as for the multinational corporations, except
that 'Ko' is prefixed, 'Ko' meaning child or child of in Japanese names. All except
Hashi were corporations which primarily engaged in consumer electronics and related
activities, such as Office Automation (OA) equipment. Hashi was a diversified
conglomerate with interests ranging from building nuclear power stations to audio
3
tapes, spread among 660 subsidiaries around the world (Hashi;1989;2). The local
plants in the study were branch plants of these multinationals: Orki owned Koorki,
Kuda owned Kokuda, Hashi owned Kohashi and Burg owned Koburg. The latter two
plants, Kohashi and Koburg, were once owned by UK based multinationals. The
differences in terms of ownership, relative importance of television to overall
production and geographical location of the branch plants are all of central importance
to understanding the different characteristics of the cases and will be outlined more
fully in Chapter Three.
ThE CHAPTERS
The thesis is organised into twelve chapters, nine of which are grouped into three
sections: 'Context', 'Practices', and 'Experiences and Perceptions'. Each section
provides a discussion of issues at a different level of analysis, starting from the
context which place the case studies within a prescribed environment of market and
corporate control (Section I), through the organisation of the labour process (Section
II), to the experience, perceptions and resistance of labour subjected to these
processes (Section III).
Following this chapter, Chapter Two, 'Japanisation' of the UK Labour Process', is
free standing and looks at various theories about 'Japanisation', flexible specialisation
and Post Fordist production. It focuses particularly on Japanisation which is seen by
the literature as both a distinct set of practices and a metaphor to encapsulate
changing relations between labour and capital in terms of power and identity. The
4
analysis will expose the problematical nature of much of these 'new era of industrial
relations' type models.
Within Section I there are three chapters. The first of these, Chapter Three, 'Outline
of the Cases', discusses previous research into Japanese consumer electronics
investment in the UK, methodological issues, and introduces features of the cases
studies looked at in this thesis. The size and location of the plants, the employment
patterns and some basic information required to understand later chapters is provided.
This chapter will show diversity in structure. nd sue of the cases, b^ gi4'ec cecth<
limitations, they are comparable, especially two cases analyzed more extensively in
Section III.
Chapter Four, 'Market and Marketing Strategy', analyses the changing relation
between Japanese and European multinationals in their approach towards marketing
consumer products. The purpose is to evaluate whether there had been a shift in
selling away from mass products towards highly individualised/ customised goods,
a thesis of the proponents of Post Fordism. It will be shown that television sets are
sold into a saturated market which bears little resemblance to Post Fordism; product
differentiation being slight and largely cosmetic. The remaining chapters concentrate
on the four case studies, and help reinforce and explain this evaluation.
Chapter Five, 'Multinational Approaches to Corporate Control', compares different
approaches to controlling the UK branch plants and the relative significance and
perceived performance these plants have within global market strategies. This chapter
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will argue that there was a high degree of centralisation of power towards the
headquarters of the plants. In the European case this centralisation was maintained
through financial control, whereas the Japanese had closer informal networks which
maintain power in Japan. This assertion is important as it implies that these cases tend
to represent a Japanese way of doing things, management style and practices, so that
one would expect to see these as ideal type cases of 'Japanisation'.
Section II contains three chapters. Chapter Six, 'The Japanisation of Production'?',
describes how a television set is made and explains what may \e ieasona'thy termed
the Fordist principles of such television assembly. This will allow a critical evaluation
of the extent to which the workplaces under study adopted and adapted key aspects
of supposed 'Japanese methods' of production. These techniques include Just-in-time
(JIT), Total Quality Management (TQM) and Flexible Manufacturing Systems (FMS).
The evidence will show that these were medium sized batch production plants, with
traditional contingency management problems of quantity versus quality in output.
This, along with the existence of stock holding, strongly challenges claims of
Japanised forms of production arrangements.
Chapter Seven, 'The Organisation of Work', looks at working conditions, the
organisation of work and details of the jobs different workers undertake. The chapter
outlines how far such working arrangements can be seen as different in general terms
from other 'blue collar' work in the UK. The chapter demonstrates dual features of
'Taylorist' style job segmentation and deeply entrenched gendering of job
assignments.
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Chapter Eight, 'A Flexible Organisation of Work?', extends the review of flexible
production to assess the evidence of labour flexibility. The chapter looks at forms of
functional and numerical flexibility, their use and limitations. It shows that, whereas
there was a long tradition of numerical flexibility for jobs done predominantly by
women, functional flexibility did not exist, and may even have been discouraged
within the case study plants.
Section III comprises three chapters. Chapter Nine, 'Worker Attitudes to Company
and Management', examines workers' views of their bosses an their irnge of 1reir
employers. The focus is on whether workers identified their own interests as being
the same as the company's, indicating 'Japanese type' harmony, or whether they
displayed what is assumed to be a more traditional British worker attitude towards
capital. It will be shown that an atmosphere of 'them' and 'us' was prevalent in both
the European and Japanese cases.
Chapter Ten, 'Worker Attitudes to Labouring', extends the discussion from the
previous chapter to examine how women and men saw their jobs and how their jobs
fitted in with their expectations. The chapter is essentially a study of whether
alienation or enrichment of jobs adequately describes working in such television
assembly factories, and will show that worker alienation from repetitive and deskilled
work was commonplace on the shopfloor.
Chapter Eleven, 'Employee Resistance and the Role of the Unions', looks at the
organisation of unions in the various companies and critically assesses the role they
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played for management and workers. The aim of the chapter is to identify
management strategies towards labour and to examine the level of overt conflict
displayed within each plant. The degree to which these relations changed over the
previous 10 to 15 years provides evidence of the extent of any 'new realism' within
unions and how far this may be attributed to 'Japanisation'. This chapter provides
concrete evidence from workers of both a conflict of interests with management and
low esteem for their union. However, overt demonstrations of these conflicts were
not prevalent in collective forms, historically a common feature within this kind of
industry.
Finally, Chapter Twelve provides the conclusion to the thesis. It assesses how far
models of Japanisation and theories of changing industrial relations are applicable to
an economic sector dominated by Japanese multinationals. The main argument is that
the claims for some new labour process paradigm are inappropriate, and that
industrial differences need to be considered when analyzing the character of collective
labour. The evidence taken from each chapter allows an assessment of the adequacy
of existing theories and provides a basis for constructing a different explanation of the
employment relationship in an important industrial sector of the UK economy during
the 1980s. It will be shown that there is little evidence of 'new industrial relations'
but that there is a good deal of reaffirmation of earlier case studies of labour process
and gendered experiences of work, set within a multinational context.
8
LIMITATIONS OF THE THESIS
It is important to note the parameters of the research and point to some of the
consequential limitations. In this thesis the prime concern is to address the question
of what 'Japanisation' means in practice in the UK. As a consequence it does not
examine television assembly operations in Japan, though this would have allowed
some exploration as to why the whole mythology of Japanisation has arisen. Although
the author has done research in Japanese consumer electronics, it was felt it would
widen the thesis too far and not allow sufficient depth of analysis of the plants located
in the UK. The thesis is, therefore, not able to question whether Japanese practices
have been imported to the UK; it is concerned to evaluate the extent to which theories
that others have constructed adequately explain practices operating in plants owned
by the Japanese firms.
A second issue which could have been the focus was the gender composition of the
workforce. As noted and considered in the thesis, 60 percent of the shopfloor workers
in each plant were women. This obviously raises major questions about the gendering
of work in the industry, but, although some comments are made about this, there is
no claim to provide an adequate analysis of these issues or to engage directly with the
feminist debates around such matters. However, subsequent chapters will show that
there is nothing peculiar about the way that the Japanese case plants manage issues
of gender as compared with the European plant.
Finally, a potential criticism of the thesis relates to the choice of Koburg as one
non-Japanese plant to represent western style management, as a methodological
9
'control' with the Japanese cases. This plant changed substantially both in terms of
ownership and in the organisation of the factory floor. Thus it might be argued that
Koburg had been forced to copy best practice from the Japanese in order to compete
in product markets dominated by Japanese firms, and can no longer be treated as a
'control' case. It will, however, become clear from the evidence that the Japanese
plants themselves varied in important respects, and that in this context the thesis does
not simply contrast Koburg with the Japanese. For example, it was a Japanese case,
Kohashi, which provided the richest evidence of the problematical character of the
restructuring of operations and the concentration of production at a 'greyfield' site.
Thus comparisons seek to identify similarities across all four cases and differences
among the Japanese firms as well as significant contrasts between Koburg and the
three Japanese enterprises. In these respects Koburg proved an ideal point of
reference for comparisons with the different plants in South Wales.
10
CHAPTER TWO
JAPANISATION OF THE UK LABOUR PROCESS?
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to describe what is commonly meant by 'Japanisation'
and then to reorientate theoretical discussions to provide a basis for this thesis, thus,
the chapter is divided into two sections; A and B. The main theme of debate on the
subject has been to explain Japanese inward investment in the west and its consequent
effects. Section A, 'Japanisation of the Labour Process - theories and models', traces
the common threads among some of the diverse analyses of such 'Japanisation', to
show how these are informed by a set of theories about political economy, and to
identify key issues which will be addressed in detail later in the thesis, with reference
to case-studies. Thus, rather than using a specific thesis about'Japanisation' as the
starting point for this research, commentary on these arguments serves as a basis for
a range of specific comparisons. Section B reorientates the debate to consider a
different way of considering the nature of Japanese multinational investments in the
UK and the labour processes within the consumer electronics industry.
SECTION A: JAPANTSATION OF THE LABOUR PROCESS - THEORIES
AND MODELS
The term 'Japanisation' conjures up a set of ideologies and perspectives of work, life,
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education and so on, which are imposed as holistic descriptions of Japan, and the
essence of being Japanese. At the centre of this ideology is an argument about a set
of relations around work which are seen by proponents of Japanisation as typifying
Japan.
This section will start by looking at two contrasting interpretations of what are
claimed to be the core features of Japanese work organisation, and will then review
two influential typologies which have been used to characterise different degrees of
'Japanisation' among transplants and imitators overseas. Finally, the section will
explore several ways of looking at 'Japanisation' as particular sets of relations
between employers and employed, by reviewing both the approach at Cardiff Business
School, which is explicitly conceptualised in these terms, and other more general
arguments about flexibility which trade on a more implicit comparison with Japan.
Japanese industrialisation as a context for arguments about'Japanisation'
The study of Japanese capitalism is a relatively recent preoccupation of business
schools in the west, since the crisis of capitalism within major 'first-world' countries
brought about by the oil shocks of 1974 and 1978. Attempts to understand how
Japanese capitalism, which has historically been heavily dependent upon imported oil,
managed to cope better with these oil shocks than their western counterparts, led to
a historical analyses of Japanese post war capitalist development. There are essentially
three schools of thought to explain Japanese success. The first emphasises the
distinctive cultural roots of religion, family, education and ethnic purity; the second
highlights structural characteristics of business-government relations, which result in
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protected domestic markets, government supported exports, and the treatment of big
businesses as social institutions; and finally the third stresses organisational prowess
and clever management, which exploited the late economic development of Japan to
learn and borrow from other countries, to form a cocktail of expert management
techniques embedded in a hierarchy of businesses from the big to the self employed.
These three schools of thought overlap in places but their foci underpin all
explanations of Japanese industrialisation.
As Japanese capitalism has become more multinational in nature, cultural and
structural explanations seem to be disproved as adequate explanations of 'the Japanese
economic miracle', as they rely on unique characteristics of Japanese society. Instead,
organisational and managerial explanations have been developed which equate (a)
post-war capitalist development with (b) Japanese multinational management, leading
to (c) emulation by capitalists in competing countries. Although this thesis is
concerned with (b) and (c), a brief consideration of(a), Japanese capitalism, provides
a context for later discussions, and I will provide this by reviewing two models, of
'Fujitsuism' and 'Toyotaism'.
These models offer two rather different characterisations of domestic Japanese
business practices - the first generally positive and optimistic, the second more critical
- as a basis for more general arguments about the respects in which these practises
may involve novel features and may be generalisable across Japanese and other
multinational operations. In these respects they are influenced by the broader debates
about Fordist and Post Fordist regimes of production, which have grown particularly
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out of the work of the French 'Regulation School'. Contributors to these debates have
sought to theorise the historical development of capitalism in terms of distinctive
forms of labour process, market relations and wider regulatory institutions, with
marked transitions between such forms based on struggles between class groups (Hirst
and Zeitlin;1991;17-20). The basis of the theory is that there has been a break-down
in mass factory production, which involved workers lined up along conveyor belts
assembling the same product all year long. This crisis and decline was in part caused
by worker unrest or decline in motivation, which resulted in a loss of productivity.
In response to this a new form of work organisation is needed, which is termed Post
Fordist. The theory then explains how this fits into a historical view which starts with
feudalism, then capitalist machinofacture, then Fordism and now Post Fordism.
Protagonists of this approach generally claim that Japan has developed beyond the
Fordist stage of production, into the realm of Post Fordism, and from this perspective
the arguments about both the character of Japanese innovations and their
dissemination across the globe become claims that 'Japanisation' represents a
fundamental transition in the organisation and regulation of capitalist production.
Euj i tsui sm
Kenney and Florida (1988) provide a version of this argument which sees the
foundations for such a transition in the post-war period in Japan. Their argument is
that in order to crush the unions in the radical early post-war period Japanese
management conceded crucial parts of their demands in exchange for cooperation,
though only after bitter struggle. Presumably, this is why the radical unions dropped
in popularity and workers joined the 'new unions', supported by management,
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although this is not stated. Historically, the new unions bargained and 'won'
concessions, the old unions were smashed, radical students were thrown out of
universities and leftists were murdered. However, though they highlight class conflict
as the paradoxical basis for a new phase of capitalist development, Kenney and
Florida skip over these details in their general invocation of post war 'struggle'. Thus
they suggest that these very concessions coincidentally allowed for the rapid
expansion of the Japanese economy underpinned by life time guaranteed employment.
At this point they fall back on traditional arguments that if a person is given
employment security this will mean that they are flexible, though in their view this
arises from a class accord, defined in terms of mutual benefit and responsibility,
rather than from a cultural unitarism.
Among the many weaknesses of Kenney and Florida's analysis, the most striking
must be the complete lack of analysis of the continuing role of job insecurity and
numerical flexibility and the possible effect that might have on the social relations
within the factory. However, an advantage of the Kenney and Florida approach is that
it has an element of dynamism: if management do not keep their side of the bargain
the accord will break down. Moreover, the model is exportable, and indeed Kenney
and Florida (1988) see it as desirable for workers, who will demand that US capital,
for example, should adopt Fujitsuism. From this perspective the shared benefits and
transferability of such 'Fujitsuist' practices help to explain their popularity among
capitalist employers and employees.
For Kenney and Florida the basis of Fujitsuism is a class accord which underpins
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information sharing, trust, problem solving and just-in-time production methods (all
features which will be discussed later in the thesis). Their argument is that the
economic world is coming to be dominated by Fujitsuism, with an order that parallels
that around Fordism. Thus Kenney and Florida (1988; 147) conclude:
Japan has moved beyond Fordism. It currently stands at the centre of
a far-reaching process of technological and economic restructuring that
will affect both the future trajectory of the international economy and
the position of nation-states within it as well as the role and well-being
of workers in yet another phase of capitalist development.
The implication is that those who are slow to copy Japan will be doomed to economic
backwardness, the second world of the age of Japanisation. Behind this line of
argument is the view that there is a form of global Japanisation which spreads with
Fujitsuism, just as the economic power of the US has been associated with the
development of Fordism, both as a production technology, and a culture of labour
discipline and consumption. Thus, Japanisation becomes a term to describe both a
technical and a cultural process of 'un-westernisation', involving Japanese hegemony
as well as Japanese production methods.
Toyotaism.
An alternative account to that of Kenney and Florida is that offered by Dohse et al
(1985), who seek to show that 'Toyotaism' is merely a more despotic form of
Fordism. They explain how workers themselves assist management in their own
subordination and ask "why do workers accept this level of control?" (1985;133-4).
Their answer is also classic: the formation of this subordination depends upon
dividing workers, with some enjoying a core status which also brings company
16
dependence, but with the core workers themselves divided through individualised
merit pay. Dohse et al emphasise that the independent unions were crushed in the
early 1950s and that the new company unions are neither resistant nor collective.
Thus Dohse et al (1985;140) comment that:
Lacking collective forums for articulation of their interests, Japanese
workers must resort to other means to accommodate the pressure that
results from work requirements and labour deployment policies in the
plant. This is the key to understanding the 'peer-group-pressure' for
presence at work and job performance.
From this perspective t
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this "peer group pressure" allowing "hardly any limits to management prerogatives"
(1985; 140).
While in some ways this account captures the constraining features of Japanese
employment relations more adequately than Kenney and Florida, it has a number of
problems. Firstly it fails to explain why employee involvement does not extend to
production control, as in immediate post war Japan (see Moore; 1983)'. Second, they
do not explain why management trusts workers to put pressure on each other to work
and help in the innovation process of the company, yet does not trust them to vote for
the 'right' union candidate. Put another way, Dohse et al are trying to argue that
1 In fact, these periods of isolated production control were not organised by the unions
but represented a spontaneous collectivism out of which radical unions formed. There
have been many cases of worker resistance, even with independent unions denied
them. Moreover, unions can only coordinate and channel collective action - they do
not cause it. Thus stating that the radical unions were crushed after the war and that
the new unions are rigged (Dohse et al 1985;135, 139) is not in itself enough.
Moreover, they do not explain why unions seemed to be growing in power between
the early 1950s and 1974.
17
management works simultaneously at both ends of the consent - control continuum,
but have not adequately explained how these features mesh together.
Whereas Florida and Kenney regard Fujitsuism as an exportable model, the notion
of Toyotaism is more strongly tied to the specific historical and social circumstances
in Japan. Thus, this variant of Fordism is only seen as exportable if labour is weak
and there is no welfare state to provide workers with a safety-net, if made
unemployed. On the one hand this highlights the importance of wider social
conditions and institutions in any internationalisation of Japanese production, but on
the other hand, it may underplay the extent to which social changes in Britain and
elsewhere could sustain variants of Toyotaism2.
The next section will introduce an alternative way of analyzing the introduction of
Japanese direct investment into the UK, which concentrates on actual activities in the
local plants and explores differences between industries and within organisations.
2 While the arguments about Fujitsuism and Toyotaism use the language of regulation
theory, they are also underpinned by a belief that Japanese post-war history is unique.
Indeed even those who are deeply critical of Japanese capitalism, such as Kato
(1988), Dohse et al (1985) and Sethi et al (1984) recognise the dynamism of Japanese
capital. There are, however, a number of texts, such as Esaka (1984) and Dore et al
(1989;38), which identify limits to, and predict an end to, the strength of Japanese
capital, though this itself is not a new phenomenon. I would emphasise that Japanese
capitalism should not be seen as a tightly coherent and stable entity, but remains
unstable (see Taylor, 1990). In Japan it may be said that strength is not the result of
dominance as such but arises from capitalism's ability, thus far, to cope with
continuous crisis.
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Types of Ja panisat ion
There have been several attempts to conceptualise and assess the transfer of Japanese
innovations overseas, each of which seeks to register the distinctiveness of Japanese
operations and their influence on non-Japanese companies. Two influential typologies
will be examined here: those provided by Sethi, Namiki and Swanson (1984), and by
Ackroyd, Burrell, Hughes and Whitalcer (1988).
One of the early contributions which attempted to define the influence of Japanese
capitalist development in the US was Sethi et al (1984). These authors divided their
discussion into two chapters: the first concerning Japanese direct investment and the
second concerning the influence on indigenous companies. Both of these were further
split into four categories each of which will now be explained in turn.
The first characterisation of the role of Japanese direct investment is in terms of
imperialism. This (1984;183-5) is seen as akin to an organism in which the US local
plant is a clone of the Japanese parent. Thus, practices are introduced from Japan
intact and local workers are treated as outsiders. In fact (1984;185):
There is also the fear that if foreigners were allowed in the system,
they would somehow weaken its integrity.
The cultural uniqueness of the Japanese way of managing is vulnerable if
contaminated by outsiders, so the foreign workers are treated like peripheral workers
back in Japan. Another consequence is that "little Japans" (1984; 183) form and there
is a focus not only on the parent company in Japan but on the reaffirmation of
Japanese national identity.
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Second, the enclave approach (1984;185-8) is where companies set up their plants in
rural backwaters, usually drawing on the agricultural mentality of potential local
workers. Japanese practices are imported intact but, unlike in the previous approach,
the local workers are integrated into the system. Part of the reason for this integration
is that the Japanese are concerned with gaining local acceptance of their operations,
especially in such closed communities as rural towns. In consequence, °little
Tokyos", whereby Japanese gettos of companies and expatriate residences are avoided
by senior management (1984;187).
Third, in the domestication approach (1984; 188-92) there is a mixture of Japanese and
local practices. Sethi Ct al list four conditions under which this approach may be
adopted. The first is where organisations enter joint ventures with local companies;
the second, where organisations are well known and large, and the region invested
in has strong unionism; the third, when the company's market competitiveness is
marginal and could be affected by disharmony among workers; the fourth, where the
product involves high technology and the company uses scarce local skilled workers,
whose motivation would not fit easily into the Japanese practices.
In all these circumstances there is a process of "strategic adaptation" (1984; 188) to
the local environment so as to minimise possible frictions. Adoption of Japanese
practices "is likely to be ad hoc and low key" (1984;189) and the system is open in
terms of communication. The extent of application varies but is particularly restricted
under conditions where there is strong unionism or unfavourable product market
conditions. The analysis of this process then becomes quite vague, using various cases
20
to show differing degrees of domestication.
The final characterisation of the role of Japanese direct investment identifies a process
of acculturation. In these cases Japanese transplants in the US replicate Japanese
practices by inculcating the Japanese way among locals. Work and employment
practices are transferred intact to all employees, as opposed to only those from
Japanese culture, as marks the imperialist approach. Sethi et al (1984; 193) conclude
that:
The acculturation's (Sic) approach is quite bold and demonstrates a
conviction on the part of the Japanese management that their system
and style of management is transferable, and can be transplanted to a
foreign culture and operate with foreign workers, provided careful
attention is paid during the incubation and early growth period.
Sethi et al (1984; 193-4) list a number of activities which the Japanese undertake to
ensure a correct acculturation process, such as careful selection of recruits, recruiting
workers who have no prior work experience, training in corporate ideology, and
careful planning.
Sethi et al (1984;206-24) then go on to identify four approaches to the adoption of
Japanese management practices by indigenous US capitalist firms, which they label
cosmetic; exploitation; domestication and indigenous approaches. The first of these,
the cosmetic approach (1984;206-9), describes both the majority of US firms and, in
their view, "what is wrong with American business" (1984; 207). It is often a
personnel or public relations sponsored initiative, involving highly a public fanfare,
but with little senior management backing.
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Second, the exploitation approach (1984;209-12) involves the introduction of Japanese
techniques to improve productivity without any attempt to generate new forms of
employee commitment. Sethi et al (1984;209) see this as a common strategy within
the US, especially among un-unionised plants and where the locality is generally not
historically linked with the union movement. They state (1984;210):
The primary focus of productivity improvement relates to things that
can be done on the factory floor and involves streamlining the
production process, improving inventory controls, and following such
other Japanese techniques as 'Just-in-time' and 'Do It Right the First
Time'.
Third, the domestication approach (1984;212-20) is employed where US firms suffer
competition from Japanese capital. The form this takes varies from poor quality to
pressure for joint ventures with Japanese inward investors. The result is to adopt
aspects of the Japanese model which are not just concerned with productivity as such,
but also introduce ways of generating employee commitment.
Finally, the indigenous approach (1984;220-4) rejects the view that Japanese practices
are being adopted. They write (1984;220) that:
A number of US corporations have long followed management and
employee relations practices that bear a striking resemblance to those
associated with the Japanese companies.
These companies are often viewed as the exemplars of good US capitalism, with
strong paternalist employee relations, but Sethi et al (1984;222-3) do not share this
view. They argue that at core these firms still remain exploitative and manipulative.
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The first implication of these categorisations is that the typologies for local and
Japanese firms are different, reinforcing the idea of the uniqueness of Japanese
capital. Thus, in the case studies within this research we can expect that, even if there
are differences between the Japanese firms, a greater difference will exist between
them and the European firm. The great advantage of these categorisations is that they
provide an explanation for differences between cases by providing a generalised
framework for integrating strategy with the social and economic environment in which
the plant is located.
Another much quoted discussion of forms of 'Japanisation', using rather different
categories, has been developed in Britain, by Ackroyd et al (1988). They distinguish
between direct, mediated (I and II), and permeated or full 'Japanisation'.
First, they suggest that 'Direct Japanisation' (1988; 16-7) occurs where Japanese firms
undertake direct investment into the UK. This is likely to be an exemplorary form of
Japanisation because of the ownership, yet at the same time, because most
investments are greenfield start-ups, they may not provide reliable guides to measure
local forms of change, characteriseci as Japanisation. Moreover, Ackroyd et al
(1988; 17) emphasise that such firms represent only a small proportion of overall
direct inward investment to the UK, and go on to suggest that:
If 'Direct Japanisation' is to be the researchers' analytical focus of
attention then the evidence suggests that this is not at present of great
significance in contemporary Britain.
Thus they tend to dismiss this form of Japanisation as rather irrelevant, unlike Sethi
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et al (1984), although they admit that in the future the growth of such investment may
change the relative worth of studying Japanese subsidiaries. However, their comment
is ill thought out as a guide to what to research, because the study of such Japanese
owned local plants illuminates the conditions workers must endure in such plants as
well as their connections with local industry, and thus provide a marker against which
to measure the other forms of so called 'Japanisation'.
Second, 'Mediated Japanisation' (style I) (1988;17-8) concerns local companies that
adopt Japanese practices either in the form of sdective bits to be inte,rated with
existing methods or as "more comprehensive change encompassing both employment
and working practices" (1988;17). However in this connection they emphasise that
many practices adopted as Japanese have little history in Japan (such as pendulum
arbitration) and others prevalent in Japan are "conspicuous by their absence" in
Britain (1988; 18). It is noteworthy, however, that in this connection Ackroyd et aT
(1988) quote plants of Japanese origin to prove their case, thus blurring their own
distinction between this approach and the Direct one.
Their third pattern, 'Mediated Japanisation' (style II) (1988;18-9) is akin to Sethi et
al's (1984) indigenous approach but with the added dimension that these local
practices are introduced under the guise of Japanisation. This is exemplified by the
auto industry, although Ackroyd et aT (1988; 19) note that according to Marsden et aT
(1985):
Within the British car industry there has been no major attempt to copy
the system of labour relations characteristic of Japanese firms and
indeed, its feasibility and! or desirability is doubted.
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Ackroyd et al point to the fact that many of the changes which have been justified by
the rhetoric of Japanisation were brought in under conditions of crisis within
companies and enterprises. A significant objective was to create a committed and
involved workforce through changing labour attitudes. It should be noted, however,
that it is not clear how successfully Ackroyd et al have disentangled the facade of
'Japanisation' from examples of the practical implementation of selected Japanese
techniques.
Fourth, they refer to 'Permeated or Full Japanisation' (1988; 19-20) to identify a
reverse model of development in which British structures and practices start to
emulate those in Japan. This viewpoint is evidenced in Dore's early (1973) and more
recent (1989a) work, as well as, more problematically, in much of the Cardiff
Business School literature. However, given the holistic definition of transfer posited
by Dore it is little wonder that Ackroyd et al (1988;20) find little evidence of this
form of Japanisation.
These categorisations indicate different forms and degrees of influence of Japanese
capitalism within the west. At a more sophisticated level, they also identify choices
of approach towards changing indigenous customs and practices in the west.
However, these typologies tend to assume a clear-cut Japanese model arising from the
'unique' and 'inherently superior' managerial practices of Japanese multinationals.
These practices appear to be seen as the components of a coherent, static and closed
system, which is then used as a benchmark against which to measure convergence
or approximation by indigenous enterprises. Finally, divergences from the model tend
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to be construed as compromises forced by the intransigence of indigenous institutional
complexes or entrenched business practices. The analysis of Japanese transplants in
the electronics sector seeks to escape from these assumptions by building on direct
empirical research which treats aspects of the Japanese model as a checklist for
observation, but does not presume that these features will be present or that they will
cluster as the models imply.
The implication of these typologies for this thesis is threefold. First, the
environmental context of labour and product markets in which the firms operate need
to be considered, as these will impact on the particular menu of practices used in the
case plants. Second, the most important criterion for determining the extent of
Japanisation is the form of ownership, so that the Japanese firms will better exemplify
Japanisation than non-Japanese firms, given the same environmental context. Third,
there is a unilinear pattern where Japanese practices are brought in as best practice,
and that because of the different context in the UK, the full-blown importation of
Japanisation will thus be rare. This thesis, will develop a critique of such typologies
through an analysis of the labour process in the case-study plants.
Business economic studies of Japanisation
Some studies of overseas investment by business economists have focused specifically
on categorising that which is transferable from Japan. Dunning (1986) argued that the
existing competitive advantages of Japanese firms were largely ownership and location
specific - consisting of manufacturing capability, integrated supplier relations and a
cooperative and willing workforce in Japan - and therefore, transfer of comparative
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advantage may be difficult. Nevertheless, Dunning concluded that transferability of
manufacturing, labour and supplier competitive advantages were achievable, largely
because of the location of transplants on 'greenfield sites'. Dunning (1986;165) also
added that another:
reason may be that over the past ten years the industrial relations
climate has, for the most part, improved.
Another commentator, Trevor, followed a somewhat similar trajectory from an
emphasis on uniqueness to a focus on possibilities for transfer. Thus Trevor (1983)
divided practices into 'hard' systems (technology, products) and 'soft' systems (social
relations, education, conscience). He concluded that, although overall transferability
was possible, Japanese managers were reluctant to engage in multinationalisation
because of the different 'soft' systems in the west and a cultural insularity among
Japanese. Thus, Japanese capital was caught between the necessity to engage in direct
investment in Europe and the cultural inheritance of insularity.
However, White and Trevor (1983), in another text which showed how British
managers emulate Japanese employment practices, inadvertently demonstrated that
British workers were willing to adopt Japanese working practices, such as flexibility
(1983; 127-8), but were not given the compensatory benefits received by Japanese blue
collar workers in like plants, namely: life time employment, fringe benefits and
seniority based wages. This suggests that selected transferability of practices which
would ensure work intensity is possible.
Finally, five years later Trevor (1988) was far more convinced of the ability of the
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Japanese to be 'successful' in direct investment in Britain. In this study he focused
on the competitive advantages of Toshiba which, he argued, provided four 'soft'
systems: vision, leadership, pragmatism and the right people (1988;234), which, he
claimed, "had been the hallmark of the best Japanese practice since the [Second
World] war" (1988;233).
These business economic studies of transplants have seen the exportation of practices
from Japan as straight transfers. Abo (1990), however, introduced a contrast between
'adoption'(straight transfer) and 'adaption' (customising Japanese practices for local
conditions) by overseas manufacturing subsidiaries. His research findings lead him
to conclude that certain features are easier than others to adopt. 'What lie calls the
fruits or results of Japanese labour management relations, such as production
technology, are more easily adopted than people related practices. However, where
a higher degree of reliance on workers is needed (in terms of skills, quality
consciousness, etc) more people-related Japanese practices are adopted. For Abc, this
is characteristic of auto factories but not of television assembly, because the latter
does not require committed workers, who would exercise diligence in trusted
positions, where they enjoy a degree of autonomy.
These differing arguments focus on the practices used by Japanese multinationals in
their transplant operations. As such, they suggest how and why some practices are
used within the UK manufacturing subsidiaries and why other practices are not.
However, they do not really provide a methodological framework for the analysis of
such patterns because they avoid discussions of the nature of the political and
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economic relations - the political economy - which conditions management policies
in Japan itself, and provide little analysis of the complexities of the political economy
within which the subsidiaries are located, except at a level of generality which is
potentially misleading. Moreover, except for the work of Abo (1990), these studies
give little consideration of the reasons for differences between overseas subsidiaries.
This kind of work shows that Japanese overseas plants are managed based on what
is needed to be transferred to make the local plant profitable. In other words, instead
of 'Japanisation' there is selected use of Japanese management practices to 'solve'
local problems where they are applicable. As a result practices differ between
industries and even between companies, although such authors tend to concentrate on
the former differentiation. The problem with this work is that all discussions are
about Japanese management being proactive in the employment relationship over local
managers, workers and unions, something which needs redressing within this thesis.
The implication of this approach to understanding Japanese transplants for this study
is to consider the terrain between pressures for centralised or localised control of the
plants within a multinational context. Within this, the number and role which
expatriate managers play within the cases may be seen as important indicators of
where control lies. Moreover, there are a set of issues around how far this corporate
control can be seen as strategic or merely reactive to local conditions and markets.
The Cardiff Business School approach to 'Japanisation'
Tumbull (1986) is credited with being the first academic to use the term
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'Japanisation', at least in the context which it is now commonly used in the UK. This
was while he was still at Warwick University, though he moved to Cardiff Business
School soon after, and this is now the centre for studies of 'Japanisation' in the UK,
measured both in terms of output and research staff. Turnbull (1987;2) argues that
to understand the significance and transferability of Japanese management practices
research must be concentrated on non-Japanese firms claiming to adopt such
practices. Thus, he studied a part of Lucas where they tried to introduce a JIT
(Just-in-Time) system. He does not provide an analysis either of Japanese companies
or overseas plants owned by the Japanese, but rather assumes that such companies
have just-in-time management.
Oliver and Wilkinson (1988) develop a more complex argument than that of Tumbull,
though they too focus on the tension between JIT, as an assumed feature of Japanese
production, and existing patterns of social relations within the British workplace.
Their starting point is that work practices in Japan are so different that the process
of 'Japanisation' cannot be seen as a generalised process of transfer but must be
understood in terms of an analysis of specific constellations of managerial processes
and practices implemented in particular circumstances. Against this background, their
key claim is that (1988;3):
The evidence we have collected suggests British industry is undergoing
a fundamental transformation, the nature of which is neatly captured
by the term 'Japanisation'.3
Oliver and Wilkinson (1992) are more equivocal about the success of Japanisation
practices than the authors were in 1988. This equivocation stems from a second
survey, issued four years later than the one used as the empirical substantiation for
their claim for Japanisation. The latter survey showed less use of, and less successful
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This claim is, however, elaborated in a quite complex manner (1988;29-43) by
arguing that JIT, as the core technique of Japanese management, creates a set of
mutual dependencies between labour and capital at the level of the firm. Such
dependencies arise from the devolved process of decision-making within the
enterprise, but this also means that there is an incentive for management to integrate
workers into the on-going process of change.
This integration supports a flexibility in production which can be responsive to market
needs as well as meeting scheduling requirements. Central to the JIT practice is
'stockless' production (Wilkinson and Oliver; 1988;48). The significance of this is
that the absence of a stock carry-over makes management dependent for output on
workers who do not make mistakes and who complete work on time. At the same
time, workers are dependent on management for employment and income and, it is
claimed, more satisfactory work relations (Oliver and Wilkinson;1989).
Overall this means that the integration of work as well as supply relations makes both
the workforce and suppliers dependent on managerial discretion. At the same time,
management is unable to substitute different elements of the production process
because of the high degree of integration - thus Oliver and Wilkinson emphasise that
there is mutual dependency.
application in, so called Japanese practices than the earlier survey. However, they
argue that this merely slows down the timetable for the Japanisation of British
industry, rather than lead them to question the basis of their analysis.
31
In this literature the term 'Japanisation' has become a label for the successful
introduction of this system of production relations. According to Oliver and
Wilkinson, it is a process which involves both internal and external dependencies.
The key implication of this argument is that accounts which refer only to the transfer
of specific managerial techniques and work practices, without addressing the
conditions which may nurture or subvert co-operation and support dependency, are
inadequate and misunderstand the process of Japanisation.
Despite the attractiveness of this mote compe'x e 	 cteriaüon, 1tfl Tiet tr%e
labour into the analysis of Japanisation, as represented in production relations, there
remain a number of serious problems with the Oliver and Wilkinson thesis. Pang and
Oliver (1988) focuses on life time employment, seniority based wages, in-house
continuous training, company-based welfare schemes, enterprise unions, and quality
oriented production-methods (quality circles, total quality and just-in-time). What this
leaves out of the account are the various mixes of such features found in different
firms and sectors4 , but more importantly, the fact that the bulk of the workforce, in
small and medium sized enterprises, fall outside this pattern of core employment and
innovative work practices.
Second, this characterisation of the Japanese model of production organisation and its
institutional and cultural supports suggests a highly problematical yardstick for
' Storey (1985) argued that the essential process of management is that of making choices
between competing alternatives, and that the final choice is contingency, neither
strategic nor static. Thus, a list of practices does not really explain management itself.
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assessing the activities of transplants and adopters. By identifying a uniform and
coherent bundle of Japanese management innovations it tends to imply that the
transplants must be very close to the real Japanese model, whilst other enterprises
which seek to adopt Japanese methods can be assessed against the yardstick of the
transplants.
Thirdly, there is a major methodological problem which reinforces this process,
namely the heavy reliance of Oliver and his colleagues on questionnaire data to locate
the presence or absence of different components of the bundle of management
innovations. Using this research method does not allow the researcher to discriminate
between management rhetoric and reality, and tends to run together enthusiasms,
proposals, plans and successful implementations. It also tends to treat the various
components of such innovation in isolation, despite their concern to emphasise the
interconnections and inter-dependencies between them.
Fourthly, the one-sided characterisation of Japanese practice in Japan is combined
with the way in which this practice acts as a yardstick so it is implied that Japanese
capital is superior to western capital, in ways which are to be admired and copied by
the west. There is an emphasis on the benign and beneficial character of Japanese
production methods and employment practices, though these may be laced with a
certain equivocation in acknowledgement of the critiques of employee subordination
and management by stress.
Finally, the very characterisation of the model and its use as a yardstick of
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Japanisation implies that non-Japanese firms in competition with Japanese enterprises
will be pressured to move towards the "good practice" of the transplants. This not
only treats Japanese theory and practice as homogenous but also ignores the
possibility that such indirectly induced changes may have no parallels in Japan. This
again underlines the narrowness of a conception which focuses on the transfer of
Japanese practices.
The Cardiff thesis is clearly an important contribution to the debate within the UK
about Japanisation, so that their core contentions must be closely assessed within this
research. In particular, the existence or otherwise of JIT, quality management and the
particular sets of mutual dependencies between labour and capital need to be
explored. This needs to be done through a careful consideration of each side's
perspective on relations within the plants.
A context for Japanisation diagnoses: more general arguments about the
flexibilit y of labour and production
A key feature of the literature on 'Japanisation' is its emphasis on the necessity and
the ability of workers to adopt flexible working practices, but in this respect this
literature converges with several other sets of arguments and debates about the
character of contemporary changes in work organisation; in particular those
surrounding the notion of flexible specialisation and the model of the flexible firm.
Both these discourses emphasise the importance of flexible workers to facilitate
flexible production to serve diverse and changing markets. Both the flexible
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specialisation and the flexible firm analyses assert that there are changes in world
markets which mean that traditional, Fordist, production methods have become
inappropriate. Instead, the market has become so fragmented that small batches of
production are needed, responding to changing and fluctuating market demands. This
in turn requires a more diverse and (at least in part) multi-skilled workforce, and a
considerable degree of organisational flexibility. Whereas the flexible firm model is
basically concerned with the ways in which these features are attained, through the
reorganisation of relations between the labour market and enterprises and the
extension of segmented labour markets, the flexible specialisation approach
emphasises inter-relations between enterprises and the ways in which these can form
mutually supportive geographical clusters.
This section will focus specifically on the flexible firm model, to illustrate the. manner
in which the theme of flexibility has been pursued beyond the literature on
'Japanisation'. Moreover, because this model has been very influential among British
commentators and managers, at least at the level of rhetoric, it deserves to be
considered in its own right in relation to the empirical evidence collected for the
thesis.
Atkinson, credited with popularising the flexible firm model, defines some very
specific and reasonably detailed structural specifications for a firm to be fully flexible.
Thus (1985;3):
The twin purpose (of the periphery) is to protect the core group from
numerical employment fluctuations while conducting the host of
non-specific and subsidiary activities which all organisations require
and generate. The core group is required to be functionally flexible;
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the numerical flexibility secured from the use of peripheral groups
provides the core group with employment security as the basis of their
functional flexibility in the face of change.
He gives three reasons why pressure has come about to encourage such changes in
work arrangements (1985;7-9): the recession; accelerating technical change; and a
reduction in overall working time of employees. There are also three factors
encouraging a move towards flexibility (1985;9-1O): high unemployment has reduced
the need for labour hoarding due to fears of skill shortages; job seekers, and even
existing employees in small firms, are more prepared to accept poorer working
conditions; and industrial relations are going in favour of management as union
influence declines. He then identifies some contradictory consequences of these
developments as (1985;4):
The impact on employees is likely to be divisive ... We envisage no
necessary incompatibility between management and union aims for
core workers, however.
This results, then, in a number of divisions of labour, not by department, but by
"functional flexibility" and "numerical flexibility". Numerical flexibility is not an
appendage but integral to the overall model. What was community now becomes open
division; the core elite is divided against, and stands above, the periphery and the
different forms of non-core worker compete with each other. Functional flexibility is
enabled because the cream of the 'skilled' and 'intelligent' are the only ones allowed
in.
The Atkinson model of the flexible firm, composed of core and peripheral
workforces, has been strongly attacked by radical critics. Pollert in particular has
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developed both an empirical and a conceptual critique which leads her to conclude
that the significance of the 'flexible firm' comes only from its role in a "very
powerful ideological offensive" (1987a;38). Pollert highlights a range of empirical
shortcomings, including the conflation of different sorts ofjob insecurity and different
sectoral trends, a misreading of varied and shifting management tactics as coherent
management strategies, and an over-optimistic characterisation of the conditions of
core workers. For example, she identifies problems in trying to understand the
character of skill and job satisfaction among core workers. It seems clear that there
is no adequate empirical basis or theoretical reason to equate flexibility with 'enriched
workers'. Pollert (1987b) also indicates that where flexible employment practices do
exist it is often the women who experience insecure peripheral jobs, so that
contemporary changes in employment patterns are strongly gendered. This issue is
particularly relevant to this thesis, with the case studies having high proportions of
women on the shopfloor. Having reviewed the empirical shortcomings of the Atkinson
argument she concludes (1988;16) that:
.it does not provide evidence for the growth of the 'flexible firm', in
spite of attempts to make the facts fit the model.
Pollert then turns to conceptual criticisms (17-21). First she emphasises that the core!
periphery contrast is not new. Furthermore traditional ideas of skills are male
dominated and merely continue old divisions among workers. Finally, she discusses
the analytical pitfalls in mixing description, prescription and prediction. In this
connection she argues that (1988;18):
A duality between sweeping generalisation of a trend, on the one hand,
and immediate qualification - bordering on retraction - characterises
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the model from the start.
Overall Pollert (198Th) argues that there is no foundation to Atkinson's claim that
there is evidence that the 'flexible firm' is already in existence in Britain. However,
she does believe it has a strong persuasive power with managements, leading them
to explore ways of moving towards the practices it extols and to legitimate things
such as unemployment in such terms (1987a). Thus she suggests (1991;24-31) that
there is a political ideology behind this interpretation of changes, which operates to
cover the realities of worsening labour conditions under a facade of (199 l;30):
.post-industrial visions of progress and functional equilibrium.
Hyman develops a related argument in his critiques. Firstly, (1988;50) he raises
questions about the extent and the coherence of the practical implementation of the
dramatic changes in employment relations envisaged in the flexible firm model. He
emphasises that the internal coherence of management processes cannot be assumed
a priori. Indeed, he notes that even Piore and Sabel (1984; 14) agree that:
Many firms (even without government intervention) would have
trouble mapping a comprehensive strategy for the future.
Finally, Atkinson himself acknowledges that (1985;3):
In our view such (numerical + functional flexibility) changes areas yet
pragmatic and opportunist, rather than driven by conscious strategy.
Hyman suggests that underlying this are two problems for management. Firstly, there
are divisions within management structure by levels and departments. Secondly,
consent and control are opposite poles which cannot be fully reconciled. The result
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is that "there is no one best way and all are partial failures" (Hyman;1988; 51).
Another line of criticism developed by Hyman is that even for those fortunate enough
to be core skilled workers inside the company "the fortress may be a prison"
(1988;53). He argues that this is because when some firms go under, some workers
are marginalised in the labour market and have difficulty finding a new job, because
these workers have firm specific skills and also because younger cheaper workers
become available.
Thus Hyman posits a different picture to that provided by Atkinson, where, instead
of firms becoming flexible under pressure, they just go under (1985;9). The workers
in such enterprises he calls 'endangered primary workers'. Though he sees forms of
functional flexibility existing in company hierarchies between levels of managers
(1988;56), less powerful groups of workers are vulnerable as fashions in the product
market change. In summary he suggests that (1985;ll):	 -
In short, the main effect of the recession on primary workers is not
through changed labour markets conditions; the reserve army of
unemployed does not act as a competitive force undermining
established conditions. Rather, it is changed product markets (or
politically defined proxies in the public sector) which generate a
(perceived) threat of job loss through closure or radical contraction of
operations.
Finally Hyman (1991;261) suggests that in so far as it is possible to say that there has
been a shift in the 1980s which adds up to a fundamental change in the nature of the
employment relationship, it is the result of global shifts of markets and capital. An
important element in this has been the export of Japanese capital, and a part of this
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influence, Hyman argues, arises from (1991;263) "the impact of production strategies
characteristic of major Japanese companies". He then goes on to list elements such
as small batch, quality orientated production (1991;263-4). However, he also
emphasises that, when these elements are related to issues of flexibility and the debate
about fundamental or incremental change, it is important to avoid what he calls the
"fetishism" of the sort of holistic theorising which is represented by models of the
flexible firm or Japanisation (1991;281).
Within the consumer electronics manufacturing industry there are clearly issues c
segmented labour markets with strong gender divis5ons. GJVeD bt piopo..rwis of
Japanisation and the flexible firm claim that these practices represent new forms of
employment relations within the UK, the thesis must address how far any practices
found are changing, especially with regard to the specific place of women within the
local labour markets, and how skill formation within the plants Fits into a
segmentation analysis. Moreover, this analysis needs to beplaced within a context of
the product market-place and how the UK plants fit into the overall supply strategy
of the multinationals.
SECTION B: REESTABLISHING THE RESEARCH AGENDA
Japan ranks third to the US and UK as the largest overseas investor (Ozawa;1991),
indicating that the interest in Japanese direct investment capital should be kept in
proportion. It is ironic that the two countries which have stronger international
investment records are the same ones which are the most preoccupied with the 'threat'
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of Japanisation. Thus, in the UK, indigenous multinationals remain largely
unconsidered whilst there was near paranoia about US corporations in the 1960s and
1970s and obsessive focus on Japanese inward investment in the 1980s and early
1990s. To keep the implications of this growing Japanese investment in proportion,
without overstating its significance, it is important to consider how to characterise this
development and to question whether this new wave of investment has any particular
and novel characteristics.
This section is concerned to draw out the key implications of the literature review in
Section A, to highlight the problems with the substantive claims and areas of major
omission in the established analyses of 'Japanisation'. This review not only challenges
the validity of these models of 'Japanisation' but also outlines an argument for a
rather different approach and method of analysis which would be a more appropriate
basis for exploring the nature of Japanese multinationalisation. This will then form
the basis for the analysis and arguments developed in the substantive chapters of the
thesis.
Japan and Japanisation
An initial but serious problem facing discussions of Japanisation has been the taken
for granted nature of much of the characterisation of work and employment in Japan,
to the point where 'Japanisation' debates often appear to lack interest in controversies
over the features of Japanese capitalism. This in itself would be less of a problem if
the literature restricted itself to discussions of Japanese overseas operations, although
the term 'Japanisation' would then be misleading and ought to be replaced by a more
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neutral characterisation in terms of the operations of Japanese MNC's (Multinational
Corporations). However, 'Japanisation' is used by these writers in order to make
explicit the relationship between indigenous Japanese practices and their transfer to
the west, which then react with indigenous western practices. Japanese capital is seen
as needing to transfer management practices in order to maintain competitive
advantage and their investment is seen as contingent on some measure of success in
this transfer. From this point of view, therefore, the study of Japanisation requires
an understanding of managerial operations and styles in Japan.
Unfortunately those publications and papers which claim that Japanisation is taking
place in the UK invariably offer a one-sided account of Japanese employment
relations, which lacks any meaningful critical perspective and relies on secondary
data, and some simply ignore Japan entirely. For example Oliver and Wilkinson
(1988;7) introduce their chapter on practice in Japan by referring only to non-
Japanese managerialist authors such as Pascale and Athos (1982), Wolf (1985) and
Schonberger (1982), while their limited references to radical writers such as Kamata
(1983) are marginalised in their overall discussion (1988;24).
Thus, where texts on Japan are used, right-wing writers, who are often management
consultants, reinforce a view of the unique superiority of Japanese business, and
stress its basis in cooperative labour management relations. Japanese business is set
up as an ideal, on the basis of either poor sociology or wishful thinking on the part
of proponents of 'Japanisation'.
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In the light of these criticisms one research strategy would be to develop a much
more extensive and empirically-based critical assessment of the operation of Japanese
companies both in Japan and abroad. Indeed, such a research strategy would be
essential to fully justify the notion of 'Japanisation'. For the critics of this notion
there is, however, an alternative conceptual and research strategy which comes closer
to the limited time and resources available for PhD research. This is to focus directly
upon an investigation and analysis of the management policies and labour process
within Japanese branch plants within the UK.
Such an approach follows from the emphasis on the overseas operations of Japanese
and other MNCs, and is the strategy adopted in this thesis. This does not preclude the
possibility that research on the Japanese companies' overseas operations might offer
insights into the distinctive character of Japanese capitalism, especially as the research
gives attention to the relationship between HQs and branch plants, but it clearly
focuses attention on the transplant operations of these multinational corporations in
their own right. The Japanisation and flexibility debates have borrowed from practices
seen as existing in Japan, but essentially they are concerned with identifying whether
there are new forms of labour management relations within the UK. This thesis, is
primarily concerned with critically evaluating the particular forms of relations claimed
by these theories of change. As such, it is not necessary to analyze the particular sets
of capitalist relations in Japan. Further, Chapter Five will demonstrate that through
strong centralised control, the Japanese case plants in the UK are essentially
dominated by 'Japanese styles' of management.
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Industrial sectors
Japanese direct investment in the UK has generally been seen as a response to EC
trade barriers and tariffs, but beyond such statements proponents of Japanisation and
flexibility seldom analyze the differences between industrial sectors or product
markets occupied by the inward investors. By contrast Wood (1991) has questioned
whether JIT practices developed in the Japanese auto industry can be used to develop
a general characterisation of Japanese production practices. As Abo (1984 and 1990)
and Elger (1990) indicate, it is essential to draw connections between specific types
of markets and products and the production processes dependent upon those sales.
Proponents of Japanisation have over generalised from specific product markets and
areas of production, allowing sweeping generalisations about what are sectorally
contingent patterns of employment and forms of production management.
Many Post Fordist writers argue that there are no mass markets left and that
specialised, flexible production is now common throughout all production. SimiIary,
the proponents of Japanisation suggest that distinctions between the production
imperatives of different products are becoming obsolete, as JIT, or lean production,
is now a generalisable innovation. However, while it may not be easy to draw a
distinction between the mass markets for small hatchback cars and 14" colour
television sets, it should be clear that these differ from markets for high performance
sports cars and 42" specialist colour monitors. Similarly, there are important
differences in the production relevant characteristics of different products: for
example quality management is more important in the car than the television, as
refunds under guarantee may be conservatively estimated at 50 times greater for the
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car manufacturer than the television producer. Again, the number and size of
components in a car is much greater than in a television, effecting the importance of
stock management. Thus, distinctions between industrial sectors are essential for any
study of management practices.
Furthermore, there is room for differentiation not only between industrial sectors but
even within sectors, through price, image and product content, so that a 14" Sony
television is more expensive than an Hitachi of the same basic specifications. With
these considerations in mind, this thesis concentrates on one industrial sector, and is
thus able to explore (i) how differences in market positioning even within a sector can
effect the control of work, and (ii) whether liT and similar pcoduction ions ai
generalisable phenomena among Japanese multinationals beyond the motor sector.
Corporate structures and strategies
Studies of Japanese plants operating outside Japan have often been dvocei from any
examination of the overall organisation of Japanese multinationals. This precludes
analyses of the varied character of such relationships, as they may condition changes
in the labour process of transplant factories, and it also excludes any attention to the
ramifications of globalisation for the workers and unions in the home plants in Japan.
The studies by Trevor (1983) and Dunning (1986), however, did make connections
between the structures of Japanese conglomerates and their closely associated
(keiretsu) groupings of companies and the difficulties which these companies faced
when locating abroad, where they lacked the mutual support which arises from such
groupings. Proponents of 'Japanisation', though, have concentrated on the process of
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transfer, rather than the structures used. Thus, their analysis of the strategies of these
companies is restricted to the transfer and adaption of Japanese practices. They are
not concerned with issues of localisation, of the role and location of regional
headquarters, or how such decisions impact upon, or provide evidence for, the degree
of power indigenous managers have over the labour process.
Especially in the areas of study encompassing Japanisation, and similar variants of
flexibility theorising, there is a tendency to see managers as either incompetent
(British and western) or 'all seeing, all knowing' (Japanese and eastern). Quite apart
from the racist stereotyping in this approach, it is inaccurate. Instead, it seems more
appropriate to regard management as a learning process in which managements try
out specific techniques at certain times to cope with certain perceived problems. In
this view site managers are the practical foot-soldiers of capitalism, too busy fighting
or preparing to fight specific problems to think of global shifts or broader ideological
battles. If this is so, it is dangerous to imbue their actions with strategic significance,
when they are more like techniques used to solve certain problems. Moreover, it is
unwise to consider that such managerial techniques are anything other than temporary,
because the contradictory nature of management and changing circumstances lead to
repeated trial and error. This understanding of the dynamic and contradictory nature
of the process of learning to manage also suggests that the commitments of both
British and Japanese managers need to be looked at quite critically. They should not
simply be seen as enthusiastic proponents of Japanese practices (thus Japanisation),
because the British managers may not see their long-term career within one of these
firms, while Japanese managers may have distinctive priorities following their career
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trajectories back in Japan.
This research seeks to address these uncertainties and contradictions through a
focused and appropriate research methodology. Japanese managers at both the Japan
headquarters and the transplant sites were interviewed, and also UK managers,
supervisors, and workers as well as Japanese engineers and supervisors at the
transplant sites were interviewed. In these interviews with managers and engineers
questions about their personal careers, their attitudes to other groups, genders and
races, and about job content and control structures were asked. Moreover, although
the same people were seldom interviewed twice, at least a six month gap existed
between visits to the UK case plants, so that different vantage points on the process
of management and work experience were gained. In this way, this study seeks to
avoid the unilinear and sometimes static model of management portrayed by the
'Japanisation' school.
Localities and local labour markets
Garrahan and Stewart's (1991) study of Nissan in NE England showed that the local
labour market conditions of skill and unemployment were central to Nissan
management's policies of location, recruitment and labour control, as they selected
a factory location which offered an eager pool of unemployed male workers. Less
critical studies, typified by those done within Cardiff Business School, tend to pay
almost no attention to location specific issues in their claims for 'Japanisation'. Such
an omission is regrettable when one considers that Japanese companies have tended
to locate factories in certain areas of the UK, forming clusters of Japanese
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investment.
Furthermore, though it has been a common decision for Japanese multinationals (apart
from financial institutions which concentrate in London) to invest in areas of high
unemployment, this still leaves choices between areas to locate. Another consideration
in such locational decisions has been the high UK government incentives for
investment into certain depressed areas. Nevertheless, labour markets are not static
and an area of high unemployment may develop skill shortages in areas relevant to
specific companies, a feature which could be exacerbated where there are high
concentrations of Japanese plants requiring similar types of labour. 	 Such
considerations make it important to situate the different companies in terms of their
local labour markets, and the ways in which state policies and local labour markets
have evolved.
Discussions of Japanisation have tended to ignore the impact of time, rather implying
that through the careful setting up of plants, with screening of recruits eager for
employment and extensive training and indoctrination of employees, the initial
conditions of greenfield sites will remain unchanged. However, this ignores changes
in the social context in which the plants are located. Japanese plants are not, and
cannot be, closed systems, as some 'Japanisation' models dictate.
Gender and the sexual division of labour
A remarkable omission of the Cardiff brand of 'Japanisation' has been the absence
of any real analysis of gendered divisions of employment within the Japanese plants.
Within car assembly plants mainly men are employed as direct labour, whilst
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televisions are made mainly by women. Moreover, the types of jobs women do are
different from those done by men even within the assembly of televisions.
'Japanisation' models do not explain such differences, perhaps because they are
regarded as unproblematic because they are thought to have no bearing on what the
'Japanisation' models are showing. The problem with this is that a consideration of
Japanese owned plants in the UK shows such gendered divisions as a most striking
feature, which at the very least needs working into any analysis of recruitment
policies and dependency relations (for an exceptional study which does consider this
see Morgan and Sayer 1988).
At the most such considerations render the notion of 'Japanisation' irrelevant because
an understanding of differing management policies to maintain control of production
would have to address the subordination of women workers, the high levels of labour
turnover among young women, sexual politics, and the gendered character of skill
formations and reaffirmations. In other words, the complexities of managing different
types of workers, the opportunities and limits to the control of gender divisions and
the relationship between these and the external labour market, may have far more
impact upon both the ability to gain efficient output and the experience of work of
individuals in these plants than forms of ownership does. Quite possibly the issues of
involvement, stock and quality control focused on by the 'Japanisation' literature may
pale into insignificance compared to such issues.
In view of these features of the gendered character of work in electronics, the sexual
divisions of labour, and how these are experienced within the workplace are discussed
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as an integral part of this thesis. In particular it will show that sexual divisions have
a contradictory character, so that women both assist in their subordination and
challenge managerial prerogatives. However, although 'Japanisation' models can be
marginalised because they do not address gender issues, it would also be
inappropriate to replace one with the other as the focus of the thesis, and the major
concern is to look critically at the claims about management, flexibility and the labour
process found in the 'Japanisation' literature, while noting how gender gives a
distinctive character to work organisation and job hierarchies.
Trade unions and their traditions
A major implication of many discussions of 'Japanisation' is that trade unions lack
an effective role within 1980s and 1990s Britain. Although debates on the demise of
current forms of trade unionism within Britain provide reinforcement for such claims,
Japanisation models appear to assert that unions become irrelevant to everyone as
managers use schemes of more direct involvement between workers and the
employer. The power of management is mediated through the need to involve workers
to a higher degree than is either possible or necessary with 'antagonistic' trade
unions. Thus, this process is quite separate from union decline due to the
restructuring of the economy and high unemployment, which informs debates within
mainstream industrial relations.
In this regard it is noteworthy that the studies which have informed the Cardiff
Business School model of 'Japanisation', and also Trevor's (1988) study of a
company council in Toshiba, are concerned almost exclusively with consumer
electronics companies. However, the fact that this industrial sector has little history
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of active trade unions has not generally been considered relevant to the Japanisation
model. Once this is recognised, it undermines the rather positive view of
'Japanisation' as something British labour should not fear.
The question, however, remains as to why the Japanese employers should want (a)
single union deals and (b) schemes for employee involvement, if conflict on a
collective basis is unlikely to occur within the consumer electronics sector? This
thesis will explore the rather unreniarkable reasons for such cscs.
single union deals are commonplace among Japanese firms, the degree of
encouragement given to workers to join such unions varies between companies.
Further, a single union deal does not in itself guarantee a single bargaining unit. This
thesis does not provide an in-depth analysis of involvement schemes, as their role
appears to be merely to provide information down the hierarchy and often involved
union representatives. Thus they are given limited attention because of their lack of
significance in understanding power relations within the workplace.
Indeed, one could argue that the Japanisation literature exhibits an over concentration
on 'the new', and that this, combined with over generalisation and over
simplification, results in assumptions about labour relations which are misleading.
This thesis provides a study of such relations based upon a rather different framework
derived from radical labour process theories, to portray a complex, often
contradictory set of relations, where unions struggle for position, much as they have
always done.
51
Methodolo2ical weaknesses of 'Japanisation'
The 'evidence' for Japanisation has mainly come from interviews with a small
number of managers and/or questionnaires distributed to workers. However, where
the research concerns complex social relations and experiences, questionnaires can
be quite misleading. For example, it would be difficult to explain why there are no
JIT practices in the plants researched here except by case study interviewing or
participant observation and discussion.
The interviewing of managers is useful within certain limits, if it is repeated and
extensive in terms of time and number of managers, as this makes it possible to gain
a clear idea of intentions, plans and statistical inforniatioc'. The hicnis of s.ch
methods remain that, without cross checking with wc>rkem and' 	 on, a
and even false picture can be painted. This is not to say that managers would
deliberately lie; rather they might think that the researcher who only speaks to them
is eager to hear how clever the Japanese way is, and how, particularly the UK
managers, have struggled to make this company different from the company they had
previously worked for. It was found that managers would concede points and seek to
justify their actions where workers had talked of conflict or management strategies.
The author's experience of research in Japan also helped in this regard, especially as
most British managers claimed that the author knew more about their operations in
Japan than they did. This helped personal credibility as well as sharpening the general
honesty of their answers.
Thus it is hoped that, through the use of a case study method, we are able to gain a
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greater depth of understanding of the real operation of transplants in this sector than
the proponents of 'Japanisation'. A considerable depth of understanding was gained
by extensive interviewing at different times in the production year with people from
various though comparable jobs at each of the case-study sites.
CONCLUSION
It has been suggested that the claims subsumed under the notion of 'Japanisation',
which highlight the development of new forms of labour-management relations, rely
too heavily on selective evidence, simple generalisations, aria un1ounieA asseflions.
Studies of the process of multinationalisation have concentrated on the transfer of
practices from Japan to overseas subsidiaries. These studies tend to be rather
unquestioning about practices in Japan, assuming check lists of activities against
which to compare the performance of subsidiaries. In all these discussions there are
two common threads which form the core of these studies: the uni&i'eaz dfrectioe of
economic development and Japan as the starting point. Thus, any convergence which
may take place will be of western countries moving towards Japan. Moreover, these
directions, although couched in differing ways, rely crucially on compliant workers,
willing to accept orders without question and managers who are then free to control
the detail of production. However, even in these accounts there is some asymmetry
of discussion, for while JIT depends on flexibility, flexibility does not depend on JIT.
Thus, Japanisation may be divided into two stages of implementation: gaining a
flexible workforce and then initiating Japanese production methods such as JIT.
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One major way of developing a critique of these models would be to study the nature
of political economy in Japan. Another approach is to question the nature of Japanese
competitive advantage by looking at how their multinationals actually operate
overseas. The latter is the strategy adopted in this thesis, with the objective of
providing a more accurate and sceptical analysis of many of the developments which
have elsewhere been characterised in terms of 'Japanisation' and flexibility. This will
be done through studying selected cases and by locating these case studies in relation
to wider corporate structures, sectoral specificities, local labour markets, gender
relations and forms of trade unionism, and by looking critically at claims for the
coherence and novelty of management practices. However, much of the subject matter
with which 'Japanisation' is concerned, such as innovations in work organisation and
production methods, the management of quality, recruitment patterns, and workers'
attitudes to management, unions and work, is important to consider. Although this
thesis will address wider issues which arise from the claims of the analysts of
'Japanisation', its focus is on the realities of work and employment within four case
study plants in the UK, three of which are Japanese owned.
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SECTION I:
CONTEXT
Section I sets the scene for the rest of the thesis by introducing the companies and the
case plants, and tracing the linkages between headquarters and UK plants. The focus
is on how the multinationals operated and what the management structures were. The
intention is to provide a context in which to understand the labour process of each of
the cases by developing an analysis of the nature of the product market place, the
politics of corporate structure and the relationship between the internal workings of
the UK branch plants and the objectives of the conglomerates as a whole. This is
done through three chapters dealing, in turn, with: an 'Outline of the Case Studies',
'Market and Marketing Strategy' and 'Multinational Approach to Corporate Control'.
There are pressures in the way the market for products changes and how the company
is positioned to deal with these changes. The whole process of multinational
investment in and into the west, with its comparatively higher wage costs than East
Asia, has been to respond to market conditions, such as growing restrictions on
lucrative markets. How the market is 'managed' directly impacts on the individual
worker because of the relations between selling in the market place and internal
corporate structures of control, which in turn affect workers in the UK plants through
the degree of autonomy given to local management to set conditions of work. These
controls involve both formal and informal processes, in which networks among
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expatriates are significant. In order to understand the differences between the cases
and to understand the complexities of problems facing management and opportunities
for union resistance, it is important to locate the production relations of each case
study within a set of pressures which impinge upon those relations. Thus, Chapter
Three explores the location, size and basic activities of the case plants within overall
corporate or conglomerate operations. Chapters Four and Five develop a theme that
the larger the contribution of the plant, in terms of output and supply to lucrative
markets, the more significant it will seem to the multinational top management, and
the greater dependence there may be on its continued success. More significantly,
these chapters trace the location of power within the case studies both within the
market place, and within each firm's 	 tinativ>al smcti.
through the transmission mechartiscn and the caCcice of coccc thec -&c & cocxg
tendency to centralise power within the cases, implyIng that the UK plants were
branch operations of the conglomerates with little autonomy. Much of this section
draws on experiences in Japan and interviews with executives of corporate
headquarters in the three Japanese cases.
This kind of contextualising analysis is not generally found within the 'Japanisation'
debate, except at the level of disintegrating markets, the starting point of the Post
Fordists. It is however, a feature of more economic based studies, such as by
Dunning (1986) and Abo (1990), explored in Chapter Two. Moreover, the following
three chapters do address issues of whether there were mass markets, whether the
transfer of practices from Japan was one way and whether there was a distinction
between European and Japanese style corporate control. All these features have been
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shown to be central claims of the proponents of either Japanisation or the uniqueness
of 'superior' Japanese capitalist management. In all these respects and in all the case
studies the situation will be shown to be far more complex and contradictory than
would be assumed under the Japanisation thesis.
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CHAPTER THREE
OUTLINE OF THE CASE STUDIES
IIURODUCTION
The primary objective of this chapter is to introduce the case studies by outlining their
location, the character of their workforce, the types of production they were engaged
in and the pattern of relations between local plants and central corporate management.
This will provide a context for the later discussion of particular sets of research
findings by providing a more rounded summary of the basic features of each research
site. This chapter will also consider some of the existing survey research on
electronics transplants and contrast this to this rather different research strategy,
which focuses upon systematic interviews with key management, union and employee
informants, supplemented with additional observation and conversations.
The first section of the chapter considers key features of the case-study plants,
including what they produced, the character of their workforces, their location and
aspects of their employee relations policies. The next section then places these plants
in their corporate context by considering key features of the parent companies and the
relationships between satellite plants and corporate headquarters. Finally there is a
review of existing attitude surveys of employees in electronics plants and a discussion
of the rather different research methods which were used to generate the research
reported in this thesis.
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PROFILE OF THE CASE PLANTS
The study focused on four case-study plants. Each was employed in television
manufacture, although as indicated below, there were differences in the range of
products produced, the ages of the plants and the ways in which the workforces were
divided along gender lines.
Whilst all the plants were primarily involved in television manufacture, in each case
there was some diversification in production as shown in table 1. In Koburg, in
addition to televisions, satellite receivers were being produced for BSB television. In
Koorki, televisions and micro-wave ovens were being produced. In Kokuda, only
televisions were produced, but a separate factory on the same site manufactured
television tubes for all European production plants. In Kohashi, micro-wave ovens
and video recorders were produced on the same site, but at separate factories. It
should be noted that, while the tube is the single most expensive component in a
television and certainly the most visible, tube making is a completely different process
to the assembly of television sets. Kokuda was the only plant where tube manufacture
was done on the same site. At the Koburg plant, the tube came from within the
group, whilst in the other two Japanese cases, tubes were bought from local suppliers,
a reflection of import restrictions specified in terms of local content requirements.
With the exception of television tube manufacture all the other activities in the plants
required assembly work of approximately similar skills and methods of working, so
there was a strong degree of homogeneity between and within the plants, even down
to seasonal variations in production, shown in table 2.
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Table 1: Production areas.
Koburg	 Koorki
	
Kokuda	 Kohashi
Primary output:	 TV
	
TV
	
TV
	
TV
assembly	 assembly	 assembly	 assembly
Other products	 satellite	 microwave TV tubes
	
VCRs and
receivers	 ovens	 microwave
ovens
(Source: various interviews with managers, 1989 and 1990)
Table 2 shows that all the plants had large variations in their weekly production
output, of between two and three tirne,s. This stri%cing 	 '	 c!e \.o
	 c)v1?1
changes in production, showing the full technical capacity of the plants were rarely
used, and when the machines did run at full capacity, many seasonal workers were
required to swell the ranks of direct employees to operate them. This issue will be
explored further in Chapters Six and Eight. While all the plants produced televisions
they differed in terms of their production capacities and in the extent to which they
served overseas markets. As table 2 shows, two of the firms, Koburg and Kokuda,
sent substantial proportions of their production overseas, but the larger Japanese plant
produced solely for the UK market. These export ratios indicated variations in
production because sets were customised for each market, as will be explored in
Chapter Four.
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Table 2: Weekly Production Output
Koburg	 Kooth
	
Jkua
	 KohashL
production capacity	 7-15000
	
5- 10000
	
6-18000
	
8-16000
export ratio	 50%
	
75%
	
0%
	
25%
(Source: interviews with production and personnel managers, 1989 and 1990)
Table 3 shows the employment of full time employees in each of the case plants and
indicates the division between direct and indirect employees on site. Direct employees
were those directly involved in manufacture or maintenance, the indirects being
managers, office workers and designers. Kokuda was the largest company in
employment terms, whilst Kohashi was little over hail the size. Significantly, although
Koburg and Koorki are similar in size' and in their proportions of directs to
indirects, the other two plants are quite different. Kokuda operated with a higher
proportion of direct workers than the others, despite its research and development
image, implying either a flatter management hierarchy or less direct supervision.
Kohashi, on the other hand, had a smaller proportion of direct employees, suggesting
that it was less efficient. The reasons for these variations will be shown in Chapter
Five.
'This similarity is important because in section III of the thesis comparisions will be
made of employees experiences and perceptions of work between Koburg and Koorki.
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total
direct
indirect
Percentage direct
Table 3: Size of workforce and proportion of direct workers, as at Oct-Dec,
1989.
Koburg	 Krki
	
1276	 1200
	
828	 782
	
448	 418
65%	 65%
Kokuda
1600
1200
400
75%
Kohashi
850
500
350
59%
(Source: interviews with personnel managers, 1989)
It will be evident from the data on the numbers of workers employed in television
assembly in these plants, shown in table 3, that levels of employment do not simply
reflect production capacity. However, this table does not show the employment of
casual and seasonal workers whose employment constantly varied in each of the plants
distorting these correlations, as will be detailed in Chapter Eight. However, variations
can be explained in terms of differences in the complexities of the sets, some degree
of differences in whether certain sub-assemblies were conducted on site or contracted
out, and the model of television being produced. Thus, Koburg and Kohashi tended
to concentrate on low budget sets, whereas Koorki and Kokuda emphasises more on
higher value and HiFi sets.
An important feature of the employment profile was the sexual division of labour in
which most managers were men and most workers were women. The character of
these divisions is explored later in the thesis, but here, the extent of employment can
be seen in following table:
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Table 4: Percentage of women workers
Koburg	 Kokuda	 Kohashi
Overall	 49%
	
51%
direct workers	 60%	 60%	 60%
	
60%
(Source: Interview with personnel managers, 1989)
These figures show that on the shopfloor most workers were women, especially
young women who had recently left school (the average age of employment in all the
plants was 22 to 26). However, these figures disguise areas where there were much
higher concentrations of women workeis; cot eampe, 'ri OTit pT1
sub-assembly area 75 percent of workers were women.
Another important feature of the case-study plants, alongside their product mixes and
structures of employment, was their distinctive geographical locations. As Garrahan
and Stewart (1991), Taylor (1986) and others indicate, Japanese multinationals tend
to locate plants in areas of high unemployment and vulnerable labour. For example
Garrahan and Stewart (1991) argue that Nissan's location of its assembly plant in the
North East was strongly influenced by two factors: the availability of a skilled, cheap
and largely unemployed labour supply for which the offer of secure employment
would guarantee a degree of compliance; and financial and rhetorical support for
Nissan's brand of industrial relations management from both local and national
government. It is therefore appropriate to identify the distinctive geographical and
labour market settings of the case study plants in this research.
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The Koburg television plant was located on a long road flanked by numerous medium
sized manufacturing units. The road led into a coastal town in the south of England,
which was dominated by Naval supply activities. Koburg was a large employer in the
locality but still outside the top five employers and, thus, did not command a
powerful position within the local economy. Even 10 years previously, when the plant
employed several thousand workers, Koburg was still not the biggest employer in the
town. However, with the contraction of the Navy and the closure of numerous small
businesses the labour market was becoming, month by month progressively slacker.
A small amount of employment in the town came from fishing but light industry and
commercial (retail, banking, etc) capital dominated. 'flms, t'nele 'as a
supply of appropriately skilled vorkets at all leNtIs. oreNtr,
	
'n
trade union base in the community.
Koorki was on the edge of a small city, which had suffered a general post-war decline
in heavy industrial employment. The plant was located on a 1970s industrial estate,
in which it was the second largest employer. However, within the local labour market
Koorki was relatively insignificant, with service sector jobs dominating the
employment scene. However, this portrayal does not do justice to Koorki' s 'visibility'
within the locality, arising from its role as an early Japanese investor, continual
expansion and its great public emphasis on its single union and harmonious
employment strategies. Moreover its 'success' within a generally depressed economic
and social environment is highlighted by the periodic opening of new Orki plants in
nearby towns, totalling five by 1989.
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Koorki, although not the major employer, represented a public face of growing
employment in light industry to replace unemployment from closed heavy, 'militant'
union establishments. Koorki appeared as the medium sized, flexible, caring employer
to replace the dirty huge plants which died in the Thatcherite coffin provided for
tripartism. The replacement of heavy for light industrial jobs did not seem to cause
a problem for workers with appropriate skills in the labour market, especially as
women came from schools and shops, though a potential problem might arise if the
company needed to employ technical men, used to union power and position in
previous employment. The way Koorki and the other Japanese firms coped with this
will be discussed in later chapters.
Kokuda was situated on the edge of a small town which was within a tourist area,
which once acted as the centre for mining. Most of the pits had closed over a long
period of time and Kokuda was located so as to take advantage of the unemployment
created by these closures at a time when the UK economy was still perceived as
strong. The community had the air of present day dilapidation after a history of male
working class struggle with despotic early capital. The stone on the cottages and
church halls was blackened with coal dust. The workers left this environment to work
each day in a white building, with clean floors and bright machinery, a bus ride away
from the town, as if to indicate the symbolic journey between old and new industrial
employment. The separation was heightened by the predominantly female workiorce
at the factory, replacing male jobs in the pits.
Another impact of Kokuda's arrival arose from its emphasis on research and
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development. Graduates from Universities all over Britain compete to work at
Kokuda, and this means that each year a few 'outsiders' come to live in or around the
town. The impact of Kokuda on skill formation in the town was, however, minimal
because the advanced technical skills remained within this educational elite, confining
locals to the other technical and manual tasks.
The Kohashi plant was located in a narrow valley, surrounded by pit villages.
Opposite the gates to the plant was a closed pit, with its black slag heaps and rusting
machinery. The community of villages was steeped in the history of mining more than
any of the other case-study sites. A mine employing more than Kohashi was still in
operation within the labour market, but among the numerous unemployed there were
enough appropriately skilled men and available women on which management could
draw.
Kohashi's decision about location was similar to that of the other Japanese cases,
being influenced by the existence of plentiful unemployed, vulnerable and skilled
labour. However, the people who made this decision were British rather than
Japanese capitalists, as Hashi was forced by the early Thatcher Government to buy
out an existing company rather than locate in a greenfield site. The transfer of
ownership to the Japanese was seen as saving the factory for the future and so had
support in the community. While the plant would never grow to the size it was under
British control, at least it would exist!
There were, therefore, significant differences between the locations of the different
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plants, but all operated in relatively congenial labour market circumstances, although
for the type of labour they required, recruitment was becoming increasingly
problematical, as will be explored in Chapters Seven and Eight. The Japanese plants
were all located in areas of higher than national average unemployment, with labour
experienced in the culture of the heavy industries of steel and mining. The European
plant was located in an entirely different cultural setting of light industry and, until
the time of the study, with plentiful employment. However, it would be wrong to
assume that only the Japanese took advantage of the high unemployment and felt
confident of 'taming' the union culture. 1(obuig 'as a git	 tt ccet
 j
owners in order to first supplement, then relocate production from Lonóon, nere the
company had paid higher wages to highly active unionised workers. This strategy of
relocation, though different to that of the Japanese also worked to the benefit of the
management by reducing labour costs and exploiting a more vulnerable labour force.
It is against this background that some of the most obvious features of the employee
relations of these plants, catalogued in tables 5 and 6 should be noted. These suggest
that, while there was a familiar contrast between the multi-unionism at Koburg and
the single-union arrangements at the Japanese plants, there was much less of a
contrast in terms of participation arrangements, while the practical implications of
single unionism also seemed to vary across the plants.
Formal schemes for involving employees within the organisation both as a
motivational tool and as means to increase quality and! or productivity is emphasised
by the Post Fordists and the Cardiff School of Japanisation. All the cases had two
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types of such schemes, team working and quality circle activity groups. Moreover
table 5 indicates that two of the Japanese firms went further, Kohashi going as far as
a 'Company Members Board' (CMB), indicating, at face value, a high degree of
employee representation within the plant. The realities of these schemes will be
explored in Section III of this thesis, especially in Chapter Ten.
Table 5: Participation Schemes
Koburg	 Koorki
	
Kokuda	 Kohashi:
teams	 teams	 teams	 teams
QCs	 QCs	 QCs	 QCs
Suggestion	 CMB
scheme
(Source: drawn from various interviews, 1989-9 1)
The following table indicates various aspects of the unions recognised in the four case
plants. The single union feature of the Japanese is striking when compared to the five
unions recognised in Koburg. However, this is where a stereotypical gloss on the
nature of Japanese direct investment ends, as the lowest union density was in the
European plant both in overall terms and on the shopfloor in particular. Further,
although single unions were recognised in the Japanese plants, this did not mean that
one bargaining unit was recognised for all the workers, but instead a demarcation
existed between blue and white collar staff, with the different sections of the unions
representing each unit. These features and their implications for industrial relations
will be evaluated in Chapter Eleven.
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Table 6: Union recognition
KQburg	 Koorki
Union(s) recognised:	 EEPTU,	 GMB
TGWU, MSF
ECSA
Overall Membership (%) 40	 95
Shopfloor membership (%) 47	 99+
Kokuda	 Kohashi
AEU
	
EEPTU
Bargaining units	 6	 2	 2	 2
(Source: interviews with personnel managers and union representatives, 1989 and
1990)
There are clearly seeming contradictions between table 5 and 6 in that the Japanese
firms had a high degree of employee involvement and high union membership, in
remarkable contrast to the important studies of Garrahan and Stewart (1991) of Ni s.caj?
in the NE of England, where participation schemes were used to replace unions both
by encouraging the channelling of any expression of descent through the company
schemes and by management taking an anti-union attitude. Another feature of these
tables is that contrary to some assumptions about gender and unions, the higher
densities were among the shopfloor workers, where women predominated, and thus
the bulk of the membership was women in all the firms. Again, these features will
be dealt with more comprehensively in Section III of the thesis.
Overall, there was a range of differences among these plants, some quite marked,
such as those of size, product mix and union membership, and others more subtle,
like those of local labour market structures and the balance between direct and
indirect workers. It is important, however, to underline that these differences do not
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simply divide the European from the Japanese plants - indeed Koburg and Koorki
were in some ways most similar - whilst in other respects, such as the character of
the core production process and the gender composition of the workforce all four
plants were quite similar when contrasted with other sorts of manufacturing.
THE PARENT COMPANIES AND THE CASE-STUDY PLANTS
The discussion so far has focused on the case-study plants themselves, but it is also
important to consider similarities and differences in the broader corporate structures
and relationships within which these plants operated. Within consumer electronics
Orki ranked number one in terms of turnover, followed by Kuda and Burg, though
the European company appeared to have poorer margins than its Japanese
competitors. By comparison with these companies Hashi's involvement in consumer
electronics was relatively small.
Bur2.
Burg was a European company which was wholly owned by its home government.
It was a state owned company, with a preference for home production but it was
increasingly becoming a multinational enterprise. Its major products were in consumer
electrical, including both white (eg. fridges, cookers) and brown (eg. heaters and
cleaners) goods, although it also produced defence and business equipment.
Most manufacture was carried out in the home country, but the pattern had been
changing since the later 1980s. Some large acquisitions of companies in Germany, the
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UK and US had extended markets and manufacturing establishments, including
Koburg. There had also been moves to exploit developments from East Asia: joint
ventures for the development and manufacture of products, such as televisions and
micro-wave ovens had been struck with two Japanese companies. Moreover, a recent
change in strategy had been to substantially rationalise production in Europe, with the
loss of thousands of jobs and transfer the production of brown goods to plants in
Malaysia.
Orki.
Orki was a large Japanese company which was almost exclusively engaged in
electrical and electronic product manufacture and sales. 58 percent of production
came from Japan (Orki; 1988), whilst only 13 percent came from Europe. Televisions
form part of video equipment sales, which contributed nearly 30 percent of production
in 1988 (Orki;1988). At the time of the study, Orki had begun to acquire companies
within related industries overseas, although its main method of expansion had been
through direct investment.
Ku da.
If any company in Japan could be termed a multinational, it must be Kuda, with only
a third of its sales being in Japan (Kuda; 1988). Moreover, televisions were of crucial
importance for this company, accounting for almost a quarter of all sales revenue
(Kuda;1988). Kuda had engaged in substantial overseas production, especially in
Europe and the US, and was increasingly engaging in growth by acquisitions (mainly
in the US) of such concerns as record and film companies, which extended markets
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for existing products.
Hashi.
Hashi was a diverse conglomerate, which was mainly concerned with heavy industrial
manufacture, with some international interests. Its engineering and electronics
corporations, as of 1990, had 43 overseas production plants and 18,000 employees,
of which 500 were Japanese expatriates. However, because of its large contracts for
heavy industrial products, such as power stations and trains, its consumer products
business (including electronics and IC chip manufacture), with 17 percent of net sales
(Hashi; 1988), was not as vital to the overall activity of the congomerae as it was Ioi
the other three case study companies.
In summary each company was a slightly different kind of multinational in its
approach to and method of multinationalisation. The only company which couà 'be
called a global company was Kuda, although most of its senior executives were
always Japanese. While each of the other companies had consumer electronics as its
core activity, Hashi was the only conglomerate, in which consumer electronics made
only a minor contribution to activities.
Management of the UK ilant.s
Moving on to the relationship between these companies and the case study plants each
of the four had somewhat different relations with their parent company. Within Burg,
the Koburg plant was seen as highly productive, but the parent company managers
had a sanguine view of both the British workforce and management, although there
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were disputes between local and Continental engineers about the efficiency of the
technology. It seemed likely that Koburg would become the European specialist in the
smaller screen sized, 14 inch, sets for the fiercely competitive market, where there
was high volume and low profits. In the future, this would be seen to allow the
development of production for export from Koburg (Interviews 7-12-89a)2.
Since the takeover by Burg there had been a move within the group to source parts
internally, where possible. This had meant that some traditional suppliers to Koburg
had been dropped and replaced by companies from Burg's own 'preferred list' of
suppliers, a list which excluded Japanese owned companies where at all possible.
Koburg was treated as a branch plant of Burg with some degree of operational
autonomy. Set against this was a restriction of scope to products assigned to the plant,
to be produced according to headquarter's designs, and at budgets agreed and set
between the headquarters and the locals. Among locals within Koburg, there was a
curious mix of opinions about whether the plant was British or Japanese. As one
walked round the plant it felt British and everyone one met was British, but workers
and engineers talked of how different it was after the British owned days (Interviews
6-12-89b and 17-7-90c). They emphasised that Burg's takeover had made it different.
In terms of their assessment of local workers and management all the Japanese firms
were more critical. In the interviews, it appeared that there were three considerations
2 This comment is ironic considering the plant closed three years later. For an
explanation of the closure refer to the Preface to this thesis.
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in managing the Japanese plants. First, a crucial benchmark consideration was the
policy of making Europe a special case whereby the Japanese wanted to appear on the
inside and develop a structure which could respond to the changing internal demands
of capital in the European Community. Second, a dominant theme was that
headquarters saw local management as incompetent and workers as unmotivated, and
yet felt obliged to use them. As a result there was conflict about where responsibility,
and thus, power should lie. This was given a distinctive twist because local managers
did feel they had a useful role. Behind this there was a complex interrelatIonship
between the Japanese wanting to do it their way, yet not wanting to appear to be
enforcing a Japanese model on the locals. The Japanese were unable to cope with
local methods and attitudes, they felt unable to change those attitudes and yet they
only knew how to make televisions the way they did back in Japan. They did not
seem to have resolved these conflicts. Instead they changed their level of expectations
and, perhaps, maintained a strategic position so that nothing could go drastically
wrong. Thirdly, however, this whole pattern was experienced as less difficult than
might be expected, and this appears to be because televisions were seen as being
something like a loss leader, to maintain and develop the brand name so that other
products could be imported from Asia.
At the same time that the Japanese were grappling with the problems of transferring
management practices from Japan, with which they felt comfortable, they were also
having to learn how to manage Western plants as they set new ones up. In other
words, there were a number of managerial processes occurring here. These processes
will be developed further in Chapter Five, especially in respect to young Japanese
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executives being developed into international mangers, a relatively new job title in
Japanese industry.
Turning in more detail to aspects of the relationship between Japanese managers and
local employees, one informant thought that in the original plans there were only
supposed to be 10 Japanese managers working at Koorki, although 70 remained as
at the end of 1989 (Interview 21-2-90c). However, he went on to say that some may
have remained because plans had changed, as the company took an expanded view
of European markets. He also explained that the type of Japanese manager had
changed from those skilled in production matters to those involved in administrative
duties (Interview 21-2-90c). Another explained that almost all the Japanese were at
Koorki as part of their training, learning from Koorki, before being given "a proper
job" (Interview 21-2-90b).
As in several plants studied, Japanese managers at 1(oofid arid in the adq'iiai\tr vci
Japan were deeply critical of British managers. One senior Japanese complained "they
have flexible ideas because they do not have to have a loyalty like in Japan"
(Interview 16-8-900. The locals were seen to move around companies, calling in at
Japanese ones to improve their CVs. They went home at 6.00pm, they didn't socialise
with others after work but went to their families. At the same time it should be noted
that one or two of the younger Japanese engineers made these observations with some
sadness that they could not do the same (Interview 28-6-900.
As for workers and even supervisors, they were seen as being no different than in
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Japan. The problem, as far as the Japanese were concerned lay with British
management. In this light it is easy to think that Orki would tend to prefer confining
power to the expatriates rather than giving the locals control of the plant.
Nevertheless, some local managers were trusted and seemed to be included on the
control process. The result seemed to be that local managers did much of the work
of keeping the plant running but their work was studied and controlled in detail by
the Japanese expatriates and the local semi-insiders (Interview 16-8-90).
Overall, then, the European parent company, Burg, had a more sanguine view of the
local management and workforce than did their Japanese counterparts, though there
were also some differences among the Japanese companies and all four plants had
limited degrees of autonomy. What seems most striking in the Japanese companies
was the vastly different perception as to competence and viability which existed
between each of the headquarters and their local plant managers. As far as the
headquarters were concerned the British plants would never match Japan. At the same
time the local managers still had optimism that their personal control would increase
as performance did. On the other hand the Japanese were not too worried about the
performance of the UK plants, partly because their own careers would take them back
to Japan before long, and partly because the relative contribution of the plant to
overall sales of televisions in Europe could be supplemented by imports from Japan
and SE Asia if there were problems locally.
Finally, in all the companies there was a tension concerning localisation versus
centralisation. Koburg had changed from a decentralised organisation to a centralised
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one since Burg took-over. For the Japanese, there was a wish to increase
decentralisation at a formal level, but it was clear that the Japanese were actually
more centrally controlled, primarily through informal and ambiguous structures. It
could be argued that this was due to the infancy of the plants, and this is an issue
returned to later in the thesis, but evidence suggests that, although there had been
some decentralisation since the initial set up of the plants, there was no strategic
intention to boost decentralisation further.
Nevertheless at the strategic or organisational level of European operations each
Japanese company took a different approach. Kuda, the multinational imaged
company, was in reality the most centrally controlled through budgeting, advisers and
pushing control from the plant to, first the Regional headquarters, and then Tokyo.
It was also into 'Japanising' British workers and was very hard on its own
expatriates. Hashi was different in that it seemed more relaxed about operations,
trying to keep responsibility at the plant though not expecting too much performance.
The Regional headquarters was likely to come to Europe only because they wanted
to be on the inside after 1992. Strangely enough it was Orki, the traditional Japanese
giant, which seemed most developed in Europe, although still not trusting the locals
too much. The trump card seemed to be the establishment of both its own on-site
components plant and close contacts with large European firms for R&D purposes.
EARLIER SURVEYS OF ELECTRICAL TRANSPLANTS iN THE UK
The research on which this thesis is based utilised the strategies of factory visits and
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interviews with key management, union and employee informants in each of the case
study plants. The interest in Japanese practices overseas has, however, prompted
several studies of employee consciousness in the UK subsidiaries of Japanese plants
using a rather different methodology. This section will concentrate on studies on
electronics and especially consumer electronics and review the relevance of such
studies for my research.
One of the first pieces of such research was conducted by Takamiya (1981) in a
survey comparing four television assembly plants: two Japanese, one British and one
US owned. He found that worker satisfaction rates were a little higher in the Japanese
firms than in the UK firm, with the US firm between the two Japanese plants, as
shown in table 7. He supplemented a direct questionnaire question on satisfaction by
indirect, and perhaps suspect, measures of employee attitudes, as is shown in the
table; labour turnover, absenteeism and strikes.
Table 7: Comparative data on employee satisfaction and other features of 4
electrical plants
Qflne	 Japan two	 U
Employee satisfaction	 15.6	 12.71	 13.2
Labour turnover (%)	 30	 25-30	 30
UK
11.32
30
9
20
0.56
85
Absenteeism (%)
	 4	 5
Strikes over 2 years
	 0	 0
Labour Productivity	 0.83	 1.07
Quality defect record (%) 4-5	 10
(Source: adapted from Takamiya; 1981; 6)
8
0
0.71
14-15
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Takamiya (1981) does not simply report the pattern of satisfactions but also relates
this to other indices of labour force response, which appear to suggest a successful
combination of the most effective production (high productivity and high quality) and
employee integration (no overt conflict and high satisfaction). There are, however,
also some suggestions of a more complex and qualified picture: firstly labour turnover
is more or less uniformly high across all the plants, and secondly the two Japanese
plants appear to have gone for rather different trade-offs between productivity and
quality, though both at a higher level than the US and especially the UK plants.
Furthermore, other features, such as the pattern of absenteeism, reflect different
managerial policies rather than simply employee satisfactions, in this case a greater
emphasis on supervisors disciplining absenteeism and lateness in the Japanese plants.
Thus this research cannot be taken as straightforward evidence of a simple
correspondence between Japanese management, productivity and satisfaction; rather
it poses fresh questions about the relationships between management policies of
recruitment and control, productivity achievements and employee attitudes, which
need to be addressed by research approaches which escape from some of the
limitations of the attitude survey.
Another piece of research from the early 1980s was that initiated by the then Head
of research at Denkirouren, Ishigaki Tatsuo, who conducted an international
comparative study of worker consciousness which has yet to be published in complete
form. However, Guest and Dewe (1991) draw on the rather limited data collected in
Britain as part of the overall project, and my comments are based on their report. The
survey was of 716 workers in three plants in South East England (199 1;80). These
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researchers found that there was low worker identification with both the company and
unions. Although managers and supervisors were often seen by these workers as
representing worker interests, the overall view of the company was more negative
because they held more critical views of the pay and promotion prospects offered by
the firms. At the same time workers' believed that the unions at national and local
levels were "not doing a satisfactory job" (199 l;86). This underlines the importance
of a careful exploration of the relationships between management policies, forms of
union organisation, and worker attitudes and identities, which will form a part of the
research agenda of this thesis.
Finally Reitsperger (1982), as part of his PhD, undertook a questionnaire study of
worker satisfaction with various issues related to work and employment among
semi-skilled, mainly women workers. His work is important in that it was seemingly
the only major study of attitudes of workers in television manufacture, covering two
Japanese, a US and a UK plant in Britain. The study is also particularly significant
for this thesis because it deals with most of the cases which I studied 10 years or
more later. The key conclusions from the survey were that (i) it revealed a complex
set of worker attitudes, where a worker could dislike the company but accept that the
job they did was satisfactory, and (ii) there was no clear linkage between worker
attitudes and the national identity of the company. (Reitsperger 1986; 176-85 and
206-23). In a summary of his findings Reitsperger (1986a) underlines these
conclusions by noting that (1986;570-2):
The greatest differences in this area (satisfaction with the firm) exists
between Japanese company one and two.
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The low level of satisfaction with pay in Japanese company one
compared to all other companies is striking. The American company
and the British company clearly emerge as leaders in this area.
In the dimension of (opportunities for) promotion.., Japanese company
two is viewed most favourably, and Japanese company one is viewed
least favourably by the operators in these companies.
Only in satisfaction with co-workers does he report that the Japanese companies have
similar results (1986;572).
On the basis of such evidence Reitsperger (1986;574-84) seems to conclude that the
two Japanese companies have been successful by applying two rather different
strategies towards labour: one using indigenous Japanese patemalist practices and the
other, Japanese two, by "applying Western individualism" (1986;572). However, if
this were the case it would be likely that Japanese Two would be consistently
clustered with the Western firms and 3apnese One wou'd stand on its own, but his
evidence does not support such a conclusion.
It suggests instead that the strategies followed by each company are conditioned by
the constraints of both productive necessity and worker resistance. Moreover, there
is also evidence that, because of the uncertainty of capitalist employment relations
managers cannot always control relations with labour in the ways envisaged in their
strategies. For example, Japanese Two was small, with around 300 workers, whereas
UK had 2,000 workers and the other two companies 700 each, yet Japanese Two was
not paternalistic and workers there expressed a relatively low dissatisfaction with
work. It was likely that in this small company tjiere was no tight integration of work
so that workers retained some control over their own jobs.
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In conclusion, it is clear from Reitsperger's work that, although there are differences
which mark out patterns of worker attitude related to who owns the company, it is
at least as important to distinguish between the two Japanese cases. This suggests that
research on so-called 'Japanisation" should be alert to such differences of corporate
policy and practice and worker experience in different Japanese factories and this will
be an important concern within this thesis. At the same time it should be noted that,
while Reitsperger studied some of the same plants as I did, it is not possible to draw
any simple lines of continuity between his research and mine. This is because the
Japanese cases have expanded dramatically over the intervening years, while the UK
plant has both been taken over by a foreign inward investor and closed down in
favour of a smaller plant.
A CRITIQUE OF SURVEY RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
All these studies of consumer electronics discussed above have depended for much
of their data collection on questionnaire surveys issued to employees. There are very
good reasons for this, namely that codification of comparisons is made easier and it
is an easier method to gain access to the shopfloor than in-depth interviews would be.
There are a number of problems with this kind of approach, not just in terms of
question fatigue, normative answering and the myth of 'hygienic' research so
criticised by A Oakley (1981) aiilong others. There are particular problems of
understanding complex relations between intentions, attitudes and actions of
individuals within a work context. Thus, Takamiya's study (1981) may indicate
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differences between Japanese One and Japanese Two employee satisfaction, but even
assuming the respondents react to the questions in the same way, there is no way of
telling why there are differences. For example, it could be that respondents in
Japanese Two are marking the questionnaires with a particular recent issue in mind,
rather than a long term view of their attitudes. It is not even possible to rely on the
labour turnover rate as a measure of attitudes, as it depends on the wages and
vacancies in the local labour market, as well as internal issues of promotion, work
pressures, opportunities for overtime and so on.
This thesis attempts to move away from statistically significant correlations to explain
comparisons, to explore comparisons through analysis of issues themselves. ln this
way participation schemes, for example, are not in themselves significant, but instead,
their workings, attitudes towards them and their relative importance as compared with
other ways employees can voice their opinions let us explore complex and often
contradictory relations between an employee, his boss and a strategic tool used by
management to impact on their relationship.
The trade off in this choice of research method is that management only allowed
access to the shopfloor in two of the case studies although one would have wished for
such access in all four plants. Although access was given to various managers,
technical staff and union representatives in all the cases, only in Koburg and Koorki
was researched allowed on the shopfloor. Despite this being less than ideal for a full
exploration of comparisons, more can be learned about the other two companies,
where access to shopfloor workers was not given, by interviewing in the ones that did
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allow access, than would have been possible through distributing questionnaires in all
the cases. For a fuller discussion on this methodological break from the past, refer
to 'The Story of the Research Process' contained within the appendices, but here a
brief outline of the interview method used for this thesis will be provided.
The research was based on over 50 formal interviews over a period of about 20
months, visiting each plant at least twice, and each time touring the factory sites.
Interviews with managers and union representatives were conducted usually for one
to two hours on an individual basis. There were informal conversations, usialty on
plant tours or over lunch as well. With other people there were usually small group
interviews allowing a different kind of discussion to take place, but also exposing the
researcher to more people in a short time. Thus, in all over 70 people were
interviewed. In addition to interviews in the UK plants, opportunities were taken to
visit plants in Japan, interviewing people there, and in the Japan headquarters of each
of the Japanese cases. This approach allowed the development of conversations with
managers, enabled the researcher to sit and listen to conversations developing between
workers and to develop an ethnographic approach to the research process. Initially
interviews were conducted using a set of topics and question areas to discuss, but
increasingly the interviewees themselves set parts of the agenda.
It is not argued that this approach is unproblematic but it provides a significant break
from previous methodologies used. Thus, this thesis is a different type of study than
that which has been done previously, although having the benefit of drawing on these
studies for particular points of discussion.
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CONCLUSION
This introduction to the case plants has shown that there are both similarities and
differences between the case plants which sometimes mark a distinction between
European and Japanese but at other times draw distinctions between the Japanese
plants. There are a number of points of analysis in the thesis necessary to fully
explore the relation between the labour process within the firms, the environmental
context in which these took place and the nature of multinational operations. The
intricacies of the relations and contradictions between these features will be explored
through the rest of this thesis.
The studies which have been done previously have tended to concentrate on employee
attitudes, defined narrowly and with few other aspects of the consumer electronics
industry in the UK, and the place of Japanese direct investment in this sector,
considered and the place of Japanese direct investment within this. In this chapter it
was argued that such research has a methodological weakness. Moreover, this narrow
focus of research provides us with very little understanding of the firms, and thus,
as argued above, a much deeper and broader picture needs to be explored in order
to understand the situation of this industry. The following two chapters will explore
the context to the plants more thoroughly.
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CHAPTER FOUR
MARKET AND MARKETING STRATEGY
INTRODUCTION
A product has no use to a capitalist unless it can be sold and sold at a profit, or as
part of a package of products which in total redeems a profit (Marx;1976;293).
Therefore, all managerial functions and actions should be considered in relation to
this ultimate purpose. The relationship between selling and production is a set of
complex dependencies but it is reasonable to say that under competitive market
conditions the power of the individual capitalist is limited to internal affairs in
preparation for selling goods in the market place. Thus, the chapter reflects this
thinking by taking the market as a given factor in the corporate environment.
By looking at general strategies towards markets some inferences can be made
concerning the debate around 'Japanisation'. This chapter will assess the relation
between selling and production, and more specifically whether so called Post Fordist
Japanese markets emerge along with Japanese globalisation, by looking at the case
study conglomerates and UK market for televisions. This discussion provides a
background to later analysis of JIT and flexible work practices.
The chapter starts by setting up a theoretical model of the 'Japanised' market place
through a discussion of Post Fordism. The rest of the chapter then looks at the
86
consumer electronics market and the strategies of companies. First the nature of the
television market in Japan, then that in Europe, is examined. The chapter concludes
with a consideration of UK industrial policy towards the industry and then the
European Corporate response to Japanese inward investment.
POST FORDIST MARKETS?
There are conflicting arguments as to the form of Japanese consumer markets. On the
one side, proponents of Post Fordism, JIT and flexible employment practices argue
that these markets are undergoing rapid change with constantly changing consumer
demand. On the other side, others argue that Japan is still dominated by mass
markets. These arguments will be introduced in this section.
The Post Fordism thesis is that mass markets are in decline because consumers can
afford and can discern highly differentiated products. This has led to arguments which
focus on small batch production, usually associated with expensive specialist products.
One explanation, specifically advanced by those in the flexible specialisation camp,
focuses on the breakdown of mass markets. Sabel (1982) and Piore and Sabel (1984)
both argue that mass markets have collapsed, requiring capitalists to produce smaller
quantities of differentiated products for consumers. Atkinson and Gregory, in a more
'preaching to management' style place emphasis on the need (1986; 13):
To increase their (managements') ability to adjust quickly and cheaply
to a more uncertain, volatile and competitive market, and to an
increased pace of technological change
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However, Sayer acknowledges that these changes are not being adopted in all cases
(1989;670):
Even a cursory examination of new consumer products shows that
mass production is not in decline but flourishing, particularly in Japan.
Nevertheless, the general thesis of Sayer (1989;194-231) is that there is a move
towards production diversity produced on general purpose machines, associated with
a move away from mass production'.
Those who study the subject from a marketing perspective, such as Mark Zimmerman
(1985) and Kotler, Fahey and Jatusripitak (1985), and those looking at multinationals,
such as Dunning (1986;76) consider the consumer markets in which Japanese
capitalists operate as none other than mass markets. Further, Gregory (1985;37-46)
provides evidence that Japanese strategy within the electronics industry has been to
turn products, such as semi-conductors, from small markets to mass markets as a
strategy to gain economies from scale.
The rest of this chapter will therefore concentrate on the consumer electronics
industry and the location of the television market within it. This will help determine
whether there are still economies of large scale production to be gained by capital
from supplying a mass market in the UK and Europe, or whether radically new
Williams, Cutler, Williams and Haslam (1987) also criticises the whole base of this
flexible specialisation model, when reviewing Piore and Sabel (1984). For example,
Williams et al point to a lack of any statistical support for changing markets
(1987 ;4 16).
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employment and worker practices will be needed to cope with increasingly
individualised consumer behaviour.
THE CONSU1ER TELEVISION MARKET IN THE UK
The consumer electronics market is where most televisions are sold (the other being
industrial) and it is this market that the case study plants supplied. This section looks
at 'product image' - consumer perceptions of brand quality - and 'Product innovation'
- product development and its impact on the market.
Product image
The television sector is basically a mass market. Televisions are a fairly standardised
product, where differentiation in production terms is slight. The main features of
differentiation are price, quality, availability and cosmetic design. Except for a few
specialised sets, price competition has meant that economies of scale from mass
assembly line production are needed. Specialist sets include such items as projection
videos, used in passenger aircraft, which as yet, do not form sufficient demand to
warrant mass production.
The average television set plummeted in real price terms while its reliability and
'add-on' features had increased (Interviews 13-11-89 and 24-10-90). One Japanese
marketing manager estimated that real prices fell five to six percent each year
squeezing profit margins and creating the need for economy drives (Interview
24-10-90). 14 inch and 21 inch screen sizes were especially competitive. As more
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companies targeted these market sectors, it further diminished profits and encouraged
over supply through increasing pressures within each firm from scale cost benefits.
Customer-perceived quality allows some price differential between competitors but
the argument among manufacturers has been that the Japanese introduced 'quality as
a standard'. Thus, if a product is seen as low quality then it can only compete by
substantially lower pricing. This quality premium has allowed Japanese televisions to
carry comparatively high prices compared to televisions made under other country
brands, with the exception of Germany. However, among themselves the Japanese
have had to be price competitive, as the quality premium is not disting,uishab1e
between these firms. For this reason those in power in each of the Japanese owned
plants in the UK struggled hard to extend the premium of 'made in Japan' to include
'Japanese made in the UK'.
Televisions are consumer items which may be termed as 'off-the-peg' purchases,
despite their cost. That is, a consumer goes into the shop, looks at the choice,
perhaps with the assistance of a shop worker, and selects one, either taking it under
their arm or having it delivered to their home. This is like the purchasing pattern for
soap detergent, with the same burden for the manufacturer. The television sales office
must try to make sure that there is a television in all the major stores so that the
consumer has the possibility of seeing their set. For the manufacturer, it means
making sure there are sets made and available for: a) display; and b) in stock, packed
at the back of the shop. This requires production for stock, not for order. This pattern
of consumption is crucially different from cars, for example, where a customer
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expects to wait for 'delivery'. If the consumer goes in to buy a television, even if
s/he intends to buy a set made by Orki but Orki is awaiting delivery, s/he will more
than likely buy a competitor's set (Interviews 13-11-89 and 24-10-90).
Within the UK, retailing of consumer electrical goods is dominated by large chain
stores, such as Dixons and Comet, which themselves compete substantially by price2.
This means that the manufacturers must provide discounts and guarantees of supplies
in order just to compete for shelf space with competitor manufacturers. The
competition between producers and the oligopolistic position of large retailers puts
considerable power in the hands of the latter (Interview 15-3-92).
Each manufacturer is constrained to produce a markedly similar product to all their
competitors. Thus, there has been a proliferation of a wide range of similar products
manufactured by different companies. One way of obtaining a perception of
differentiation is through aesthetic design. This can be to create a design which gives
an image such as classical or modern, or it can be to provide a choice of designs for
the same set. This later tactic has been used widely among small screen sets,
providing white, red, green 'boxes' for the kitchen or the children's bedroom. This
type of gimmick can be important for relaying the quality image and to appeal to
those who see the television as part of the furniture of a house, rather than the box
2 At the time of the research competition on the basis of 'customer service' was not so
prevalent in the UK, as it was 10 years previously. This is partly because the method
of manufacture is making it increasingly difficult to repair faulty parts. Instead new
'sections' of the television are replaced, or often the whole set. As all the retailers
tend to give similar service in this area, it has more or less become a 'standard'.
91
in the corner. The problem for the Sales Department is that giving a choice of designs
leads to a further proliferation of the stock a retailer must carry. This is under
pressure from finite stock space, with all the competitors vying for the same shelf
space.
In 1982 Reitsperger wrote (1982;53):
The UK colour television market at the time of this study was
characterised by extremely competitive pressure ... characterised by
over-capacity in the industry and heavy losses in several established
companies.
Ten years later, little had changed. The television is a mass consumption good which
the consumer buys off-the-peg. Mass consumption televisions are narrowly
differentiated by price, design, but mainly by the screen size. However, as will be
argued in Chapter Six, these differences had little impact on the shopfloor.
Product innovation
Since the first black and white sets were marketed there have been some variations
in models. During the 1980s there was both an increase in the number of screen sizes
and a range of 'add-ons' introduced to complicate the basic set. The consumer was
given a choice from small 14 inch sets to 33 inch screen sizes and many points
between. Now there is a size for each room in the house and even the car3 . Second,
Hand held televisions use a different form of technology than normal televisions to
display the picture on the screen. For this reason they tend to be manufactured in
plants for audio equipment and not television plants.
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the television is being used in other ways than just to see pictures from the television
stations. Now there are on-line text services, computer compatibility and so on.
Add-ons need to be provided as options for the potential consumer, over a range of
screen sizes. The television makers must supply the full range of television sizes to
the retailers, along with the different combinations of add-ons, lest they miss a
potential sale.
One area of periodic design changes has been in the construction of the television
tube, such as 'Triniton' and 'Black Diamond'. These changes were not researched
because the implications for production change at the point of assembly were
minimal. Nevertheless, considerable basic or fundamental research is needed for new
types of screen. These changes are not merely cosmetic as, for instance, the flatness
of the screen and the darker the shade of grey of the screen (seen when the set is
switched off) the clearer the picture displayed.
Some additional complexity in the market is occurring as a result of developments in
production technology. These either improve the picture, as in HDTV (High-
Definition Television) or the sound, as in NTCAM (otherwise known as 'Digital
Stereo', an advanced set of circuitry for improved picture transmissioii and sound,
allowing stereo). Both may be considered as luxury features now but, as happened
in the past, competition means that the luxury of the present becomes standard in the
future.
Despite the expansion of the range and new developments in television sets during the
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1980s the process of manufacture is largely the same, dictated by a set of core
processes of manufacture undertaken by all producers. The screen sizes require some
additional coordination, to make sure the right size screen goes in the corresponding
chassis4 . The add-ons are additional printed circuit boards (pcbs), which although
requiring much design, have a minimal effect on production. These add-ons can even
be bought-in as kits and inserted in the modified chassis. HDTV requires design
modifications to the pcbs and different screens (which are generally bought-in
anyway). Speakers are always bought in to the assembly plant, so that stereo just
means inserting two speakers instead of one in a marginally modified chassis.
In summary, these changes mean in most cases additional production work for a
television set but never different work. For Television Research and Development and
chassis design it means more work, some of it new. For the market, this variety and
extension of the basic television allows, with each 'innovation' an extension of the life
cycle of the basic television set. In the context of multinational organisations this
means that production is for a highly competitive and in some aspects saturated
market, although opportunities for further development have been identified by the
multinationals. However, many of these developments may result in radical departures
from the basic television concept in the future.
Chassis is the frame in which all the components of the television go, including the
screen. A full explanation is given in Chapter Six.
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STRATEGIES IN THE JAPANESE MARKET
In Japan the consumer electronics market has become saturated so that it now mainly
serves to replace old sets, with the result that companies like Orki and Sanyo are
coming to concentrate more on commercial sales (Interviews 17-3-89 and 17-4-90).
Orki, for example, intended to increase non-consumer sales from its present 50
percent in 1990 to 70 or 80 percent by 'value' and personnel over five or so years,
and to concentrate on six areas: information, communication (including computers),
semi-conductors, Factory Automation (FA), air conditioners and Hi-Vision - a pattern
similar to other manufacturers (Interview 17-4-90).
Wakasa (1990;67) stated that companies were concentrating on product differentiation
based on small technical differences in products, continued aggressive marketing, and
integration between products, such as VCRs (Video Cassette Recorder), Cameras,
home computers. Wakasa (1990;55-64), moreover, perceived a strategy of increased
globalisation as a way to influence the market. For examp)e Kuda had a be/fez
reputation overseas than in Japan, which executives put down to a lack of advertising
in Japan (Interview 18-4-90). However, more generally, it was agreed in Japan that
Kuda, like Honda, adopted a strategy of developing overseas markets rather than the
home one first (eg Interview 18-4-90). Although this incurred the displeasure of MITI
(Ministry of International Trade and Industry) (Morita; 1987;65-6) it meant that these
companies were less price competitive than other Japanese companies. It also meant
This trend is underlined by a comparison of Annual Company Reports of Japanese
companies (Hashi;1989, Orki;1989, Sanyo; 1988, Kuda; 1989).
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concentrating on 'latest' technology from an early stage (Morita; 1987;65-6).
Overall, then, the market was saturated and so profits were increasingly sought
through market diversification and selling to overseas markets, including to Europe.
EUROPEAN MARKET
Doyle et al (1987), comparing UK, US and Japanese marketing strategies, found that
the Japanese plants had clearer long term objectives than the others (1987;23):
[Japanese firms] had a clearer view of their customers and how their
products would compete in the market. As the market changed and
new segments emerged they quickly brought out new models to match,
and exploited these developments.
Dunning, looking at the actual operations of Japanese companies in the UK, found
that (1986;76):
There appeared to be little distinctive about the marketing or
distribution practices of Japanese affiliates, but in pricing, they tended
to be tougher than their indigenous competitors.
In the following sub-section consideration is given to the various approaches to the
European market in order to discover which of the two opinions above is more
accurate. This is done through studying general strategies and then the perceived
implications of the Single European Market.
Strateaies for the Euro pean market
Compared to the two local consumer electronics giants, Thomson and Philips, the
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Japanese have not dominated the television market the way they have in other sectors.
This is especially so outside the UK. The reason given by Japanese firms was that
import restrictions applied in the early 1970s protected European markets
(Gregory;1985;141-8, Kotler et al;1985;194). This argument holds a lot of validity
when this segment of the electronics market is compared to audio, where market
penetration is higher and imports were less restricted. The exception of the UK, with
its severe consumer price competition, is a result of Japanese competition among local
plants and a less powerful lobby against the Japanese competition than in France and
West Germany.
One area where restriction can be maintained is in selecting standards for new product
developments, such as HDTV. Phillips and Thomson have lobbied successfully to the
EC to get their standard, called 'MAC', adopted rather than the Japanese developed
HDTV. 'MAC' is the standard the Japanese have to adopt to apply for manufacturing
licences if they want to enter this market segment. Denial of licensing could
effectively stop entry or at least stall access of the Japanese so that market share is
established by European firms and penetration from outsiders becomes harder
(Interviews 17-3-89 and 18-4-90).
Each country within Europe has different consumer cosmetic tastes and different
market emphases. More basic, smaller, sets sell well in Southern Italy, most of Spain,
North Africa, UK and other 'less' economically developed / enhanced areas. In
Western Germany, France, Barcelona, Northern Italy and Switzerland it is larger sets,
with add-ons and sophistication that sell better. In Europe, the 'new' technologies of
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Stereo and 'MAC' are priced high for a niche market at the luxury end of the overall
market, probably to regain some of the development costs.
Effects of 1992 and 'single market'
The UK market for televisions, like that in Japan, is price competitive and almost
saturated. This is quite unlike the rest of Europe, where import tariffs have
maintained a higher price for television sets. In theory, it would appear, therefore,
that the market would grow on the continent as competition and the abolition of trade
barriers allows prices to fall. For this reason, the European market was seen as
important by the companies under study.
Orki made Koorki their European television plant (Interviews 13-11-89 and 17-4-90),
and the general consensus among managers there was that 1992 had already occurred,
as 17 European countries were supplied from Koorki. Thus Orki was already an
insider and, like Kuda, managers were proud of the Queens Awards for Export they
had gained (Interviews 13-11-89 and 1-3-90).
Kuda could not say if Kokuda would be the centre of production in Europe as
marketing strategies were still being developed (Interview 24-10-90). Kuda had eight
factories in Europe, all set up Without 1992 in mind. However, the "To our
shareholders" report by the Chairperson and Managing Director, in the annual report
(1989;2) stated that 1992 was encouraging further localisation. Possible isolation of
the UK would end once the Channel Tunnel was built (Interview 18-4-90). In line
with these developments the television sales headquarters in Europe had developed
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more sophisticated plans to enhance the European operations. It intended to divide
Europe into regions and establish, or expand, existing factories to supply each
division, locally. There was much discussion concerning the method of segmenting
- by country, by economic prosperity, by transport routes and so on (Interview
24-10-90).
Hashi management thought 1992 had been a good external force for them to develop
the European market. In their view, they need a European headquarters to cope with
competition from other Japanese companies! Hashi was establishing a Research and
Development centre for HDTV, and was unifying its sales and manufacturing. A
Japanese manager in Tokyo said (Interview 19-4-90):
We normally wouldn't feel compelled to establish a regional R&D
centre. It wouldn't be cost effective.
However he thought there was a necessity in the case of Europe because of
protectionist pressures, such as in the adoption of MAC instead of HDTV, which is
accepted as the standard in most other regions of the world.
Kuda and Orki senior management agreed that 1992 was in itself not as important as
the implications which the single market would have for the possible future
integration of the less economically developed Eastern European countries (Interviews
17-4-90 and 18-4-90). Kuda was considering locating a production plant in one of the
Eastern European countries and letting it supply that type of market (Interview
24-10-90). The other two cases, Hashi and Burg, were much more concerned with
developing the markets they were already entering (Interviews 24-10-89 and 19-4-90).
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Burg, had engaged in large scale acquisitions in order to increase European market
share and to extend its markets beyond parts of Europe, to include the US. Production
was especially concentrated in Europe, where television factories were maintained,
while Audio production had been transferred to East Asia. It is for this reason that
European consumer electronics manufacturers lobbied for selective import restriction,
as a wide net would prevent imports of their own audio products. Koburg's senior
management predicted that there would be a shake-out of manufacturers in the
European market (Interviews 24-10-89 and 7-12-89), and they thought that most of
the Japanese plants would close, or be bought out to leave a big three of Philips, Burg
and Orki.
Hashi and Burg managements saw 1992 as an opportunity, whereas the others saw
it as not very important because they had engaged in substantial production for export
for a number of years already. The reason for the difference lay in past acquisition
and expansion policies. Hashi and Burg took over existing UK owned plants, which
had supplied only the domestic market. This orientation had been hard to overcome
because of production, investment, management and control problems. However, as
these are sorted out, perhaps 1992 will appear as just a peg on which to hang a more
export orientated strategy, which would emerge, regardless of the single market.
Thus, although there exist market segments into which differentiated televisions are
sold, these are basically either (a) basic cheap sets or (b) luxury specification sets sold
at a premium. As has been indicated previously, in assembly terms the difference
between these two segments is small. It would therefore be inappropriate to categorise
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the European market for televisions as anything other than a mass market.
INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND CORPORATE STRATEGY IN THE UK
The history of the European market has been based initially on small scale production
companies producing for local-single country markets, with the exception of some
state sponsored multi-product firms and giants such as Philips and Thomson. This
situation changed as a result of increasing competition and there has been a rash of
company acquisitions and mergers on the continent, and rationalisation in the UK.
The continental market was more secure in terms of having a higher degree of
protectionism than in the UK, allowing the major consumer electronics firms to
become competitive vis a vis the arriving Japanese firms. The European Community
seems to have taken a similar policy to those adopted within France and Germany,
thus allowing home grown competition to stand a chance against the outsiders, in the
same way that the Japanese domestic economy has been nurtured.
In Britain during the 1980s, many conglomerates hived off their less profitable areas,
including television manufacture, which were then closed down or bought out by
companies from East Asia. UK diversified multinationals such as Thorn-EMI and
GEC have exited from the less profitable consumer electronics markets in preference
for military and business sectors of electronics. Moreover, the British Government
gave confused signals towards the sector, encouraging Inmos, as a high technology
industry, then letting it disappear. Government policy towards the lower technology
end, such as televisions, has been that the market 'rules'. One exception to this was
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when Hitachi and then Mitsubishi, wanted to open greenfield sites, the UK
government prohibited this as further endangering employment of the local
competitors. Hitachi then resorted to a joint venture with one of the ailing locals.
Thus UK government policy and low profit margins have resulted in the extinction
of British owned capital from consumer electronics, and that which is left, such as
brand names of chain stores like Dixons, are supplying products made in South East
Asia.
EUROPEAN CORPORATE RESPONSE
Doyle et al (1987) found that in contrast to the Japanese marketing strategies vithin
the UK, local firms tended to be production rather than market orientated. They were
rather uncommitted to the UK compared to the "aggressive" Japanese strategy. If the
European firms were to survive, a response was required to meet the Japanese
challenge.
If the argument about the decisive influence of Japanese firms is correct, then it is
reasonable to expect that European multinationals will also be influenced by Japanese
firms and practices. To examine this point a comparison is made between Philips and
Burg. This sub-section will include a brief analysis of Philips as a point of
comparison with Burg. The intention is to show that Burg's market strategy is not
necessarily indicative of the 'European response' to Japanese competition.
Philips is a diversified company with a long standing European-wide reputation.
Diversification has taken place within each sector of the consumer electronics market
102
but has included unrelated diversification, such as petrochemicals. Diversification
within consumer electronics had always meant Philips was present in business
electronics and Office Automation (OA), as well as supplying 75 percent of the
world's light bulbs. The multi-market strategy has extended to putting investment
commitment into Japan, including a large headquarters in Tokyo. However, price
competition from Japanese multinationals encouraged Philips to move much of their
production facilities from Europe to developing countries in South East Asia. This
was a poor strategic move leaving the company in serious financial difficulties up to
the time of the research. In the process of copying, it had over simplified the multi-
nationalisation strategy of the Japanese and started to lose much of its own
competitive advantage, which derived from its European locations, avoiding import
restrictions and duties. Television assembly was an exception to this overseas
investment strategy.
In contrast, Burg has developed quite a different strategy based on 'late development'
to borrow a term. Burg is a state owned industry which initially looked almost
exclusively to supplying the domestic market for a range of consumer products. With
increased competition Burg's Directors saw that (a) it was not possible to completely
protect the domestic market from imports from within the EC, and (b) that in order
to compete at all Burg had to be a "big player" (Interview 24-10-89). The growth
strategy was based upon acquisitions of other consumer electronics companies, which
were themselves diversified. These purchases were mainly within Europe but
extended to some major purchases within North America. The result had been an
overall growth in a short space of time, less than a decade, which had expanded the
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Burg Corporation to many times its original size, making it a major multinational. At
the same time, Philips had engaged in more limited acquisitions within Europe to
consolidate its position.
Burg and Philips have very different policies towards relations with the Japanese.
Burg supplied some parts through its subsidiaries to Kuda but did not seek any long
term relations or contact, although this was not stated publicly. Philips also supplied
parts, but additionally engaged in joint research projects with Japanese companies
(Interview 13-1 1-89). The reason for the divergent strategies between the two
European giants may be related to divergent forms of ownership, Burg, a nationalised
industry, whereas Phillips is privately owned.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the market is complex in terms of competitioi and is not uniform
across the whole range of products. A television set is not a unifonu product because
of different sizes and 'add-ons'. Nevertheless, the problem which remains for
marketing is that largely indistinguishable products have to be differentiated. Another
conclusion is that the peculiarities of the television market within Europe emerged as
a result of selective import restrictions, keeping prices high on the continent and
reducing competition. This both encouraged inward investment from Japan, and meant
that most of this investment went to the UK, to a degree substituting for what
previously was exported from Japan.
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Different marketing strategies to deal with this were being employed both in terms
of product targeting and supply sourcing. As competition intensified it would become
more difficult for individual plants to attain increasing economies of scale to sustain
lower prices, and to maintain profitable small segments. New product development
provides some room for profits at the margins but requires large R&D outlays which
may not be recoverable before competition arises.
At one level the Post Fordists can argue that in this mature market, near the end of
its product life cycle (Reitsperger;1986;74), television set production is not relevant
to their argument as such products represent the past (Sabel;1982; 199). However,
there are two reasons why television production is interesting. Firstly, much research
on Japanisation in Britain still relies on such cases, and secondly, the intense
competitiveness of the market, the high number of companies engaged in this
competition, and the dominance of the Japanese, means that here we should see all
the tricks and techniques each company could muster to gain market share. The rest
of the thesis will address these themes.
105
CHAPTER FIVE
MULTINATIONAL APPROACH TO
CORPORATE CONTROL
INTRODUCTION
Japanese multinationals have been a centre of interest since the 1970s in the West,
attracting much academic writing. This chapter will examine the organisation of
Japanese multinationals, considering why inward investment was pursued and what
Japanese capitalists expected from this practice. This will be achieved under the
headings: Japanisation within Multinational Control; Power and influence of
Consumer Electronics in Japan; Control Structure; Control Indices; Power of
Expatriates; Comparison of Approaches; and Conclusion.
The chapter will explain the transmissions of control between the case study plants
and their corporate headquarters. Although these mechanisms run both ways, to and
from the UK plants, it will be shown that there was a high degree of centralised
control in all the case studies. However, the transmission mechanisms of control, and
therefore the nature of control, was different between the European and Japanese
plants. Nevertheless, the assertion that there was a high degree of centralised control
would tend to affirm a view that the Japanese cases represented 'Japanese best
practice' in management style, including production and employment management.
106
Therefore, the case studies used in this thesis should provide ideal types for
measuring the existence or otherwise of Japanisation.
JAPANISATION WITHIN MULTINATIONAL CONTROL
In 1976 Imanishi wrote expectantly about how the consumer electronics market would
change. He predicted that low wage developing countries would produce labour
intensive products for Japan and the European Community. Further, he talked of how
Japan was loosing its competitive edge through wage increases, labour shortages,
market saturation, increased competition from developing countries in South East Asia
and Western import protectionism (1976;184-5). Many of these issues remain a
feature relevant today, although Williams et al (1992) argue that Japanese capitalism
can still rely on cheap labour from the high amounts of unpaid or low-paid overtime
worked.
In an analysis of consumer electronics in Japan K Ohmae (1985;56) stated that:
Because Japan's major exports, for example, automobiles, consumer
electronics, cameras, and watches, are so visible, the Western world
has the false impression that all Japanese industries, and therefore
management, are competitive and generally successful.
He then went on to argue that industry outside these areas were comparatively
uncompetitive and has poor productivity. Further (1985;57):
If we remove these uncompetitive industries from the manufacturing
sector, the remaining (that is, competitive) industries correspond to
only thirteen percent of the Japanese working population. They are
mainly assembly industries, with the possible exception of steelmaking.
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Thus, overall, Japan's "power" is limited to a few industries.
He then explained that both foreigners and Japanese were unaware of this structural
weakness in Japanese capitalism. This directly challenges the centrality given to
Japanese capitalism in a new economic order on the one hand (eg Oliver and
Wilkinson; 1988, Kenney and Florida; 1988) and, on the other, those who suggest that
the Japanese cultural context provides the basis for economic superiority (eg Sethi et
al;1984, Dore;1974).
Ohmae's description may mean that the headquarters of consumer electronics
corporations in Japan have a responsibility to the Ministry of International Trade and
Industry (MIT!) and the elected government as the cutting edge of the development
of Japanese Capitalism; teaching the inefficient how they may become efficient. At
another level, these industries can attract the "cream" of the Japanese education
system so perpetuating their dominant position. This may be more achievable because
of the relatively small concentration of efficient capital. This may also account for
competent managers dealing with what is relatively old technology - televisions.
For the plants, this had two consequences. The cutting edge of UK capital was in
other sectors, so less proficient managers were retained in the consumer electronics
sector, coming up against the cream of Japan's management. Second, with such a
dominant position in Japan, overseas operations may have been politically low key
in comparison to domestic issues of intense oligopolistic market competition and rapid
product development. This could be especially true for companies that were seen as
Japan's giants (eg Matsushita, NEC, Fujitsu, Toyota) and for Japanese on assignment
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to the local plants (although this may be said of any multinational's expatriates
looking after their own careers).
One qualification to this line of argument is that Clegg (1987;107-8) found that
Japanese capital tends to export in high technology areas whilst only allowing low
technology products to be produced in overseas direct investment plants. Thus, what
arrived in Britain was well tried in Japan (Reitsperger; 1986;74) and was no longer
the focus for future growth of Japanese capital.
There is, however, a more general argument that Japarese firms are 'reiiictanI
multinationals' and have been forced into the situation of overseas xiecnment.
The initial proponent of this argument was Trevor (1983), who suggested that external
trade had been through trading houses but protectionism and fear of Japanese (note
not European) competitors pushed them into import quotas. He argued that the
reluctance was not because of production methods, 'Qhich 'Nexe ax'f4a cporte to
Japan, but arose from management and personnel practices.
The implication of this reluctance is that in organisational terms there would be a
reluctance to delegate control to overseas plants for fear of loosing competitive
advantage and a lack of competence in international operations. Franco (1983),
Williams, Williams, Haslam, Adcroft and Johal (1992) and Nagano (Interview 28-4-
90a) reinforced the 'reluctance theory' by arguing that investment in North America
and Europe was done to promote or ensure the continuity of imports. Franco stated
that even with expanding direct investment, the objective of multinationalisation was
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in (1983;71):
Promoting Japanese exports of components and intermediaries
indirectly by establishing manufacturing facilities 'upstream' in a
vertically integrated chain.
Thus, the relevance of manufacturing plants in Britain was merely to ensure overall
profitability in terms of continued imports. In this way, competitive advantages of
home production were maintained by minimal expenditure on final assembly in the
host country. The implication is that transferability of Japanese practices was, thus,
unnecessary and irrelevant. Williams et al (1992) go further, to suggest that the local
production plants were not here to make profits but as a political exercise to gain
access for continued imports to Europe.
Takayama (1981) was generally sceptical about the whole idea of transferability
because of the interrelationship between the development of technology and its social
location. Others, qualify this, such as Dunning (1986;70-80) and Abo (1990; 100-20)
have researched transferability in consumer electronics and found that from checklists
of practices, there were variations. Personnel and marketing methods tended to be
localised, whereas company philosophy, Research and Development, and financing
tended to be centralised.
A final argument is that Japanese capitalism is still immature in overseas investment
and that in time it will mature (eg implied in Clegg;1987;30). This is not an
important issue for this thesis, but has been dealt with elsewhere. The implication for
this chapter is that, perhaps, the Japanese companies in this study were using the case
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plants as learning experiences, rather than as positively contributing to accumulation.
This body of literature indicates in general that Japanese corporations wish to
centralise control as far as possible, within the constraints of local markets and
industrial cultures. The following sections of the thesis will explore the location of
corporate control between Japanese headquarters and the UK based case plants.
JAPANESE GLOBAL STRATEGIES
The UK was seen by Kuda as a good place to produce televisions because of low
wages, high ability to produce, and in Wales, a good attitude. Kuda had developed
like a true multinational using local managers, informally supervised by Japanese
'advisors'. Japanese were used to teach locals how to use machines developed in
Japan. This in turn was a learning experience for the Japanese. As regards the use of
Japanese advisers Kuda was reticent about providing a direct answer - first pretending
they do not exist then, when confronted with evidence of one, they said it was part
of his management development training (Interviews 1-3-90a and 18-4-90). Advisers
have more power than Kuda would like to admit and such advisors seem to be a
common feature of Japanese firms operating in the UK (Field notes and Taylor; 1986).
An Orki manager listed some reasons why the company had difficulty in transferring
production overseas. He said "certain high-tech products could not be manufactured
overseas" (Interview 17-4-90), not because of capital costs, but because of the
competence of local skills to do precision work. He argued that 'it is not economical
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to send the engineers to train locals as they are doing now' because while these
engineers train others they were not developing or applying their own skills back in
Japan. He went on to say that regarding responsibility "If we had more capable local
people, we'd put more responsibility in the hands of local people" (Interview
17-4-90). Yet it was a policy to delegate responsibility to local people. Thus, this
manager saw transferability as very problematic.
In order to 'prove his scepticism the managei said "W&ie 'e
(Interview 17-4-90) with prof'itabiity being inei in 	 a inan lT1
Furthermore, Orki opened a components factory in Europe 'on(y beeause of the ocai
content rule'. So, televisions were not making a ioss, perhaps reac)ing a break-even
point, allowing Orki to keep a high profile in the market because in Europe there
were customers for other Orki products which were more profitab'ie 1nterview
17-4-90).
The headquarters of Hashi thought that the British plant should become the centre of
production for Europe but the local workers seemed content to only supply Britain.
The number of engineers was being increased in their German plant. Overall
productivity was lower than Western Germany but higher for wage productivity,
though this was still lower than Asian countries. Productivity in the US was 'average'
though increasing now.
According to a Japanese manager, local UK managers tended not to want much
responsibility, only job security (Interview 19-4-90). To illustrate his point he
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suggested that whereas in Japan quality inspectors went onto the line to locate
potential faults, in Britain the all local-teams didn't. However, because suitable local
managers were in short supply the threat of lay-offs would be dangerous. Thus, "We
don't expect local managers to play a larger role. We have tried to change their
attitudes but have had little success" (Interview 19-4-90). In the UK there were,
relative to other Hashi plants, few Japanese managers, seven out of a total of 1,000
workers and managers (Interview 19-4-90).
After the buy-out Hashi sent many local managers to Japan for training, in Japanese
management practices, although this does not seem to happen at the time of the field
research. The expectation was that new recruits will get on-the-job training from their
bosses, who had been trained in Japan, or were Japanese.
Overall, there was an impression from Japanese interviewees that local managers
were seen as somewhat stupid and generally there was this feeling of 'under
development' in the UK. On the other hand, shopfloor labour got mixed reviews.
Export ratios
Dunning and Cantwell (1989; 1) report that the US produces five times as much by
sales in Europe as it exports to the EC, but Japan only 20 percent. Thus, these
overseas operations were only part of the relationship Japan had with European
consumers and governments. In terms of operational efficiency Britain was seen as
primarily cheap labour, but workers generally were also seen as having no enthusiasm
and were unskilled.
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Kuda exported only 34 inch televisions to Europe and about 1,000 to 2,000 per month
from its British assembly plant. As from 1991, these would be produced in Western
Germany (Interview 18-4-90), along with other sizes of televisions already produced
to meet continental consumer demand.
In the 1970s, the head of Orki, produced a 50 I 50 sales plan of domestic and
overseas production for the subsequent 10 years for all products, called the
"Corporate International Cooperation Action Program" (Interview 17-4-90). Europe
would be slightly late in achieving the target of 50 percent locally produced against
50 percent exported from Japan. At the same time there was an intention to double
imports to Japan - "We will import anything" (Interview 17-4-90). Orki claimed to
be the biggest importer to Japan of all manufacturers, for example importing a few
large screen sets from the US (Interview 17-4-90).
Managers at Koorki were proud to inform that they produced 99 percent of Orki's
televisions within the European market, the other one percent being specialist
televisions, sourced from East Asia. Orki did not export any televisions from Japan
but did bring a small percentage from other Asian countries. These comprised cheaper
models, and high tech products could be shipped in future, such as HDTV and LCD
screen televisions. Their market share stood at four percent in 1986, and about the
same, three years later. Within Britain, where 40 percent of production was sold, the
companies held six percent market share in 1986, behind the European multinationals
and other Japanese producers (Interview 13-1 1-89).
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Hashi exported large size and projection televisions from Japan. Small size televisions
came from Singapore. Germany made some large screens and the in UK small and
medium televisions (Interview 19-4-90).
Production was usually concentrated on the UK market although, as pointed out,
Koorki supplied the rest of Europe as well. Specialist and low volume sets were
produced in Asia, leaving European plants, and those in the UK in particular, to
concentrate on simpler forms of production in mass assembly factories.
UK plants were important to the Japanese for supplying the UK consumer market,
and in Koorki's case this extends to the greater European market. However, as later
sections will show, this importance was relative, such that the European market was
not a major contributor to corporate profits, perhaps with the exception of Kuda.
Purchasin2 parts and subcontractors
In the case of Kuda, discrete (surface mount) components were sourced from Japan
and assembly components were sourced in Europe, because (Interview; 18.4.90), it
was easier to use assembly components in Europe which suited a lower level of
technology used in the European plants, than in Japan. The Kuda philosophy was to
develop cooperative relations with the subcontractor to develop components, many of
which were new. As regards local content, this was built up as production expanded
to avoid delivery problems across the world, based on communications problems.
Kuda had not encouraged Japanese sub-contractors to locate in Europe because of
cultural and language barriers for the suppliers.
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An Orki interviewee stated that the company had a policy of trying to raise local
content as much as possible. Orki had not encouraged Japanese subcontractors to
set-up overseas so far because it was not seen as necessary. Ninety percent of
television components were made within the Orki group, though they tended to buy
simple components, such as cabinets, boxes and mechanical components from outside
the group. Wherever possible Orki had joint ventures with other European companies,
including Bosch, Philips, Grundig and Seimens (in US with Kodak) but not with Burg
(Interview 17-4-90).
In Japan Hashi made only the major parts of the television and subcontracts the rest.
However in Europe, in order to meet local content requirements, these parts were
bought locally, though they were of a lower standard. It was believed that in Asia
parts were of better quality than in the West because Japanese production methods
were used, and Hashi had trained Korean subcontractors in Japanese techniques in the
past. For example, in the US all non-mechanical parts were brought from Asia, but
the tubes from the US supplier had a much higher failure rate, though the price was
cheaper. Chasses for overseas production were assembled in Asia because of cost and
reliability. Generally, as far as local content restrictions allow, Hashi bought parts in
Asia and exported them to other overseas plants. Hashi had not asked Japanese
subcontractors to go overseas but had told them that production would stop in Japan
so this may have been an encouragement! They were not teaching manufacturing
techniques to Western suppliers, only the managerial style - the emphasis on quality
consciousness, and providing strict quality and delivery time standards. It was thought
that UK suppliers were learning by their mistakes, and that increasingly quality
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control people in newly established overseas plants tended to be highly trained
(Interview 19-4-90). Because the Kohashi plant was previously a joint venture there
were local designers and more than 50 percent of chassis were designed in Europe
(Interview 19-4-90).
Ownership identity in the branch plants
Local managers in the Japanese case study plants thought the plants were essentially
British, despite the foreign ownership. On the other hand, workers and supervisors
saw the plant as a Japanese one, controlled and directed by Japanese. This might
reflect a wish by British managers to retain some status and feeling of power, or a
view by workers of unique working arrangements 1 . This split of identity was a strong
feature of consciousness in the Japanese cases, and to a lesser extent in Koburg.
The general consensus from interviews undertaken in Japan was that the UK plants
were not an independent profit centred but formed part of the global organisation of
the parent conglomerates. In turn the globalisation strategy was born out of particular
circumstances in Japan, which were not desirable for Japanese capital (Trevor; 1983).
However, the situation was complex, with pressures to localise with inhibitions to let
much control decentralise.
'These explanations will be explored further in Chapter Nine.
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POWER AND INFLUENCE OF CONSUMER ELECTRONICS IN JAPAN
This section will discuss various aspects of corporate power and control within the
three Japanese cases, and Burg, to explain how plants were integrated into an overall
global strategy.
The UK branch plants operated within a context of relations between Japan and the
local plants. These were determined by the size of the plants and the revenue
contribution they made in relation to the overall activities of the multinationals. This
contribution may be measured not just in terms of sales or profits, but in terms of
corporate image. This sub-section deals with these issues under the headings: size and
product mix, and Japanese relations to overseas investment, and finally draws some
conclusions.
Size and product mix
One rather obvious thing to say about size is that the 13K plants were small in
comparison to the size of the overall organisations. Based on their respective 1989
year end accounts:
Table 8: Size of the Corporations
Unit sales (1 million)
Hashi
	
274,508	 6,401,417 (25,6O6)
Orki
	
193,088
	
5,504,250 (f22,017)
Kuda	 78,900
	
2,145,329 (8,5813)
(Source: corporations Annual Reports, 1989)
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Although Hashi was the largest, and so would seem the most powerful producer, this
is not necessarily so. Orki was seen as the giant, the pace setter in Japan and did
effectively decide the format of VCR (Video Cassette Recorder), even though it did
not develop any format itself (Morita; 1987; 150 and Lardner;1987; 137-150). Hashi
only had 16 percent of its sales from consumer electronics (Annual Report; 1989),
whereas Kuda received 16 percent of sales from televisions alone (Annual
Report; 1989). In 1990 Orki recorded 29 percent of its total sales from television and
video recorder sales (Annual Report; 1990). However, among these firms one point
is clear, there was a strategic shift of product mix away from consumer electrical
products to information and other industrial electronics (office automation etc), as
Japan's domestic consumer market became saturated. The implication of this is that
it is not absolute size or membership of a huge Japanese keiretsu 2 grouping which
determines power and influence within the industry but size and influence focused
within particular markets which facilitates Orki's position of dominance. Orki
management's wish to sustain and extend dominance overseas may be displayed in its
ever expanding number of plants being located in Britain - five other plants in the UK
- establishing one in 1986, two more in 1988 and two in 1989 for different electronics
products (Interviews 17-4-90 and 16-8-90).
2 Keiretsu are post war reconstitution of Zaibatsu conglomerates, which were banned by
US occupiers of Japan after WWII because they were associated with fascism and
strong power centralisation to the benefit of a few ruling families associated with the
Emperor. These Keiretsu have been accredited with forming the backbone of Japanese
economic development by many writers, such as Clark (1979)
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Japanese reactions to overseas investment
Disinvestment from Japan to overseas in the early 1980s was a serious concern,
especially in relation to consumer electronics, incurring a strong reaction from the
Left in Japan (see for example Ajima; 1986 or Toda; 1987). Although, at the time of
the research, the feared 'hollowing-out' of manufacturing had not generally
occurred3 , the union movement, especially Denkirouren (Federation of Electrical
Workers Unions), had been very active in providing policies and material to the
general public and government officers on their employers' growth in direct overseas
investment (Rengo; 1989, and Interviews 24-4-90 and 26-4-90). The unions have
tended to be interested in influencing the type of unionism growing in East Asian
countries and protecting their own members (eg Nikkeiren;1989;15). Irie (1984) did
find evidence of a decline in employment in at least one consumer electronics parts
maker, as well as much data on export substitution. Such fears may affect the degree
to which the state was involved in encouraging such disinvestment
(Zimmerman;1985;157-8 and Kotler et aI;1985;64-74).
The reaction from the labour movement is interesting in that Japan was the first
advanced capitalist country where penetration into other markets was initially wholly
achieved by exports (Trevor;1983 and Kotler et al;173-96). Only later export
substitution took place. What was previously made by Japanese workers in Japan, was
eventually made largely by British workers in Britain. For televisions this had become
By early 1993 there were strong indications that through recession and expanding
disinvestment from Japan profits and even employment commitments were under
threat.
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almost 100 percent substitution, leaving the Japanese plants to produce replacements
for the now saturated domestic market (Interviews 22-2-89 and 17-3-89). Even the
few sets that were exported to Britain, at the time of the interviews, tended to be
made in Taiwan, Malaysia or Singapore.
Conclusion
While the UK plants were only a small part of the overall contribution and
employment of the Japanese corporations they had attracted considerable concern.
Add British media and academic interest to Japanese fears and the significance of
relatively small operations becomes magnified. Thus, UK branch plants operated
within a goldfish bowl of attention, affecting the whole corporate image. For the
Japanese, the UK plants needed to be played down, but for the UK public they should
be made to look significant both as contributing to the economy, and as model
employers. In this way, the Japanese corporate image makers fuel the academic
debates about Japanese capitalist superiority.
However, while all the multinational corporations were huge, and in this regard their
UK plant operations appear insignificant, the operation of European Community
Tariff and Import Barriers placed local manufacturers, including Burg, at an
advantage over the Japanese. Whereas Burg could switch production between plants
within Europe, this meant that the Japanese were relatively tied to making a success
of their single UK operations, or in the case of Kuda, restricted to a choice between
Germany and UK plants.
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CONTROL STRUCTURE
The structure of management control is determined by a complex set of relations
within and between functions and communication networks. This section will analyze
some selected activities in order to locate where control and power lay between
Headquarters and the UK.
Organisational Structures
The Japanese Corporations had regional headquarters for Europe, and North America,
to coordinate local operations. This contrasts with centralising all management
functions within Japan for East Asian operations. Executives in Japan gave as the
reason for the European structure 'in order to respond quickly to local production,
the market, and for costing purposes' (Interviews 13-11-89, 17-4-90, 18-4-90 and
19-4-90). This does not explain the different treatment between East Asia and Europe.
The Japanese recognised the peculiarities of the Western markets and capitalist
formation and the contrast with their economic dominance of the East Asian region,
supplanting military dominance of the past4 . Moreover, whereas the Western plants
tended to supply local markets, the East Asian overseas plants tended to be export
orientated, thus needing to be integrated into the headquarters's global strategies.
Burg's control over Koburg's branch plants was being increased since the takeover.
A tier of management was abolished so that the UK branch plant dealt direct with
This is not a racist comment, but based on experience of conversations with Chinese,
Taiwanese, Thai, South Korean, Indonesian and Malaysian, as well as right wing
Japanese, over the past six years. Halliday (1975;293-9) and Sadao (1989;166-206)
provide good accounts of the extent and dangers of this.
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television headquarters in the European Capital (Interview 27-11-89). This same
headquarters was part of an overall headquarters for all Burg operations. Moreover,
sales were coordinated through the headquarters, being part of a division separate
from production.
Within the organisations there were fairly 'standard' organisational trees, with
functional separations, such as Purchasing and Production, and staff hierarchies, such
as Personnel. The organisation of production relates to corporate strategies, which
required differing management structures depending on the role of assembly plants.
Thus, Koorki, Kokuda and Kohashi were given more decentralised control from
Tokyo than their Thai counterparts. Koburg, on the other hand was tied into a central
control by Burg. The reasons for these differences in tiers of management may relate
to economic zones based on geographical proximity to headquarters, such that Thai
plants were closer to Japan and Koburg to Burg.
Coordination and Communication.
The channels of communication and the methods by which local managers were
informed of what was going on in global operations indicate much about control. If
the headquarters was the locus for communication within global operations, such that
a UK plant must go via the parent country to communicate with another branch plant,
power was centralised. The interviews show differing areas of focus for coordinating
global operations.
Koburg's managers had no formal mechanisms but neither were there any official
123
restrictions to direct communications with other plants. As there were no 'enabling'
facilities, it seems that uncertainties in the Koburg plant about the future (and
language barriers) focused communication on telephone conversations and informal
meetings almost exclusively with headquarters.
Communication between subsidiaries in Kuda was direct. Marketing headquarters in
Europe decided monthly production targets with the sales people in each country.
Also, a UK executive was a Kuda Board member and Head of Kuda television
Europe. There was also a liaison office in Japan which dealt with a 'window person5'
in the Business Group; television was a Business Group, as too was Video (Interview
18-4-90). Kuda had a policy of conducting meetings in English, even among the
Japanese themselves. However, there was usually somebody from Europe in Tokyo
to take part in such meetings. There was no formal communications network, so it
was up to individuals, and personal contact was seen as the best way of
communicating (Interview 18-4-90).
	 -
Orki was just starting to introduce a global information network system using an
internal telephone system. Also, all the Regional headquarters had moved from Japan
to the relevant locations. These headquarters were responsible for sales and
production over the whole range of products. In Japan the organisational structure
was split between sales and production and in production by product group. There
This Japanese manager was responsible for communication between the UK plant and
overall operations in Japan. This not only had a formal element but provided the
expatriates in the UK with access to current issues and activities 'back' in Japan.
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were five secretary executives world-wide, one for each sector: audio visual,
television, home appliances, information equipment and air conditioning. All
decisions were taken regionally, including such things as calculating the economic
feasibility of capital investments, such as robotics, and items such as wages were set
locally, in the plant. For meetings with local staff "language is a big problem"
(Interview 17-4-90), but between engineers it was not, because of the nature of the
things being communicated and the commonality of technical items (Interview
17-4-90).
Hashi had a training school at the headquarters for overseas managers and ensineers
in Japan, which it considered a worthwhile, though expensive, exercise.
Communications was mainly achieved through periodic meetings. Designers in
Europe met twice a year to develop next year's products. Accountants and presidents
went to Japan twice a year and buyers met in Asia and Europe twice a year. For
Koburg, twice yearly meetings occurred in London between sales and production.
Costs and efficiencies were discussed but remained the responsibility of plant
managers. Sales prices were decided by Sales. Shipping price was negotiated between
the two. Sales and production were separate up to Japan level. If a compromise could
not be reached locally it could be resolved between Sales and the Vice President of
Consumer Products Group. Europe was the only area where a regional headquarters
was felt to be needed, although there was increasing regionalisation. It was planned
that the overseas headquarters would move to Singapore and merge the Asian
subsidiaries into one over the subsequent two years (Interview 19-4-90).
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There were clear problems in organising effective forms of global communication
networks capable of carrying a corporate identity. Orki was the only one of the three
to attempt advanced formal networks which allowed, even encouraged, horizontal
communication. The other three relied on periodic meetings and informal
communication, which signify either a lack of interest in communications systems,
which was unlikely, or a wish to centrally control communications. This latter
approach may have also increased information reaching the headquarters, as problems
which individual plants may have feared declaring directly may be admitted if there
were other plants facing similar problems. Any dangers of loss of control by the
headquarters which this may facilitate were unlikely because expatriate Japanese
would fear its affect on their personal careers. Thus, ultimately centralised control
was maintained.
Informal relations.
A distinction needs to be made between local managers and expatriates in terms of
their informal relations. For locals, informal networks were established as a result of
formal meetings and training periods. In contrast the expatriates had much more
scope for extensive networking than locals. This was extenuated in the Japanese plants
because the multinationals had adopted a strategy of very close contact between the
centre and the local plants. Japanese managers were in constant contact with their
work mates in Japan, in the 'mother' plant.
In Koburg, contact with headquarters by local managers and engineers was rare.
Contact with other plants was also rare, except that when some equipment was
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transferred from another plant some local engineers and technicians met home country
counterparts. However, friendships were not readily established in these exchanges
(Interviews 6-12-89a and 6-12-89b).
The introduction of a European Headquarters for Orki and Kuda had reduced some
direct communication between the expatriate managers and improved that for locals.
However, because the UK case study plants manufactured televisions, the Japanese
expatriates had much more in common, for most issues, with the 'mother' plants in
Japan than with the regional headquarters in Europe (Interview 28-6-90). These
potential conflicts of interest among expatriates which could result are discussed later.
The informal communications, language and perceived cultural differences put locals
at a significant disadvantage in dealing with the Japanese. This process contributed
to an 'us' and 'them' atmosphere in the plants, at least among those off the shopfloor,
notably managers6.
Conclusion.
Orki was the only case where significant steps were being made to integrate the
Koorki plant into a global network. The others relied on formal meetings and
informal contacts for information. The result was that communication was for, and
through, home country nationals. Informal barriers of language and personal contacts
6 This draws on my own experience in Japan, both when I could not speak Japanese and
when I was more proficient, witnessing those who could not communicate. BBC's
(1987) "Chopsticks, Bulldozers and Newcastle Brown" documentaries also showed
such problems within Komatsu.
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effectively precluded UK nationals being involved in much of the power base of each
of the multinationals. Thus, power and authority rested with Japanese, who had a
degree of independence to make decisions but were strongly tied, personally and
organisationally, to the corporate management structures. Therefore, the case study
plants were Japanese owned and run, and any issues of localisation of production
techniques or personnel practices would were severely constrained by this Japanese
power base.
CONTROL INDICES
Using two examples, financial control and location of research and development, an
assessment can be made about the independence of case plants or centrality of control
within multinationals. This will also provide some explanation of the reasons for the
location of power.
Method of financial control.7
Williams et al (1991) explain how management accounting in Japanese corporations
is primarily concerned with design and how individual costs relate to overall
performance of the company, in contrast to US and UK company pre-occupations.
The Japanese approach is, then, based on cost minimisation as part of a production
strategy based on continual improvement - Kaizen (199 1;11). To quote (1991;15):
Orki was reticent about discussing financial control, so this section analyses only Kuda
and Hashi.
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In the Japanese scheme of things every worker must be his own
accountant just as he is his own engineer. Thus, in Sony television, the
view was that even labour productivity measures were too complicated,
abstract and indirect for shop floor use; the division's factory
managers were expected to translate a request for 10 percent labour
productivity improvement into "remove one worker in 10 within so
many months".
The implications of this research are that control over design and long term budgets
are the points at which control may be measured. Other forms of accounting, seen in
Koburg, were less important in the Japanese cases. However, Burg was following the
trend of regarding measuring market share as just as important as monthly
profitability statements (Interview 7-1 2-89a).
Kuda saw Tokyo as the profit centre, and its role was to suggest how overseas plants
could make profits. Kuda also gathered the overseas representatives together in order
to make production decisions. Tokyo was also responsible for architectural research
and bore the cost of that, even if the'j asked an o ersezs at to he. T other
words, the overseas plant could cost such research to Tokyo,even for Teletext, a
feature exclusive to the UK market. All research projects were generated in Tokyo,
although Kokuda could spend its own money to develop something itself. On the
other hand salaries were a local management issue (Interview 18-4-90).
In Hashi, the individual plants were the profit centres. Overheads were centrally
allocated to the plants but this was difficult. Each product design group was given an
overhead of 10 to 20 percent. During budget periods, job descriptions of individual
workers were compared to different factory tasks. This then allowed product costings
to be made by apportioning each worker's pay-roll to each product (Interview
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19-4-90).
In Burg, financial control was restricted to formal financial measures. There was an
emphasis on overall control measured in financial terms, which was underlined by the
fact that the only permanent expatriate was the Finance Director. He was responsible
for the plant as a profit centre.
Although there were differences in the location of the profit centres between the two
Japanese companies, because of high integration, formal and informal, the distinction
is a little artificial. Williams et al (1992), Kotler et al (1985;152) Trevor (1983;197-8)
and others indicate that competition between Japanese enterprises in terms of market
shares is more important than short run profits, thus reducing the importance of the
accountant, so dominant in the West, including the UK (eg Armstrong;1989), and
within Burg. However, the location of the profit centre unit does indicate how local
plant operations were seen. Whereas Kuda television manufacture was a global
operation, and required global costing, Hashi and Burg localised accountability as an
overt statement about the responsibility of local operations. Perhaps, the fact that both
plants were takeover businesses highlights the need to express improvements in
financial terms so that it was familiar to local managers, who were held accountable
in such ways previously.
Location of research and development.
There are two levels or kinds of research: first basic, fundamental research for new
materials, types of products, and second, design, production methods and product
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market. Basic research is expensive, requiring very highly skilled labour and
specialised equipment. For these reasons, it tends to be centralised in one place.
Design research must be sensitive to local markets. As market penetration had been
undertaken through exports, design research and development was centralised in the
headquarters countries. With the shift towards local production, there had been a
parallel localisation of design, and with decentralisation of such research can come
greater autonomy of operations within Europe.
Kuda relied on European suppliers for unique European technologies, such as Teletext
and Prestel terminals (Interview 28-6-90e). Burg and Philips were the first to design
many of these new technologies but Kuda was the first to get them onto the market
in marketable designs. These designs were created by local people. The procedure
was that basic design, for example 'Superscreen' 8 , was carried out in Tokyo while
Kokuda designed the chassis (Interview 18-4-90). Kuda found no problem obtaining
engineering skills in Britain, preferring to employ generalists who were not specialist
engineering graduates, and then training them up (Interview 28-6-90f).
Orki did most research and development at the main site in Japan but was planning
a structure where there were regional research and development centres (Interview
17-4-90). This would facilitate such developments as English language technology.
However, the local plant was experiencing difficulties recruiting and retaining
'Superscreen' is a disguised name for a basic research invention. This was originally
designed in Kokuda.
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appropriately skilled engineers for design work in the UK (Interview 16-8-90f).
Hashi organised its research and development into two types each related to costs: (a)
cost allocated directly to the product and (b) diluted overhead. The first was for
product design and the latter for new product and broad-based research. Basic and
new product design research was carried out at the central laboratories only, whereas
product design was also carried out at divisional laboratories related to industrial
sectors. There was no move to localise research and development for televisions as
chassis technology could be standardised and circuitry differences were small. Only
Studio (commercial broadcasting and the like) standard chassis were different
(Interview 19-4-90).
Burg was the most centralised of all the cases and was committed to furthering this
process. There was a policy, in the case of televisions, to centralise basic and most
other forms of product design to a single location in Europe (Interviews 24-10-89 and
6-12-89c). One of the repercussions of this was redundancies in the UK and some
feelings of insecurity, and certainly a loss of UK operational independence.
For the other three, Japanese, cases the basic design determined the basis of the
productive process and so was a fundamental restriction of any potential local
autonomy. Local managers and engineers looked to Japan for advice not only because
of this but also because the Japanese plants tended to be quicker at implementing
change. For instance, a new form of automated machine will be introduced into
Koorki soon after the field research, but it was already running in Japan. As one
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Japanese manager put it, "when someone is ahead of you in the game, you look to
them as teacher" (Interview 17-4-90).
Basic research and production design was centralised in Japan, whilst much
technology used in Europe was bought from indigenous manufacturers. The remaining
design was produced within Europe, though not necessarily at the plants. Orki was
leading the way towards increased design localisation for the so called 'add-ons -
teletext, PAL (Picture Aptitude Lines, the UK system for number of lines on the
television) and so on. There were genuine moves to localise research and so increase
local autonomy in these areas.
The control of Koburg by Burg was very simple: direct control which treats Koburg
as a branch plant of centralised operations. The Japanese were more complex, with
the most Europeanised style of control being displayed in Kuda, and the most globally
orientated being Orki.
POWER OF EXPATRIATES
The number of expatriates working in local plants and the positions they held
indicate, much about the location of power and trust in the multinationals. There were
three levels of expatriate employment: managerial, engineering and shopfloor. There
was an additional category in the Japanese plants called advisors, who were not line
manages but 'advised' local managers. This section will discuss numbers working in
the branch plants, the preparation given to expatriates going to the UK, and the role
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of such expatriates when in the branch plants.
Numbers of Expatriates
It is difficult to provide exact figures and jobs of expatriates in the case study plants
because distinctions were made between short and long term stays, whilst the
Japanese companies were reticent about discussing anything concerning their
'advisors'.
In Koburg there was only one expatriate manager, the Financial Director. Other
executives visited the plant periodically but only for short periods. It was common
for engineers to visit but more often the local engineers visited continental plants in
an effort to standardise production technology.
In Koorki seven out of nine senior managers were from Japan, leaving Manufacture
and Personnel to locals. There was one Japanese middle manager in production out
of three. However, this hid two phenomena: trainees and advisors. Trainees came to
the UK plant as part of management development programmes to learn about the
international side of the multinational's operations. Advisors came to the plants in
order to advise or liaise with line managers but their exact role is unclear to the
outside observer. What is clear is that they tended to stay two or more years.
In Kokuda the structure was more complex because television was split into tube and
main assembly, each with a senior production manager. Among other senior managers
three out of six were local, controlling Colour Television operations, Public Relations
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and Finance. The Japanese controlled Tube manufacture, the Chief Executive and
Research.
Kohashi had moved from all 10 Directors being Japanese to five being local. These
locals headed Personnel, Colour Television Manufacture, Quality, Micro-wave Oven
Manufacture and Finance. More generally, among 27 managers, above the level of
supervisor, there were eight Japanese in Kohashi.
Generally, there were no permanent Japanese managerial staff at levels lower than
upper middle management in any of the case plants. Although statistics were not
forthcoming from interviews, there were Japanese engineers in evidence in research
and development sections of the plants, as well as young assistants in the offices.
In conclusion, the lack of direct control in Koburg was in marked contrast to the
Japanese cases, especially considering that the takeover of Koburg was only two years
old. At a similar period of ownership by the Japanese (two years) there would have
been over 100 Japanese managers and engineers and many short visits. For example,
after a period of two years of single ownership, Kohashi was swarming with over 70
Japanese staff.
Preparation of expatriates
There was considerable variation in the extent of preparation of expatriates by the
Japanese parent companies, which is discussed below. In Kuda there was no training
programme for Japanese going overseas. Staff had to learn the local language on the
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job and go when and where they were needed, often at short notice. There was no
special treatment for returning expatriates, though re-adjustment could be hard
(Interview 18-4-90).
Orki had a training programme for both expatriates going overseas and local
managers at a Training Centre. It handled about 1,000 people a year. For expatriates
the training was supposed to last six months, but depends on the time available. There
were also English language classes generally available. Returning Japanese usually
took-up their old jobs (Interview 17-4-90).
In Hashi expatriates and their families were trained before an overseas assignment.
Returning expatriates tended to either get their old job back or were promoted on
seniority grounds. Usually only manufacturing people were sent but more recently
designers, accounts staff and buyers were being sent.
These cases showed clear differences of approach to training. In all the cases,
however, communication in English was poor and I thought there was generally poor
preparation for Japanese going overseas to cope with UK customs and culture in the
impression of the researcher. This might reflect the difficulty of work life for a
Japanese 'salaryman' 9
 or a lack of understanding of the nature and problems of
The Japanese 'salaryman' is noted for having long work hours and his personal life
is little considered by the company. It is not uncommon to be told on Friday that you
must work in another part of Japan, away from family and friends, to then be
expected to complete a normal twelve hour day on the Friday, and the following
Monday in the new location.
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multinational management. In consequence a kind of Japanese 'ghetto' formed in each
plant of Japanese speaking and socialising, to the exclusion of locals.
Role of expatriates in the case plants
The role of expatriates indicates the degree of trust given to local managers and the
perceived competency in areas such as production management. Moreover, there are
issues of training managers to become directors of multinational activities.
In Koburg the expatriate had a clear line functional job, doing financial management.
This shows that there was a strong line control from Burg headquarters down to the
plants, via the financing mechanism. However, the Japanese, with greater numbers
and more diverse positions had a less clear status in the UK plants. One UK manager
in Koorki explained that (Interview 21-2-90a):
Targets are set by the Japanese but how we get there is up to UK
management	 -
Thus, the UK managers seemed to have a form of responsible autonomy based on
discretion in achieving financial targets. A Japanese manager thought of it differently
(Interview 16-8-900, as:
Generally it is managed here [at Koorki] but contact is needed for
Japanese know-how, new materials, etc.
This suggests that the relation was far more ambiguous, although responsibility still
lay within Koorki. Whatever the formal structures, Japanese managers retained a
strong hold over overseas plants. As Hishinuma (1986;98) explains:
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Japanese firms tended to use operational and managerial control
[and] Japanese managers tended to be autocratic
This control is exercised on two levels: personal and through the management of
business activities. These activities include centralised control of basic research and
development, and through some ambiguity of financing arrangements, which allow
corporate headquarters to change budget definitions in order to retain control over the
unexpected! This ambiguity allows flexibility in managerial control from the centre
without Japan absolving ultimate power.
Few if any of the Japanese would be permanently located, or see their career
progression within European operations. They were more likely to be trying to
maintain a foothold in Japan and may even have felt their careers were threatened by
being out of the normal social networking, which is a feature of the Japanese
management development system @romotion system). In such a situation it was
unclear who the individual Japanese saw as his overall boss'°. Another orientation
of the expatriates was that, for their own career enhancement they saw the two or
three year stint in the overseas plant as providing an opportunity to make a name for
themselves by changing things 'to look good'. Thus, their interests may not have been
that of contributing to the development of the operations in the local plant".
'° The emphasis is on his because there were no women in any of the branch plants at
management levels. Some companies are trying to change this image, especially for
international public relations. The UK plants were also male dominated.
11 These ideas were developed from various discussions with Abo Tetsuo, of Tokyo
University.
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The Japanese plants used expatriates to a much greater extent than Burg. Although,
Kuda was not interested in training its expatriates to the extent the others, all put their
nationals in positions of strategic power in the UK plants. This allowed strong
Japanese control and influence on local operations, in terms of the basic design of
products, production arrangements, financial control and even output figures' 2
 as
well as providing for the personal development of individual Japanese.
COMPARISON OF APPROACHES
Although the Japanese and the European multinationals arrived at their market
positions through different historical circumstances, their strategies towards product
mix and competition were largely comparable. All the cases showed a tendency
towards centralised control by some means or another. However, there remained
differences which could only be understood through the national origin of the
multinational. This is not a culturalist argument but relates to the historical nature of
the development of multinational capital in Europe and Japan.
Whereas the European conglomerates grew partly through internal investment much
came from an aggressive policy of acquiring existing plants and personnel. On the
other hand, the Japanese preferred to obtain greenfield locations from which to
engage in export substituted production. Even when Hashi was denied this
'opportunity' by the British Government, it fought hard to replicate greenfield benefits
12 This was done through financial control and decisions about the relation between
imports and local production quotas.
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at its joint venture site by claiming that Japanese ways of doing things were unique.
Another difference was in the method of centralised control. Burg relied on a simple
financial control with budgets for capital expenditure and profit / loss centres. Burg
also had separate functions for production and finance, within its plant and
organisational structure. The Japanese were more complex in their approach to
control, and relied less on finance and much more on informal communications
between expatriates. On the other side, the communications between marketing staff
and the local plants meant that the Japanese plants had a degree of autonomy from
headquarters not experienced in Burg, which had rigid functional divisions within its
organisational structure.
In conclusion, although there were differences between each case and between the
countries of origin, it would be over-simplistic to hold to a view of Japanese
uniqueness, except in regards to the strong networking relations among expatriates
and between the UK plants and Japan. This, however, should not be over emphasised
because there were definite and deliberate attempts to concentrate power among the
Japanese, these networks merely lubricate the power structure in the conglomerates,
rather than being the power structure itself.
CONCLUSION
The approach to multinational control in Burg was different to the conventional view
of Japanisation. Kuda was most similar to the Japanisation picture, though with more
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informal mechanisms and structure, while Orki was the most globally orientated. On
the other hand, both Hashi and Burg were similar in trying to get formal local
financial accountability established. The largest difference was in the importance of
informal working relations which led to continuous flows of information which
dominated and permeated through the Japanese multinationals. However, this network
was a Japanese affair, precluding locals from access to the power base which such
information enhances or facilitates. Thus, whereas Burg's UK employees (managers
and labour) were controlled by budgets which were clear and public, in the Japanese
plants their local counterparts had less tangible targets of control. The locals had to
try to tap into the management networks through peop'e who saw their 	 tec
interests not in the UK plants, but back in Tokyo or Osaka.
The Japanese companies were essentially controlled by Japanese managers and
engineers located both in the headquarters, rather obviously, and in the UK case
plants. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the UK plants mirror Japanese home
country practices and, that what has become termed 'Japanese management style'
exists within the plants. There may be some assimilation of indigenous UK production
practices but these were ones the Japanese found acceptable without undermining their
own power base. Although, it is likely that most assimilation practices were related
to policies emanating from the Personnel Management function, it is necessary to
recognise that any personnel practices are qualified by the production imperative. A
major consideration in this is the forms of 'collective labour' management, which
forms the focus of this thesis, especially because of the 'perceived' uniqueness of UK
labour.
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One final general point is that although it is possible to argue that these organisations
were multinationals, in that they have production facilities in more than one country,
they were not strictly global corporations because of the centralisation of control
formally and informally. Although there is much confusion in the use of terms, within
the definition used by Dicken (1992;47-8) these were all multinationals, according to
Griffin and Ebert (1989;604-5) they were not, because, to be a truly multinational
corporation, there should be no perceived difference between production locations
overseas and home. The Japanese firms do make such a distinction, and so should be
considered as merely transnational 13 . This distinction is not pedantic but
acknowledges that however important the UK plants may be to the overall companies,
this would never be allowed to dominate home country considerations. Thus, UK
workers in the end were at the mercy of Continental or Japanese economic, political
and even social considerations.
13 For the purposes of this thesis, the term multinational will be used because, confusion
aside, this is the term most commonly used to describe these firms. However, the
distinction can be made that these are not global firms, without a 'home' country.
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SECTION II
PRACTICES
Section II is concerned with the way each of the cases operate, and is divided into
three chapters. The focus of the section is on how televisions are produced in the four
cases and whether these represented a new form of the organisation of production
which may be described as 'Japanised'. The. e.xpe.ctaton o tl'toe.s 	 sse
Chapter Two, is that the three Japanese cases should have shown a considerable
degree of transfer of Japanese practices, whilst the European case should, either have
been a poor emulator, or at least quite different from the other three in work and
employment practices.
Thus, Chapter Six, 'The Japanisation of Production?', describes the production
methods and evaluates these methods in terms of models of 'Japanisation'. Chapter
Seven, 'The Organisation of Work', analyzes how labour was utilised, whilst Chapter
Eight asks whether these arrangements amounted to 'A Flexible Organisation of
Work?'.
Viewed as a whole this Section explores the labour process, which then provides a
basis, together with Section Ito explore the experience of workers within the process.
The purpose of each chapter is to provide substantive information to enable
understanding of relations to be dealt with in Section III through discussions of
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production, work and employment practices. In addition, specific issues of
Japanisation and flexibility are addressed, such as just-in-time production practices,
lean-production, flexible working and employment patterns, and quality initiatives.
A picture is painted of complex and contradictory practices where there was little
conclusive evidence for Japanisation but much which identifies a wide gap between
managerialist rhetoric and practice within all four case plants.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE JAPANISATION OF PRODUCTION?
INTRODUCTION
This chapter focuses on the production process, indicating the contours of production,
the tasks and jobs undertaken, and the degree to which these production methods were
distinctive by focusing on points of comparison between measures of daily production
operations such as output, relations with suppliers, quality and automation. The
purpose is to explain how the cases dealt with the production issues of output, stocks,
quality and automation to show whether forms of operations existed which may be
seen as 'Japanese production methods', according to many authors, including Monden
(1983), Sayer (1986), Schonberger (1987), and Oliver and Wilkinson (1988, 1989 and
1992).	 -
Oliver and Wilkinson (1988) describe Japanisation within Direct Japanese investment
plants, of which 52 percent of their sample were in electrical and electronics. They
list an evaluation by companies of different practices, starting with production
techniques used'.
'Their evidence, however, for just-in-time relies only on purchases which are brought
into the factory just in time to be used in the assembly process. However, it is
generally acknowledged by the proponents of 'JIT' that it is dependent on most, if not
all, the other practices also being in place. Thus, without flexible group working and
zero quality defects JIT would not be possible.
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Table 9: Use of Japanese production techniques
Never	 In use, planned,
Practices	 I %
	 implementing_%
Total quality control	 0	 100
Statistical process control
	 21	 79
Quality circles	 27	 73
Just-in-time production	 36	 64
(Source: adapted from Oliver and Wilkinson; 1988; 120)
sample
19
14
30
22
All these techniques are used in more than half the cases, with more than 90 percent
of cases using the top three. Compared to the others, JIT (JIT) production is a
relative rarity, being practised in almost two-thirds of the plants. Clearly, the transfer
of production techniques from Japan is common, according to this study.
Oliver and Wilkinson asked respondents (managers in Japanese firms) to then evaluate
how successful these practices were seen to have been in the British context.
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Table 10: Evaluation of Japanese production techniques
	No	 Quite-very	 High Mean
Practices	 success	 success	 success 1 =low No.2
TQC	 0	 4	 8	 3.50	 12
SPC	 0	 6	 3	 2.89	 9
QC's	 1	 8	 1	 2.50	 10
JIT production	 1	 6
	
1	 2.25	 8
(Note: scale range is 1 -5)
(Source: based on Oliver and Wilkinson;1988;121)
Those practices which are more commonly used are found to be more successfuf,
which is probably derived from the Japanese managers only implementing practices
which are likely to succeed in their terms. There are few failures, so that it may be
concluded that not only is there a high incidence of transfer of p ctct5 I ut t.b.e
transfers are extremely successful.
This chapter will compare these findings by Oliver and Wilkinson with the research
findings of this thesis by looking at output, suppliers and stock holding, concerns
about, and control of, quality, then issues of automation of the production processes.
In this way an analysis of the degree to which the cases needed to implement
'Japanese' practices could take place.
2 This column was added to show the drop in response rate to these evaluative questions,
of an average of a third (64% from a possible 97% positive responses to the previous
question). With such small samples, especially for more taxing questions, it may be
misleading to rely heavily on such survey findings at all.
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Next the chapter will briefly outline the process in television assembly before
addressing more directly the issues of whether these processes were uniquely Japanese
or not.
TELEVISION ASSEMBLY
A television comprises of speaker(s), a tube (screen), an electrical device which fits
like a yoke around the back of the screen, a transformer which steps up the power
from 240 to over 1000 volts to power the tube, plus various circuit boards, including
the tuner and connecting wires. All this is contained within a plastic case. The case
itself consists of a chassis, on to which the screen and all the components are
mounted; a 'backing' serves as the means of enclosure to complete the 'box'. In all
the cases studied some components were bought into the plant, although, as will be
explained, there was variation in the incidence of sub-contracted assembly processes.
The television is made in a number of stages but three basic sub-assemblies and a
final assembly stage can be identified, for a diagrammatic representation of these
processes refer to Figure 1. The main sub-assembly is for printed circuit boards
(j)cb), which holds all the electronics for colour, transmission, channel selection and
so on. These boards are a common component in almost all electrical products,
including televisions. Another sub-assembly process involves placing the tube (the
screen through which the picture is viewed), with some attachments, in the 'box'. The
last sub-assembly is cabinet manufacture, which is now a plastic case made in two
parts - backing or cover and chassis. The main assembly puts these all together and
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packs them for storage. Increasingly there are 'add-ons', such as teletext, but these
are really just more pcb assemblies, introducing further sub-assembly stages. This can
mean that in a large set there can be 13 different boards per set. Some are very small
- a couple of inches square whilst others are the size of A4 paper. Moreover, all these
processes are checked by quality control staff at each stage of the process.
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Figure 1: Model diagram of colour television assembly
In all the case studies the layout of the factory floor consisted of production lines
dedicated to certain product types, with the exception of the auto insertion section,
which was situated at one end of the factories.
Television manufacture within the plants was assembly production, with clearly
demarcated tasks, which were defined in such a way as to avoid worker discretion in
undertaking their tasks. The complicated television was assembled so that each
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operation was straightforward. These sub and final assemblies involved a mixture of
highly manual and technical tasks, but the process was designed in such a way as to
minimise any specific task from being in itself complicated. Tasks were regulated by
track speeds and, apart from manual insertion, most tasks required little handling by
workers3.
FLUCTUATIONS IN PRODUCTION
There were areas of the plants which did not change very much, but elsewhere,
production runs tended to fluctuate, particularly where batch production was
operating. Batch production is a system where a given number of sets built to certain
specifications are produced followed by another given quantity or batch of sets with
different specifications. The latest variant in this type of production is called 'mixed'
production, where several single items are mixed in a sequence to form a continuous
flow of production. However, in Japan, and in these case studies, televisions were
produced in batches, with size variations of between 200 and 1,000 units. This meant
that in all the case plants on any given day there would be an average of one or two
changes in the type of television being produced on a line. However, this may not
have been very significant, especially as the chasses were dedicated to particular
lines, throughout the assembly process. In spite of this, any change has an impact on
This distinguishes consumer electronics assembly from that of cars, where much
handling of components is still required, even on lines which use many robots. This
may be important in drawing distinctions between 'Japanisation' features found in
auto industry and this research.
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workers, never allowing them to become completely 'robotised' 4 . At the same time
change incurs a cost for capital in terms of some lost production during the
changeover, with the potential for quality problems. The implications of this will be
discussed later in the chapter.
Each week the supervisors knew what changes were required and the size of the
batches, so that they could plan production for the following week to try to minimise
the disruption that changes in batches caused in the case plants. Managers in the
plants were conscious that breaks for toilet, tea and lunch interrupted the flows of
production lines (Interview 2S-6-90c and 6-12-%9). AIthoug'ri nese 1orea\c.s thi no
change what was produced, the implication was that, for the individual worker, one
batch became two when they took a break. In other words, as a production manager
in Koorki explained (Interview 21-2-90c), breaks from work also break concentration
and so when returning to the job the worker needs time to readjust, even for the most
simple and repetitive task, often resulting in an increase in the number of rejects
coming off the line.
FACTORY AUTOMATION
In all the plants the level of sophistication, and extent of use, of technology was
roughly similar, although the production layout was different. Moreover, some plants,
At a minimum, workers were required by capital to be adaptive. In this process of
adaptation there is a degree of discretion elicited from workers, which negates
complete 'robotisation'.
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such as Koorki and Koburg were further advanced than the others in introducing new
manufacturing techniques. Koburg's engineers talked of a time when they introduced
too much technology, which "bunged up the system" (Interviews 6-12-89b and
17-7-90c). This reflected a period of paying close attention to what was seen to be
happening in Japan, rather than what was appropriate technology for the task.
Kohashi, on the other hand, still suffered from a lack of investment in places, which
went along with the history of the plant being neglected for many years prior to the
Japanese takeover (Interview 15-8-90a).
Cosmetic changes were made to sets all the time but there was no clear market niche
to exploit. All the producers were innovating at the same time in the same sort of
areas, both in terms of the product and in terms of production technology. This was
why the plants were remarkably similar in design and level of technology. Thus, the
product competition discussed in Section I extends to the plants, to create a
competitive stalemate which gets ever more vicious, as one, then another, tries to
gain advantage only to be matched by the rest. In such circumstances, it helps the
plant to be part of a large supportive multinational in order to gather information on
competitors and to develop and test run new production techniques. The next chapter
will examine how such pressures impact on the organisation and experience of work
in such a hostile environment.
THE IMPORTANCE OF DESIGN
The chassis is the main item by which different televisions are separated, as this is
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the basic unit which contains the main boards. The screen is also important, though
in terms of its effect on the assemblies, the basic tube shape and size is very
standardised. Design changes can have an effect on almost everyone in the plant,
although to varying degrees, as will be shown next.
Design was mainly, though not exclusively, done in Japan for the Japanese case
plants, whilst at Koburg it was transferred to the European headquarters. When a new
design reached the plant, the first stage was pre-production runs, before going on the
lines of the factory floor. These stages were: to check that the design actually works,
to work out what changes would be needed in production, and how changes would
be handled.
Detailed descriptions of changes in pcbs, including different parts, where they go, and
whether they could be auto-inserted5 , were drawn up by draught! drawing technical
workers. A clerk was then responsible for getting design sheets from the design
department and filing them. This clerk then issues parts for the whole design to the
different supervisors who then draw up diagrams for the inserters and minders, to see
where the changes and insertions would be made. In addition, parts lists were issued
to the auto insert minders and the parts feeders in manual insertion.
The reverse of this is that, once the main production started, unexpected changes
One of the most important design considerations is to increase the number of parts
which are able to be inserted automatically.
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were often made, with problems occurring which were solved while production was
running. When this occurred, sometimes including circuit diagrams, the clerk who
updated the specification sheets was informed. Most of these problems and alterations
were spotted by the quality control staff on the shopfloor. Koburg's quality control
checkers even complained that they did not get the diagram sheets very often, so
designed their own (Interview 7-12-89b).
The effects of design changes involved the quality control workers, supervisors and
managers for the most part. Attempts were made to minimise the disruption to
shopfloor operators. Even so, Kokuda got 80 percent relect rates when design changes
were first introduced on the shopfloor (Interview 28-6-90e). There was no reason to
suppose that Kokuda was a different company in terms of its ability to cope with this
type of change, especially as it had a reputation of being one of the two most
innovative. companies in the consumer electronics sector in Japan (Field Notes
1987/9). This implies that this was a difficult process, requiring management to work
hard at reducing the effects of change. The result was an increased number of
meetings at the time of the introduction of design changes, increased emphasis on
quality control and the minimisation of major change f it was possible. The object
was to reduce the period of time in which high rejects occurred.
PRODUCTION OUTPUT
The amount and variety of production, measured in batches, indicates how often
change in the plants were required. Small production runs of very different types of
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televisions may indicate a need for highly versatile workers and quality consciousness.
Output varied according to consumer demands and the ability to produce to targets
which predicted the demand. At the time of the early interviews in Koburg, the
Production Manager planned to close one line down and share its 1,800 units a week
between the others because of a shortfall in consumer demand (Interview 6-12-89c).
Against this the Maintenance Department was being criticised for not achieving a two
percent target for lost production due to breakdowns of machines (Interview
6-12-89b).
In Koburg it seemed important to separate the applicability of targets, such as whether
demand fell short of output, from the achievement of the targets themselves. The
objective was in fact to control as much as possible but consumer demand was one
of the less controllable items. The fact that the shortfall in production output helped
compensate for a lower than expected demand rate is irrelevant (Interview 7-12-89a).
Both were 'problems' independent of each other because they were not related in their
occurrence and they were deviants, variations from the management plan. Output was
the ultimate thermometer of how well management was controlling the plant in the
short term. Managers said that market share and! or profitability were key indicators
of long run performance (Interview 07-12-89b and Field Notes 06/07-12-89).
Management had to be flexible enough to alter batch runs to take account of changes
in demand but, with long production runs, and few models or model changes, stability
was managed.
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In Koorki production capacity was increasing quite rapidly with continual expansion
(Interview 13-11-89), for example, weekly production rose from under 10,000 to over
11,000 units by the next set of interviews nine months later. Still further, it was
expected that seven to eight months following the latter interviews production would
reach 12,600 units a week (Interview 16-8-901). Originally, capacity itself was
expected to be increased after two years, with an expansion into a new building
(Interview 13-11-89), which was going to plan (Field Notes 16/17-8-90).
Seasonal variation in production at Koorki had been almost eliminated over the
previous two to three years so as to maintain constant labour utilisation according to
management (Interview 13-1 189)6. This required a very different strategy towards
production scheduling, than in the other cases. However, this did not mean that
production in Koorki was a constantly unchanging process.
Over 120 different models were produced in a year, with variations of about 50
different models in a month (Interview 16-8-901). The reason for this was three fold.
Firstly, there were a number of different screen sizes produced, from 14 inch to 28
inch. Secondly, there were the various add-ons, such as Teletext for some sets in each
of the different screen sizes. Finally, there were differences in national taste, for
design and legal rules relating to electricity safety within the sets (Interviews
13-11-89, 21-2-90a and 16-8-901).
6 It is not clear that this is entirely true as some production variation persisted. The
following chapter addresses this issue of labour flexibility directly for all the cases.
156
The objective was to have batches of a 1,000 in order to gain some economies of
scale. However, this was not always possible, leading to batches of around 500
sometimes. The reason given for this was not only pressure for different models but
also that the plans themselves could not be kept to because of the unexpected. New
designs might not be ready, so causing half of another batch to be slipped in early,
or the old batch extended (for example to 1,500 sets), or a shortfall in consumer
demand on a particular model, or production problems, such as in supplies being late
or providing inappropriate quality (Interview 21-2-90a).
Kokuda
Daily production targets were seen as being very tight in Kokuda (Interview
28-6-90e). Much more achievable were the weekly targets, based on those sets
leaving the plant site. The reason was that some stocks allowed a buffer to form
which daily targets did not allow. Overtime fluctuations were seen as the method to
claw back any daily shortfalls so that the week overall was on target (1nteriev
28-6-90b). Behind these figures there were areas of sub-assembly which produced
more than this 1,230 target. These sub-assemblies were for supply to other plants in
Europe (Interview 1-3-90a).
Kohashi
Kohashi was reticent about providing production output data but concentrated on
batches and model variations. Batches varied between 500 and 5,000 units, although
all those supplied for Europe, excluding the UK, were small, being a maximum of
just 500 (Interview 27-11-89). Compared to the other cases, these were small batch
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sizes, reflecting a considerable loss of economies from scale. The number of models
was also few with 27 different types of set, 18 of which were for the UK market.
This included different screen sizes and combinations of add-ons (Interview
15-8-90d).
The implication was that the production system was the least sophisticated among the
Japanese owned plants. There was no benefit in this system for Kohashi. If the fewer
number of models allowed long production runs (large batches) there would be some
economies of scale, allowing cheaper sets to be marketed as a compensation for the
narrower choice for the consumer. This was the old Japanese marketIng strategy and
one now employed by Tatung (Interview 10-3-92). The down side was that the image
of the company in the consumer's mind was lowered, along with the perceived quality
of their products. Hashi must either be selling at a loss and suffering from this
negative image or selling at a higher price but with a customer criticism of a lack of
choice.
Summary discussion
In each case there was a balance between gaining economies from creating as little
change as possible, against the needs to supply the markets. While Koburg tended to
have few models for the market at any one time to avoid a lot of batches, Kohashi
was caught-up in small batches through inefficiencies in management's ability to
control quality. The other two cases aimed for production runs of around 1,000. One
option for all the cases, was to produce very long production runs for stock; this idea
will be discussed next.
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SUPPLIERS AND STOCKS
Previously it was suggested that the cases differed in the degree to which they
purchased parts and semi-finished manufactured parts. This section will discuss these
differences in terms of 'just-in-time' manufacturing practices, by looking at relations
with suppliers and strategies towards stock control within the plants.
Koburg
Koburg employed Material Requirement Planning (MRP) and MRP2, which are
reasonably sophisticated stock control techniques. This does not mean that no stocks
were held but that there was an attempt made to minimise stock holding between
different points of the production process. When looking around the factory, there did
not appear to be any excessive stocks when compared to the other cases or those seen
in Japan (Field Notes 6/7-12- 89 arid 17-7-90).
Relations with suppliers were quite complex in that with the change of ownership
there had been some re-organisation of supply. This meant that orders for parts were
switched to a more centralised organisation, with servicing supplying all the European
plants. In some cases, the supplier plants themselves were part of the Burg group
(Interview 6-12-89c). The implication of this was that Koburg was still in the process
of developing new relations with some suppliers, which may be seen as a move
towards adopting Japanese style relations with their suppliers.
One aspect of this 'Japanisation' was the introduction of visits to suppliers to help
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with quality issues and to devise lists of criteria for compliance from suppliers. The
works manager also said that they were "encouraging suppliers to adopt the QLP
[Quality Leadership Process] process" (Interview 7-12-89a). QLP was a form of
quality circle scheme, entry was voluntary and, although usually drawn from one
work group, was not always. Launched in Koburg, it was intended that QLP was to
be used throughout Burg, so some suppliers would adapt the scheme 7 . This indicated
a desire by Koburg's management that suppliers should become more integrated into
Koburg procedures. This was a development from supplier relations solely dependent
on legal contracts which simply rewarded and punished compliance and non
compliance of the agreed supply. At the same time, it implied a reduction in self-
management and independence of the supplier. On the other side the supplier may
have felt more secure, if Koburg was investing time and money in the 'encouraging'
process. In reality, this may have been more wishful thinking on the part of certain
Koburg management, rather than an active strategy. There were no discussions of
sanctions, or preferential sourcing to suppliers who adopted QLP, but this perhaps
indicated some of the problems of UK suppliers in seeking to maintain sovereign
control.
Koorki
In Koorki, as in the other Japanese cases, JIT was more explicitly talked about. No
one professed that JIT had been introduced, although some UK managers did say that
they were trying to move in the JIT direction. One Japanese manager said that
' A fuller discussion of the QLP programme will be provided in Chapter Nine.
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nowhere in the company, including Japan, was JIT being introduced (Interview
16-8-901). The Senior Production Manager (Interview 21-2-90a) in the same case
said:
Change with just-in-time is very, very difficult.
Koorki tried to keep a buffer stock of three days between auto insertion and pcb
manual insertion sub-assembly and to keep one to two days stock between the
sub-assemblies and the main lines. Koorki also endeavoured to maintain one month's
supply of finished boxed sets of 25,000. At the time of the interview there was only
20,000 units, but during the following five months, stocks would be raised to 50,000
or two months supply, with additional stock in transit to customers (Interview
21-2-90a). Some of the spare buildings were being used for warehousing on site,
which would eventually be converted into expanded factory space (Field notes
2 1/22-2-90). This indicated that some stock holdings would be reduced subsequently,
or located elsewhere.
The issue on the input side of the production process was whether parts used in
manufacturing, or assembly, were stocked. In Koorki again there was a policy of
stockholding for different time periods based on the nature of the component and
supplier. For expensive and bulky items, such as tubes and bulky items, such as
packaging, plastic backs and the like, three days stock was held. All these tended to
be bought from fairly local suppliers. The tube could be an exception because special
screens (very large ones) came from Japan because there was not the economy of
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scale to produce locally (Interviews 21-2-90a and 16-8-90f). Moreover, as the screen
represented about half of total material cost, this three days average holding was a
significant factor in undermining the idea of perfect JIT. For smaller parts sourcing
was often from Japan and South East Asia with a consequent delivery cycle, which
means that 25 days stock were held in case there were problems in the supply lines.
This gave an added dimension of inflexibility since for some parts there needed be
over six months lead time between ordering from suppliers and delivery. This was
clearly not JIT as it was intended in Toyota (Monden; 1983). However, most of these
small parts did not vary much from one model to another and were quite cheap,
despite the transportation costs. It may well have been more flexible to buy the small
transistors and capacitors locally even though they may not be as cheap or as reliable
(Interview 16-8-900 as those supplied from overseas.
At Koorki relations with suppliers were considered close. Obviously it was strongly
based on Japanese style relations in South East Asia, with guidance and links through
the headquarters in Japan (Interview 17-4-90). What is more interesting for the
purposes of this thesis was Koorki's relations with local suppliers. There were
comments about giving help and setting rigorous quality targets but also of deeper
relations based on 'mutual' understanding (Interview 21-2-90c). A European
multinational had co-developed a new tube exclusively with Orki for Koorki, even
though the European conglomerate also made televisions. This required trust and
significant technical cooperation which was unique among all the cases. This practice
was not in itself a sign or even a movement towards JIT; but showed that Koorki
considers its operations to be European based and displays a measure of the mutual
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dependency often seen to characterise JIT processes (Wilkinson and Oliver, 1989).
Moreover, 90% of tubes came from the single supplier, even if from different
specialist plants of the same supplier (Interview 13-11-89).
Kokuda
Kokuda management were divided as to whether they were achieving JIT. The quality
assurance manager thought there were JIT deliveries with reduced stocks and work
in progress and reduced supply lead times to customers, together with increasing
flexibility to cope with fluctuating consumer demand (Interview 28-6-90c). This
confuses different aspects of a unified JIT process. The General Production manager
was much more direct in saying "We do have so called just-in-time deliveries"
(Interview 28-6-90e). On top of this he qualified the statement by explaining that in
some instances short lead time deliveries, such as from a local plastics manufacturer,
of only one to two hours inventory needed to be held, but for supplies entailing
longer delivery times more inventory was required. For example, a ship from
Singapore was said to take 19 working days on the high seas to arrive so higher
stocks of such imported components would be held. On the other hand, 90% of
components were said to be sourced in Europe (Interview 28-6-90e). One manager
explained that the early stages of using the system of so called 'JIT' deliveries had
caused many problems due to lateness, failures to place orders, and the like.
However, at the time of the interview he said things had improved though such
problems still occurred occasionally (Interview 1-3-90b).
Value items such as tubes and other components (deflection yoke, transformer) were
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special cases for this plant because they were made on site. The internal stock holding
between the tube plant and the assembly plant was just one days production
requirements. The holdings of pcb mountings and main lines was just three hours'
requirement (Interview 28-6-90e). One of the main line managers reported how on
a particular day there had been a shortage of boards (stocks had run out) because a
machine had broken on the pcb line (Interview 28-6-90b). Compared to the other
plants, Kokuda had much tighter control over its work-in-progress and much less
reliance on outside suppliers. This did not mean however that they were immune to
stock shortages.
An exception to this tight system was in keeping high stocks of finished sets. 'With
high consumer demand at the time of the field work only half of the normal stocks
of boxed sets were held in store because the high season had started earlier than
expected (Field Notes 28-6-90). This buffer required Kokuda to work overtime to
match supply to demand and to rebuild stocks. Had the stocks not been there, the
argument goes, customers would buy a competitor's set (Interview 24-10-90). While
this argument may be made for stocks of finished sets, it cannot apply within the
production process, because, although customers' demand is not controllable, internal
management processes were. The problem faced by Kokuda was whether the cost
savings of low stocks compensated for the loss of production when a machine went
down, or when a part did not get ordered from a supplier on time.
Management claimed that, for parts that were supplied from outside, they might send
advisers and engineers for two or three weeks at a time to assist their sub-contractors
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if needed. Yet, at the same time, there was a deliberate policy of dual sourcing to
encourage competition among component producers and secure supply in case of
bankruptcy. On the other hand, it was said by the same manager that they would like
to have a single source arrangement with good suppliers (Interview 28-6-90f). The
contradictions between strategy and wish were unresolved however, because suppliers
could not be trusted to stay reliable, or to remain solvent. No parts were sourced
from Japan; they came predominantly from Europe, with 10 percent being shipped
from Singapore and South Korea (Interview 28-6-901).
So, although Kokuda attempted to approach JIT arrangements for some supplies, and
some work in progress, this sometimes had a cost due to lost production. Moreover,
these near JIT supplies do not qualify as full JIT because they were not single sourced
components. This is important because it indicates that JIT is perhaps an unrealistic
concept, a view also confirmed by studies in Japan 8 , where consumer electronics
manufacturers commonly used more than one supplier for the same kind of
components and kept stocks at each stage of the production process.
Kohashi
In Hashi the Japanese manager interviewed explained that there was no JIT in any of
their plants because television makers do not face the same problems as car
manufacturers, like Toyota (Interview 154-8-90g). In cars, he explained, there are
8 This is based on discussions with Abo Tetsuo and Totsuka Hideo of Tokyo University,
and personal observations at various factories during stays in Japan in 1987-9 and
1990.
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many bulky parts, such as panels and seats, with high warehousing costs. Televisions
mostly have smaller components, so the cost pressures to introduce JIT are less.
Moreover, he expanded, Toyota is such a big company that it could pressure its
suppliers to become involved in JIT arrangements, whereas Kohashi, as a smaller
company, had less power vis a vis many of its suppliers. Toyota also uses dedicated
suppliers, but Kohashi's suppliers sold to other companies as well. Nevertheless, for
Kohashi a main concern remained supplier relations (Interview 15-8-90g).
The Works Manager explained that they had tried to work towards JIT by reducing
supplier lead times, but he felt this to be a difficulty because suppliers were not
reliable enough (Interview 15-8-90d). Another manager saw this problem being
overcome as European manufacturers became quality orientated. He also felt that
parts being supplied were being delivered more reliably, as time went on (Interview
15-8-90b). But the works manager also complained that he had a "major headache"
because a local supplier had failed to deliver supplies and that production lines were
stopping. He explained that suppliers could be split into two categories: small and
large part suppliers. Small parts generally came from very large companies and so
deliveries were reliable. But problems came with the smaller specialist manufacturers.
Such difficulties were compounded because the one or two reliable local suppliers,
such as for plastic moulds, were being courted by all the other consumer electronics
companies in the area. This analysis implied that Kohashi was low on the league
ladder, because of its comparative small size, its checkered history and probably its
financial constraints (Interview 15-8-90d). Thus, the hierarchy would be reinforced
- the company that was relatively poor would stay relatively poor because it could not
166
guarantee itself 'good' suppliers.
Although no one would put figures to these comments, it did appear that there was
a general lack of confidence which tended to suggest high stocking and more
components being sourced from East Asia. Kohashi also imported several parts from
Japan. This had been done first when the plant was taken over by the Japanese but
had continued longer than had originally been planned because it was found difficult
to locate suitable local alternatives (Interview 15-8-90b). As one Japanese manager
put it (Interview 15-8-90g):
If I phone a supplier after say 7.00pm there is nobody in. This is the
UK so must go by UK method. If UK member [manager or
employee, they wonder why I contact them at Midnight on Friday.
That is culture I think.
It seemed that Japanese expectations of local suppliers was much greater than the
suppliers were prepared to give.
In the days before the Japanese took over, Kohashi had undertaken much more
sub-assembly and component manufacture than it did at the time of the study. This
was cut out under severe rationalisation but still, compared with Kohashi in Japan,
many more of the processes of making a television were internal in the UK. The
	 -
argument offered for doing more things in-house was that there was a lack of
appropriate sub-contractors. But, at the same time, the original rationalisation was
undertaken in order to reduce the complexity of management associated with a
disparate range of skills applied to constantly changing activities because of consumer
demand (Interview 15-8-90d).
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Summary discussion
Thus, each case plant had slightly different circumstances which caused them to adopt
a different strategy towards their relation with suppliers, stock levels and control of
work in progress. Koburg had the most hands off approach and Kokuda the tightest.
Koorki was more inclined to try to keep its production lines running and to bear the
cost of stocks in order to meet customer demand. On the other hand, Kohashi seemed
to be much more reactive. Hence, it appears that Koorki was the only one of the four
cases that managed to keep its labour working constantly, thereby avoiding the
psychological problems of line stops. This point will be considered further in the next
section.
Finally, the forms of JIT practised in these plants, were fragmentary and corrupted.
Moreover, whilst some local managers wanted to give the impression that full JIT
was a realistic management objective, Japanese interviewees were more sceptical
about its application within the consumer electronics industry.
QUALITY MANAGEMENT
One popular view of Japanisation is that quality is the concern of every individual
worker and as part of this there is no need for specialist and separate quality control
staff. Tying this in with supposed JIT procedures, supplies must be relied upon for
quality so that there is no need for inward goods inspection. Another view of
Japanisation relating to quality is that quality is paramount. It is assumed that unless
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there are 'zero defects' there is no truly effective production. Even if we accept the
Buddhist concept of the impossibility of reaching perfection, and that zero defects is
therefore not possible, there is still the managerial rhetoric or commentators' hype
which says quality is prioritised, first and last (Collard;1989, Shingo;1989;16-24).
This sub-section will review these assertions within the case study plants.
Koburg
In Koburg there were a number of quality inspectors, falling into two categories.
There were checkers on the lines and there were inspectors who bordered on
engineers and who checked major parts of the television assembly and inward goods.
These inspectors reported to the delivery and materials department, and not to main
production. The ex-Personnel Director said that it was a management aim to reduce
the overall number of inspectors and to try and get quality control incorporated as
part of the individual operators jobs. To some extent it was hoped to this end that
recruitment criteria would concentrate more on quality consciousness and that
subsequent initial training would include a similar emphasis (Interview 24-10-89).
The main influences on quality were seen to be the recent rationalisation which had
recently taken place and the introduction of new processes and machinery to the case
plant (Interview 6-12-89b). Employees had problems in getting used to the machines,
and to some upgrading in technology. It was also noted that some products caused
more production problems than others, but this was not explained by managers
(Interview 7-12-89b). Finally, the Personnel Manager said "it is very difficult to
balance quality. In the busy season the quantity versus quality issue becomes large"
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(Interview 6-12-89a).
Koorki
The quality target throughout the plant was a reject rate of 2% to 3.5 percent in
Koorki. These targets seem very inferior compared to those in the comparable plant
in Japan, which were 0.3 to 0.5 percent. The Japanese manager explained that this
hid the fact that there were many more parts of the production process which were
sub-contracted in Japan than in the UK plant (Interview 16-8-90f). However, an
important consideration for management was that the UK plant was gaining an image
of good quality from consumers, which was seen as pleasing. One manager said that
all the Koorki and white collar 'members' were proud (Interview 13-11-89). The
actual process by which this outcome was achieved involved a number of different
activities.
The Personnel Manager stated that (Interview 13-1 1-89):
In reality, I think quality is the responsibility of everybody on site and
quality is not just about the product itself. And I think perhaps
Japanese companies, generally speaking, we're looking at the quality
of the person, we're looking at the quality of the product, we're
looking at the quality of the housekeeping, we're looking at the quality
of the canteen, we're looking at the quality of every single aspect. But
as far as the Personnel Department, we generate a campaign, we
generate the initial interest in quality, not specifically about the product
quality but the more global view of the company's quality image, its
involvement in quality, because the product is sold as a quality product
and so all departments are involved in quality...
Thus, it would appear that Personnel was very involved in the whole production
process. Quality was sought as a deeply ingrained aspect of the 'company culture'
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with Personnel as the prime mover.
The statement was very difficult to substantiate as fact, either for workers, or for
actual quality. What may lie behind it is more likely that Personnel wished the
working environment to be clean arid tidy, and the food to be edible (Interview
13-11-89). Perhaps such an environment was seen by workers and managers to be
beneficial, although it was not certain that this had any effect on their motivation
to work.
Within the production process it was much easier to see the physical steps that had
been taken to maintain or improve quality. One of these was in the organisation of
work itself which can be seen in the following quote from the same Personnel
manager (Interview 13-11-89):
The production set-up is designed for producing quality. An example
of that is many of the small components look fairly similar but they
have different values, different electrical values. You don't give a
girl9
 the same part, that looks the same and has got a different value,
because she is likely to get them mixed up. And equally the girl beside
her will not have the same part as she's got. They are totally different
parts so that people are not swapping.
Work was organised with the expectation that workers might think in terms of	 -
output rather than think more deeply about the implications of swapping parts and
in the plants were almost always referred to as 'girls', although some were old
enough to be the mothers of those men who used the term! Although the average age
of the plant's shopfloor workers was young, this turn of speech signifies a perceived
status divide on the part of those who used it.
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the impact on quality (Interview 13-11-89). This suggests that managers did not
trust workers and further, that quality came from management's ability to freely
organise workers' work.
Within the bounds of the work, management claimed that there was still
considerable scope for workers to deliberately, or otherwise, damage the television
sets. There appeared to be some confusion here; the Personnel Manager went on
to explain how different stages of the production process were broken into blocks,
and quality checks were made between them. He explained (Interview 13-11-89):
The basic production process as far as quality in the production
process, it is what we call a 'block assurance system'. So that each
sub-assembly has to ensure that what they are producing and passing
on to their customer, which may be another production line, is
working before they pass it on. And there are a number of jigs which
test that apparatus checking. So the whole process is quality oriented.
This quote is in contrast to the General Manager, a Japanese, who said that quality
inspectors were only employed for goods inward and finished output and that all
the production workers checked their own efforts. The confusion is cleared if it is
realised that the Japanese General Manager did not consider all the checkers and
re-workers as being involved exclusively in quality. The other inspectors he
referred to were graded as technicians and engineers, so this may reflect a
Japanese view of hierarchy (Interview 16-8-900.
A recurring issue in this thesis is the production cycle for jobs. The senior
production manager argued that quality was improved by constant work without
breaks and line stoppages. According to him, it was better even to be under
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pressure than to stop and start the lines as far as quality was concerned (Interview
21-2-90a). The argument for this approach was explained by supervisors and is
based on the idea that workers lose concentration and break their rhythm when the
line stops (Interview 7-12-89c), as was argued earlier.
Kokuda
Kokuda management saw quality as an important part of their products' success
and welcomed the publicity which management association and state bodies had
given them for their achievements in quality (Interviews 1-3-90a, 28-6-90c and
24-10-90). Such attention ignores the way in which reject rates started from over
80 percent following the introduction of a new model, and only through time were
reduced to a few percent during production runs. This high point had been reduced
as each new model was introduced by reducing the time period during which the
abnormal reject rates persist. Thus, 10 years previously, the & percent reject rates
may have persisted for several weeks, whereas at the time of conducting field
work they lasted for only two or three hours'°. This significant decline in quality
at times of change-over and the consequent high concern with quality was a
feature of this case plant in the UK (Interview 28-6-90c). The reason for the
problems was unclear but they may be in insufficient pre-production planning,
because of high consumer demand, and in the complexity of arranging production
in all the sub-assemblies on site.
10 The object was to reduce the time to a few minutes.
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The Personnel Manager argued that quality had to do with everyone in the plant
and not just the Quality Department (Interview 1-3-90a). There had been a zero
defects campaign running in the plant for five years with two directors (a local and
an expatriate) heading it. This campaign was seen as trying to instil a culture in
the plant based around setting targets for the different stages of the production
process. Each time the target was reached the next target figure was halved. The
other side of the campaign was ideological in that the worker was encouraged to
think of the next person on the line as a customer (Tnterview 28-6-90c).
The Senior Production Manager said (Interview 28-6-90e):
In my job the major issue is quantity and quality together. It is very
difficult to achieve both at the same time, so my job is very difficult.
This reflects the reality of the trade off within production which in the final analysis
involves quantity .v. quality. With a high reject rate and high consumer demand it is
likely that quantity was winning even though the rejects generally were contained
within the plant; the quality checks spotted the rejects so that they did not leave the
factory warehouse (Interview 28-6-90e).
The design of working time was discussed by two interviewees who gave opposing
opinions. The Senior Production Manager explained that after five or six months on
the same job a worker gets into a rut and quality begins to suffer. Therefore, frequent
job rotation was seen as desirable. However, he considered that "there are some girls
who just cannot and will never be able to do certain jobs" (Interview 28-6-90e). The
Production Engineering Manager explained that to him the control of quality is "just
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the control of change", including minimising disruptions to the constant flow of the
production lines. For "a perfect example [of this kind of interruption of flow] is when
somebody goes to the toilet" (Interview 28-6-90f). Both opinions may be valid: in the
short term change interrupts concentration, but after a long time the concentration is
replaced by boredom. Add to this the perception held by management that some
people cannot change anyway and the process of managing labour is difficult; control
is qualified.
Kohashi
The quality assurance manager thought that when the plant was British owned reject
rates ran at around 30 percent overall, although no accurate records were kept. When
interviewed he thought there was a three percent reject rate. However, there were still
problems, with a target of rejects attained on the final assembly line of 0.1, but only
achieving three times this rate. As a result, all sets were checked, and this took time
and was costly. No other factory visited for the research in the UK or Japan had 100
percent checking prior to packing. Many problems were put down to suppliers and
the process of improvement was also directed to improving quality from suppliers
(Interview 15-8-90b). Some comments suggested that there were too few designers
(Interview 15-8-900, and this might account for some quality problems due to
inappropriate pcb designs. Labour was not blamed (Interview 15-8-900, but one
wonders whether the high reliance on contract labour caused periods of high rejects;
informants indicated however that this did not happen (Interview 15-8-90b).
Summary discussion
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It is important to realise that the control of quality cannot be reduced to a fully
automated activity and that human judgment is needed. To illustrate this proposition
one can consider the jig which tests pcb circuits. Although a 100 percent of boards
were tested on these jigs, the jigs did not test the quality of each board completely.
To design and use a machine that is capable of a 100 percent checking would be
much too slow to operate and too expensive to buy (Field Notes 13-11-89). Thus,
there was a dependency on the workforce to 'do quality work'.
In reality in all four cases there were both separate quality inspectors and always a
degree of trade off between quantity and quality. On the other hand the interviewees
were generally concerned with quality, stressing its significance within the consumer
electronics field. Among the managers at least, quality issues were seen as crucial in
the overall company image for the consumer market place.
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATION FOR ThEORY
The process of television assembly is made up of a series of sub-assembly lines, each
of which supplies materials for a final assembly line. Although the degree varies
between cases, many of the sub-assemblies are bought in from outside sources.
Kokuda was exceptional in its manufacture of the complicated tubes, but even here,
this process was carried out in a different building, with a different workforce, thus
simulating sub-contracted manufacture.
Television production is large batch assembly. This shapes the layout of the plants,
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and significantly impacts upon the character of jobs and the process of management.
Batch sizes are determined after considering how many units the market will buy in
a period, and the cost of carrying stocks until the consumers do buy, against the
economies of scale available from repetition. Moreover, it has been shown that, even
with product variations, most production tasks remain the same. Historically,
technological change has reduced the occurrence of some tasks, but rarely completely
eliminated them. At the same time, televisions have been developed with more
features and components built into them, but through mechanisation and automation,
human input has been reduced within overall proportions, to just five percent of
overall production cost. However, the ability to gain any sort of competitive
advantage through automation is dependent on being able to be the first or only one
to change. In the competitive climate of television manufacture, this is difficult, so
that the position of the frontier of control between management and worker is a
crucial factor in the ability to remain profitable.
Finally, because of the practice of centralising design processes the location of
research and development impacts on the overall control of the manufacturing
process. In the plants, there were almost no controls over design, which was
concentrated in the multinationals' home countries. However, as designs changed and
production problems emerged, a degree of discretion was ceded to the UK plants.
This relationship between the control of the production process and the control of
labour working the process will be explored in the following two chapters.
An engineer in Mitsubishi's Nagano plant in Japan said "The systems are the same
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in all Japanese plants. Its just a problem of getting local labour like these in Japan"
(Interview 17-3-89). Thus, a television plant is a television plant is a television plant.
However, there were differences between the plants both historically and in the range
of operations done within the single assembly plant. Moreover, the constant pressure
of competition meant that technical and organisational forces faced by each television
assembler induced constant attempts to introduce new methods ahead of the others.
That said however, the changes were of degree, not kind. This still required assembly
lines and even with the development of surface mount technology 1 ' for the assembly
of pcbs the same process of auto machine minders and manual inserters were
required.
A television assembly plant has a technology and set of worker requirements which
set it apart from an automobile assembly plant. Yet, like car assembly, there are a
number of very different processes occurring in television assembly. This creates
implications for management control of the process, and shows that there are different
kinds of fairly incompatible jobs, which restrict options available to management in
terms of flexibility. At the same time, this statement gives opportunities for UK style
union involvement, with their concentration on job rights and skill protection, points
which will be developed through the thesis.
Irnlications for theory
There is little evidence in these cases of any drift towards 'Japanisation' of production
1 Surface mount technology is a new form of making pcbs, which increases
automation and reduces the physical size of pcbs.
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practices by management in the terms laid out by Oliver and Wilkinson's survey
(1989). By tracing the theoretical basis of empirical arguments advanced by important
writers in this field it should be possible to analyze why Japanese production practices
were absent from these four cases.
Monden (1983; 1-5), a managerial oriented writer, defines JIT in terms of stockless
factories, flexible, motivated workers, single sourced suppliers, small batch, even
single unit production, and Kanban' 2 . In this arrangement these elements are brought
together to form the single Toyota Production System. He also gives emphasis, within
JIT and supporting Kanban, to such elements as standardised jobs and smoothed
production. Yet he also states (1983;1O) that:
The two pillars which support the Toyota Production system are
Just-in-time and Automation.
In other words the Toyota production system is defined to include several different
elements which integrate to a unified whole. JIT is only one of the elements.
We can ignore this whole debate if, as the Japanese manager in Kohashi (Interview
15-8-90g) indicated, Monden's description is restricted to the 'Toyota-Production
System'. However, the debate has widened to include Japanese manufacturing in
general and consumer electronics in Britain. The irony of this extrapolation from a
single case is that Toyota broke-up auto assembly into small factories because of a
12 Kanban is a control system for ordering stocks based on a paper form which
is attached to a component and tracks it through production.
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labour shortage around Nagoya, where its first production centre is located (Japan
Economic Journal;24-2-90).
The first radical analysis of JIT in Britain was by A Sayer (1986), who compared it
with JIC (just in case) in Britain. He defined JIT as (1986;51):
The just in time / total quality control system ... is shorthand for a
group of related practices. It emerged in the post-war period through
the attempts of some Japanese car manufacturers - particularly Toyota
- to adapt western practices to Japanese conditions. Strictly speaking,
just-in-time refers narrowly to a way of organising the immediate
manufacturing labour process and supplier-buyer relationships between
firms.
These are supported by a context of labour market, skills and labour management
relations. Then (1986;53):
Instead of producing at maximum volume in long runs in anticipation
of demand, the essence of the JIT system is that work is only done
when needed, in the necessary quantity at the necessary time.
Thus, small batch production was for actual, not anticipated, customer demand. But
then he writes (1986;56):
Just-in-time is a system of mass production consisting of a highly
integrated series of small lot production processes
Thus, Sayer's definition attempts to hide the inefficiencies of small batch production
within the economies of scale of mass production. In the four cases being considered
in this study, the Japanese and Europeans clearly saw a need to strike a compromise
between mass, continuous production, and small batches. Although, the plan was for
long runs, in practice uncertainty drove management to shorten production runs
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sometimes.
Wilkinson and Oliver define JIT as simply (1989;47):
Just-in-time (JIT) systems of production are those in which goods are
produced just in time for them to be used.
The article then shows how vulnerable this system can make capital because
(1989;51):
JIT entails relative difficulty in substituting the actors in the production
process.
This is because of the need for single sourcing, high skilled, functionally flexible,
core workers and an absence of buffer stocks. In Japan, they argue, this is not a
problem because of pressures which eliminate scope for disrupting the system. Not
only that but both labour and capital benefit - higher pay and higher profitability. So
that (1989;54):
This mutual dependency functions to reduce the likelihood of the
exercise of power by either party.
Further, the employment relationship is seen as paternalistic. It is that paternalism
which is seen to allow such a system as JIT to be developed 13 . It would be possible
to explain the findings of this study in terms of a lack of trust of local workers and
The issues of employee cooperation and dependency will be studied through the
remaining chapters, but here, the Cardiff Business School group's argument
rests on these mutual dependencies in order to achieve production efficiencies.
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suppliers, which prevented the transfer of such Japanese practices to the UK.
However, as indicated in the introduction to this chapter, Oliver and Wilkinson (1988
and 1992) assert that such transfers are extensive and successful.
Voss (1990) is the only study where he and Ozaki-Ward actually carried out wide
ranging research into the subject in the UK and Japan. The findings include the
following comments (1990;4):
JIT is a broad rather than a narrow concept. Its broadness makes
transfer difficult to Western companies.
There is a wide variety of practice of JIT in Japanese companies.
Rather than having a Japanese style of manufacturing management,
Japanese companies were found to be heterogeneous.
Many of the practices seen by the west as core JIT activities are not
used by many Japanese companies practising JIT.
The term JIT is not widely used in Japan. It was originally known as
Toyota Production System, and is still known by this name or
derivations from this name in many organisations.
They define the core of JIT as being flexibility, flow and developing a chain of
supply. This is done through tools on the one hand (eg. visibility, waste reduction,
management of detail), and enablers on the other (eg. people, design, planned
maintenance). These findings add up to a denial of JIT production methods in all but
name and replace it with a set of techniques which attempt to cope with, rather than
solve, the problems of individual capitalist labour processes.
Thus, Kokuda was introducing the strongest controls and relations with suppliers in
an attempt to improve quality and reduce stock holding. Yet this was, perhaps only
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possible because Kokuda produced, in-house, more parts of the television than in any
of the other cases. Koburg had the most emphasis on quality, at least at the level of
rhetoric. The aim of all cases, nevertheless, was to manage for stability, within a
process which was inherently unstable. Crucial in this aim was a desire to control
change by reducing it to a minimum, minimising its effect when management knew
change would occur, and coping with crises when they did not. JIT production
techniques as defined by Sayer (1986) and Oliver and Wilkinson (1989), within
consumer electronics at least, was an unnecessary, over complicated, even outdated
set of techniques. Worst of all, the continued credence given to JIT obscures the
realities of labour process in Japanese multinationals.
The arguments, however, are marginalised if a more conspiratorial approach is
considered. Shingo (1989;xix), in the preface of a Japanese edition of his book quotes
another author, Ohno, as writing:
[1] hope that this book will enable many people to understand the
Toyota Production system correctly and implement it successfully in
their own plants.
If the secret to Toyota's success is its production system, then a secret it would
remain, otherwise it would cease to be able to maintain a profitable position. Toyota's
production techniques, which are seen as employing JIT systems mystifies the realities
of exploitation within Toyota plants, and obscures reasoned debate around work
transformations. The next chapter explains these complexities by looking at how
production work is organised.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
THE ORGANISATION OF WORK
INTRODUCTION
This chapter sets out to explain the organisation of labouring work in a television
assembly factory. The purpose is to evaluate the impact of any so called job redesign
initiatives which may have taken place. The aim is to provide an outline of the
structure of work, and to illustrate this, by focusing on 'representative' jobs. In this
way, the processes including the way the production system was organised and
operates will be revealed. On the basis of this examination it will be possible to assess
and evaluate the extent of 'Japanisation' and the introduction of flexible work
organisation in later chapters.
The chapter is primarily based on interviews with different groups of workers doing
three kinds of jobs (auto insertion, manual insertion and technical maintenance) at two
plants: Koburg and Koorki. Further, for the purpose of comparison it includes some
material gathered from the other two plants. The chapter is concerned with the
organisation framework and job content. The first section will outline the structure
of work in all four plants, including expatriate employees. The next section then
examines in depth, three job categories within Koburg and Koorki. Third, a review
of explanations for the sexual divisions within the workforce. Finally, threads of the
discussion are drawn together by pointing to general features of the organisation of
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work within the four cases, to enable further development in the following chapter.
ORGANILSATION STRUCTURE
The organisatioflal structure at the plants was functionally based, with departments
headed by directors, or managers, for personnel, production, finance, purchasing,
research and market support. There are two qualifications to this 'traditional'
organisational structure: marketing and non-television assembly. The marketing
support department in each case was not a complete department but in the Japanese
cases liaised with separate marketing companies and in Koburg was centrally
controlled from a European capital. The other exception was that in the Japanese
cases the other products made on the same site, such as micro-wave ovens or video
cassette recorders (VCRs), have a separate product director and managerial structure
covering production, marketing and engineering. Koburg did not have a director for
BSB' production.
Monden (1983) argues that the organisation structure of Japanese companies is flat
relative to the many levels of management in UK firms. However, it is clear that in
the Japanese companies such a clarity was not available because there was some
blurring of definitions between manager and worker. It was possible to argue that
there were a number of levels of workers who also undertook managerial duties. This
will be explored when discussing the job content of what were called 'floats' later in
1 BSB stands for 'British Satellite Broadcasting' a commercial television station using
satellites. Koburg manufactured satellite decoders under licence from BSB.
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the chapter. Management posts and the position of expatriates will be-discussed next.
In Koburg, there was only one continental manager in the plant. He was the financial
director. Others visited the plant, especially engineers but it was also common for the
local engineers to visit continental plants in an effort to standardise production
technology, the machines for malcing televisions (Interview 6-12-89). This was in
marked contrast to the Japanese cases, especially considering that the takeover of
Koburg was only two years old. At the time of the takeover in Kohashi there were
a lot of Japanese at the plant (Interview 15-8-90a) and in the other two cases the start
up was with a strong Japanese management influence2 . In Koorki seven out of nine
senior managers were from Japan, leaving manufacture and personnel for the locals
(Interview 13-11-89). Kohashi had moved from all ten directors being Japanese to
five being local (Interview 27-11-89). These locals headed personnel, CTV (colour
television) manufacture, quality, micro-wave oven manufacture, finance. In Kokuda
the structure was more complex because television was split into tube and main
manufacture. Among senior managers three out of six were local, controlling
television operations (main television as in other cases), public relations and finance
(28-6-90e).
In the Japanese cases it was difficult to gain a picture of how many Japanese there
were in total, and what jobs they were doing. To illustrate, among 27 managers above
supervisor level there were eight Japanese in Kohashi (Interview 15-8-90a).
2 This seems to be a feature common among Japanese inward investing companies as
evidenced in three cases in North East England, studied by Taylor (1986).
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Generally, there were no full time regularly employed staff at levels-below the upper
middle management level. In Koorki, out of three production middle managers, there
was one Japanese (Interview 21-2-90a). However, this hides two phenomena: trainees
and advisers who were not considered permanent staff in the plants. However, as no
people from these job categories were interviewed, it is difficult to judge their power
and role within the organisations.
JOB CONTENT
This section describes the content of three types of jobs within Koburg and Koorki.
The purpose of the section is to provide a general description of jobs with some
comparison between case study plants, but mainly to draw a picture of different jobs
involved in television assembly. The three compared jobs, auto and manual insertion,
and maintenance technicians, represent the whole range of shopfloor jobs. It is not
possible to compare numbers employed in each plant because the range of tasks may
vary under the same job title and there is no accounting for part time or seasonal
employees.
Auto insertion minders and loaders
Tasks involved in the auto insertion sections were machine minding, quality checking,
transporting and loading parts into machines.
Koburg
There was little contact between the worker and the supervisor, perhaps because the
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machine was important in controlling the manual work. Each person-was in charge
of the one machine. However, where two or more machines were linked together on
the same track the minders would help each other out. Basically "AIS [Auto Insertion
System] is all about working on your own" (Interview 17-7-90b).
The machines were noisy, although they were not kept in a sound proofed room
(Field notes 6-12-89 and 17-7-90). The interviewees did not mind this situation, being
reassured that the noise level was not dangerous and that it was regularly monitored
by the safety officer (Interview 17-7-90b). One of the men commented that he only
noticed the noise when all the machines "went down" (broke down or were switched
off) as "it is so quiet" (Interview 17-7-90b). One woman said "I tend to shout when
I go home but don't mean to" (Interview 17-7-90b) but she was not concerned about
this. The only people to complain about the noise were the line workers who were
on other lines close to the auto insertion section.
Koorki
At Koorki, like the Koburg plant, auto insertion workers were organised along lines,
though there were six in Koorki. In contrast, the machinery was older and
comparatively more workers were employed at Koorki, 40 per shift. Paradoxically,
the age of the machinery and the organisation of work meant that these workers could
pace their own work more effectively than the Koburg workers.
The auto insertion section attempted to achieve batches of 1,000 boards before
changing, and the larger the boards, the longer the runs sought. The target for this
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section was an output of about 40 boards per machine per hour. The-program for the
machines indicated a target output of 60 per hour. This did not allow for changing
parts, or insert errors. In Koorki, unlike Koburg, the targets were made so tight that
they were rarely achieved. However, it is debatable whether the minders in Koorki
were under more output pressure than in Koburg. On the face of it, the Koorki
workers were consistently under-producing so management had a gauge of failure. On
the other hand the targets seemed to be considered as fictional. Thus in Koorki the
workers "try for 70 percent to 80 percent" (Interview 16-8-90c) of the target, in effect
regulating their own output targets (Interview 16-8-90c).
Once, when visiting the plant, Koorki workers complained that for the previous few
weeks the output was "terrible" because of machine problems. It was just after a two
week holiday closure "when all these machines were supposed to be maintained"
(Interview 16-8-90c). Many of the machines were old and if a fault became persistent
the minder would call in a technician. There was a lot of contact with the these
technicians who worked from a pool and prioritised which machine to repair first
(Interview 16-8-90c). This implies that there were quite a lot of machine related
problems, again, implying that output was largely decided by machine performance.
Individual workers were responsible for a broader range of tasks at Koorki than in
the Koburg plant. As a machine minder said (Interview 16-8-90c):
It sounds easy but little things can make it hard.., if magazines won't
go in properly or the boards are not going into the magazines properly
or you got insert errors and you're walking backwards and forwards.
189
To control all of this workers were supposed to do 'Z Checks' 3-every hour. This
required stopping the machine then checking the parts sheets, which came with the
programmes, against this the parts, magazines and the boards themselves; "they are
supposed to tally (laughter)" (Interview 16-8-90c).
After the machines ran a while they could start to misplace a part. As the interviewee
put it "if we do the Z checks every hour as we are supposed to do we will pick that
up" (Interview 16-8-90c). As each minder was responsible for four machines, and
each machine could put in 60 parts in a single board this could take quite a long time.
It was supposed to take 10 minutes to check each machine, and with the four
machines involved, it meant 40 minutes out of each hour was spent checking parts
and parts sheets. As the minder indicated, that assumed there were no problems.
Assuming no faults were found, it meant that out of an eight hour day each machine
lost 80 minutes production. As the minder said (Interview 16-8-90c):
They want us to do the Z charts but keep the line going for the output
- you just can't be doing it.
The interviewees felt that the auto insertion section was a special place, separate from
the rest of the factory because of the shift working involved. There were 40 workers
each on a continental shift system, including the technicians and supervisors. The auto
insertion section was in a new building, along with a few manual insert lines. Among
the 40 there were about five women. Everybody interviewed was drawn to the shift
Z checks were a form of quality control technique used to chart the occurrence of
quality errors.
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work because they would have to put in about 40 hours overtime-a- month on the
other lines to got the same pay as they get in auto insertion (Interview 16-8-90c).
Auto insertion was batch production, which was largely machine paced. At the same
time, without proper monitoring of production output quality could be affected. The
environment was noisy and hot, quite unlike the rest of the factory environments.
Manual inserters
Manual insertion was line paced work with workers placing small components on to
boards. Each person inserted a few components on each board.
Kcrg
Further along the line from auto insertion, at Koburg, manual inserters were
employed, in rows of up to 20, totalling around 150 full timers, of which all but two
or three were women. They worked in groups with shared experiences, which helped
the formation of strong cohesiveness. Occasionally, an individual's approach to their
work could cause 'internal' conflicts.
In manual insertion the operators insert 10 to 12 parts in a cycle time of 33 seconds;
taking the example of one interviewee, her batch required inserting 11 components
per board in 95 boards every hour. This was exceedingly repetitive work, where even
the colour of the components did not vary. Not only that but it was fast work, with
about 3.44 seconds per insert or around 1,045 inserts an hour. As an interviewee
described the job (Interview 17-7-90a):
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The job is click take, click take - there is no time to sit up-and talk.
The work is continuous.
One hand takes a part out of the tray in front of the inserter whilst the other hand
inserts the part, so that both hands are moving at the same time, something akin to
the hand movement of the crawl stroke in swimming. Once the board has been
completed a button is pressed to move the line along so that the next board stops in
front of the inserter. On one line this movement happened automatically, after 33
seconds. One person, who had moved from insert to solder checking said "the
pressure is off me completely now. No one likes going on insertion and everybody
tries to get off it" (Interview 17-7-90a).
Output depended on whether there was a full work load to do, and in Koburg whether
there was stock. This was not the fault of the inserters but because of parts shortages
from suppliers. Consequently, the line frequently stopped, or treads water by
continuing old batches for stock, until parts arrived. Inserters understood the
wastefulness which results from such situations (Interview 17-7-90a).
As with auto insertion, there was a constant pressure for quality as well as quantity.
Rejects were marked against each person and there was a computer behind them
which indicated their current rejects, as well as a weekly report which totalled each
person's rejects. The interviewees thought that the selection of who was at fault in
creating a reject was unfair. One interviewee complained that she had four rejects
marked against her that morning which were not hers because the parts had fallen out
as the boards were turned over after the solder bar. She implied that machine errors
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were to blame - the maintenance technicians fault, or an accidentror the fault of a
person who had just been put on the line. She went on to say (Interview 17-7-90a):
You do feel good at the end of the day if you don't do any rejects - it
does make you feel good. A girl puts in ten thousand boards a day and
she gets four rejects - its nothing but you're made to feel its a crime.
I can see that if everybody does it becomes a problem. That puts you
under pressure as well.
Quality control was seen as a pressure yet at the same time a cause of satisfaction.
The minders were aware of the cumulative effect of bad quality and yet it was still
seen as all rather petty of management to get so worked up about four rejects in a
day, a 0.044 percent reject rate for a person (Interview 17-7-90a).
Koorki
At Koorki, on boards which were large there were 13 parts inserted by each of 16
people on a line. On smaller 'H' boards, which went on the back of the tube, there
were only five people putting in five pieces each. The output target was 1,200 boards
on the 'H' boards a day but workers usually achieved 50 boards more. This meant
a cycle time of 4.5 seconds an insert or 22 seconds a board. It may not be appropriate
to compare to the cycle times in Koburg because there may be different types of
components involved but the times were over 30 percent slower in Koorki than
Koburg. The ability to produce above the target, as in Koburg's auto insertion
section, implies that either the targets were too slack or the minders were not doing
something which they should within their work cycle. In either case it reflects badly
on management: either the work study times were out, or the 'bosses' were not
making sure the workers did their full allotted tasks. On the other hand, work study
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is a not scientific managerial technique, evidenced by changes in-methods and job
redesign (for a thorough discussion of this issue refer to Kelly; 1982).
If the line is controlled by pressing a button, the line is controlled by the individual
operators up to the point where the supervisor tells them to speed up4 . However, an
interviewee said (Interview 16-8-90b):
I find if I'm on a line the faster I go the better I am. I find if it goes
slower, my mind wanders and I start missing parts ... I did enjoy
going fast and that.
This has two implications: there is a speed at which the hand movements become
automatic and the inserter retains concentration on their job. Second, one or more
people can effect the whole line by 'playing games' with their work. It appears that
for optimum efficiency the line speed or targets must be set at a level which kept the
inserters busy, and kept the routine going.
The group, or team relationships, on manual insertion allowed one person, usually
near the beginning of the line, to effect the work pressure on the rest. In the case of
the interviewee, who "liked to go fast" (Interview 16-8-90b), she either did it in order
to get noticed with an eye to promotion, or to relieve the monotony of the work by
playing a game with herself5 . She competed against herself on how many boards she
Burawoy (1979; 177) shows how this autonomy becomes a form of control as workers
rarely conflict with management over production goals.
A similar and much more detailed account is provided by Roy (1973).
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could do in a given time, rather like a Japanese child will see how-many beans they
can hold between two chopsticks and still get it in their mouth. Notwithstanding the
personal satisfaction of playing this game it was a selfish act because it effected the
rest of the work group. Either there was a gap before the 'player', or a build up of
boards after her which reflected on the rest of the group. The supervisor could ask
why the flow of the line was not event smooth and could conclude that it was because
the others are not working as hard as the 'player'. A conclusion that can be deduced
from this is that when there is line working, where each worker is tied to the
performance of the others, output is dependent upon the fastest not the slowest
worker, because the fastest becomes the pace setter to which management will cajole
the others to match. However, if there is not a 'player' in the group, output is
regulated not by the individual worker, but, like a machine, by the group norms
(Interview 16-8-90b). Thus, workers will always feel that work pace is regulated by
an external force, not by their own volition.
There was one worker who kept a check on the quality targets and who recorded
individual rejects, producing a graph charting each person from figures of the
previous day's performance. Apart from this public record of performance, "If the
same reject comes up which came from a girl, she will be told to keep a special
check for it" (Interview 16-8-90b). Thus, there was a constant feedback to the
inserters of any rejects which got attributed to them, in a model similar to that used
by Robert Owen for worker control. The interviewee did not know the quality targets
or the performance at the time, except that she was told that it was "still not good
enough yet" (Interview 16-8-90b).
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Clearly manual insertion was repetitive work with a mixture of pressures for speed
and accuracy. The workers were conscious of these dual stresses on their activities.
Technicians
Maintenance people were employed to keep the lines going by both making repairs
and trying to prevent breakdowns in the machines. These in-house technicians did not
maintain the more sophisticated machines, which were managed by outside
contractors.
Koburg
In Koburg, there were 31 technicians, who worked on either of two main tasks:
planned maintenance and repairs. The two were seen as interrelated, such that more
planned maintenance could reduce the need for repairs during line operation.
Planned maintenance was carried out by a special team which came in at night and,
because there was no overlapping of shifts, supervisors have to consult with each
other to check what problems came up during the day. As an interviewee pointed out,
it meant that the person who had been dealing with a problem during the day, instead
of maintaining the machine in overtime, leaves it for another person to come in and
learn about the problem. It could be very difficult to explain to someone else the
nature of a fault. The overall result of this was that the technicians lost some control
over their work because supervisors became involved in passing on messages and
could thus check up on the performance of their subordinates (Interview 17-7-90c).
However, some workers argued that it was unlikely that this was why management
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instituted planned maintenance; rather the aim was more likely—to-- cut down the
overtime payment costs which had previously been worked almost every night and
weekend (Interview 17-7-90c).
Most of the work had changed from repairing manual switching equipment to process
logic controllers (PLC's) which were just pulled out and replaced with a new unit.
However, most of the mechanical work had remained the same, except (Interview
17-7-90c):
It is easier to maintain if you can get the components. They are
supposed to be thrown away when they go wrong but here we have to
repair them because there is not another in stock.
So, much of the mechanical work was patching and making do because of the expense
of keeping stocks of components that might fail (Interview 17-7-90c).
Another quote shows the main concerns of the technician (Interview 17-7-90c):
When we work on one system all the time it gets boring. Also, we can
get several problems at the same time and are expected to be a genius
and correct them all at once. At times you have to look busy and other
times you are busy. If there is a big problem often others are also busy
so there is no one to come and help you out. Everybody's job takes
priority and the supervisors are unsympathetic if you prioritise another
line. You have to become accustomed - you say I will do it but then
go and do somewhere else - never say no. She will get her boss if you
do.
In one example (Interview 17-7-90c):
In the same way if a girl says she has had an electric shock - and you
can't find a fault you say 'yes and I fixed it' to keep them hPPY.
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The role of technicians in product quality was small but it seemed-to be high in
relation to output quantity. If a machine was down it could stop production
completely. However, the interviewees felt that much of the blame for machine down
time was not as a result of poor maintenance but inappropriate use (Interview
17-7-90c):
We don't get stick for quality but lack of production. We've had
problems with R&D, which we get the blame for. An example is that
they design one television and then make different screen sizes without
testing them - we have had problems with sets falling over. We can
put our comments forward to design one said but another says we have
no input, we are told what do, we know about design anyway! The
same problem occurs on the line. We get told to put something on the
line but the operator will say it gets in the way of their arm. But we
put it in because we are told to. They blame each other.
Finally, there had been a split between technicians working on televisions and those
working on satellite equipment manufacture. In spite of this, the technicians still
helped each other out (Interview 17-7-90c):
that is if it is allowed by those in charge because it gets a bit
political then.
Management was more concerned with their own sphere of control and less with the
flexibility of their subordinates. In contrast, these workers were open to some
functional flexibility. This will by discussed further under the next sub-heading and
in Chapter Eight.
Koorki
In Koorki there were 24 technicians, undertaking similar work activities to that in
Koburg, but the atmosphere was quite different.
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The one interviewee worked in a pool of workers but was also the--leader of a team,
which shifted, depending on the work needs. Part of his role was training, a recurrent
topic for technicians in both cases. This was not so much to do with flexibility but
with change within existing work areas. The interviewee said that (Interview
17-8-90):
One of the biggest problems is in training. There are so many new
systems coming in and there is not enough time to be sent to college.
We are given the manual and expected to be an expert on that
machine. When I have to run a department, keep people busy, order
stocks (there is no engineering stores) etc, there is not much time left
for this.
This quote explains one of the main problems in maintaining machines. There was
a lack of resources and time for training. Further, training was also hampered by
other duties, such as organising stocks of repair and replacement components, and
organising the introduction of planned maintenance into Koorki. As indicated
(Interview 17-8-90):
I don't have any time to train my teams, if 1 am working on a mac'riine
I try to teach a person in the ten minutes as much as I can about that
machine. I am supposed to be knowledgable of all the tools but that is
impossible.
The interviewee was not supposed to be doing maintenance but planning and
managing the work team. He claimed that he selected members of the team based on
their attitude, rather than their level of skills (Interview 17-8-90), from outside the
organ isation.
Planned maintenance was being introduced for the first time in the pcb section,
excluding auto insertion but was not very effective at the time of the interview. "They
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tried to implement planned maintenance in the past but there was-such high labour
turnover in the section that it was not possible" (Interview 17-8-90).
The image is one of a very hectic and quite chaotic factory at Koorki, which contrasts
with Koburg. This may be further illustrated by concluding with another quote from
the team leader (Interview 17-8-90):
I am responsible for maintenance in the new factory where pcb's are
made. I want my own team to plan with but management is not very
cooperative. Because there are still discussions between Japanese and
UK managers about manning levels, budgets, etc. But it is only six
weeks away. That's forward planning for you!
Finally, quality was only seen as an issue for the technicians as far as it referred to
the solder bars which had their own specialist minders. The team leader tried to
motivate them to concentrate on their work (Interview 17-8-90). This view of quality
was exactly the same as in Koburg.
Discussion
A number of conclusions may be drawn from these descriptions. There were jobs
which were very different in nature with varying degrees of line pacing and direct
management control built into them. The plants were similar in many respects,
including a generally ambivalent attitude towards the maintenance of quality and the
quality of maintenance.
Koburg appeared far more organised and relied more on the responsible autonomy of
employees than did Koorki, where there appeared to be conflicts between locals and
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Japanese regarding what was 'best practice'. Perhaps as a result—targets set by
management had become fictional guides for workers.
SKILL AND GENDER DIVISIONS
The work at these plants was divided by 'male' jobs and 'female' jobs and between
skilled and non-skilled workers. Men did not do 'dexterous work' rather they did the
more so-called 'skilled' work in assembly. They were also more likely to do what is
traditionally 'heavy work', even though much of this 'heavy' work had become
mechanised so that it was in fact 'light' work. For example, boxing television sets
after final assembly was not a heavy job because cranes have been introduced to place
the sets in the boxes. However, Cavendish (1982;76-97), and Phillips and Taylor
(1980) show that such segmentation by gender is a common practice in
manufacturing. The following sub-section v'i\1 aaiess t\it tom 't.itc c te
raised under job gendering. The second sub-section will address gendered images of
skill6 . Finally, the sub-section will provide a brief indication of differences between
the case studies in the degree to which they used gender to segment their employment
arrangements.
6 For the purposes of easing analysis of job types, references to 'skill' (in single
quotation marks) indicate definitions used by the management and unions in
the cases. These people use categories of 'skilled', 'semi-skilled' and 'un-
skilled'. Skill, without quotation marks, refers to the author's personal
understanding.
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Employment gendering
One area that was almost exclusively male was auto insertion. The reason given by
all who were asked about this arrangement was that shift systems worked in each
plant (Field notes 24-10-89), although this was beginning to change with recent
government legislation lifting the restriction on women working shifts in certain areas
(Interview 24-10-89) but to what extent was uncertain. Women once did the jobs
which were now embodied in the male attended auto insertion machines, so why were
women not moved onto the automated machines instead of newly employing men?
Armstrong (1982), studying a similar change, has argued that although the shift
system guaranteed male working on nights, women could have worked the day shifts.
Men cost more money but they were worthwhile because the company was able to
gain higher return on investment by continuous working of expensive capital machines
through the shift working, so men replaced the women. Armstrong (1982;32-3)
provides two explanations. First, men, tired of permanent night shifts asked
management for the opportunity to sometimes work during daylight, and thus shift
rotations started. Second, in order to avoid being caught by equal pay for equal work
provisions within the Equal Pay Act (1970) it is unwise to employ men and women
on the same jobs.
Why did management pay the men more than the women? Why not lower men's pay
to those of women in the factory and so reduce overall labour costs? Within these
cases the differential factor was the claim of pay for skill and responsibility. As will
be seen in the following section, auto insertion was not highly skilled work in
comparison to other line jobs. Nevertheless, Harvey (1987) shows that where
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technology is brought into male jobs skill upgrading is accredited, but-where it affects
women's jobs the technology is not recognised as enhancing skills. Beechey (1982;68-
71) argues that much of women's disadvantage in the labour market comes from their
unique relations within the family, which lowers perception of their labour value by
men at work. Moreover, as will be shown in Section III of the thesis, women under
value their own labour power, so that there is no overt resistance to this form of wage
discrimination. However, I would add, along with Armstrong (1982;38-9), that the
men gain their advantaged position often at a price: in the case of auto insertion
workers this means compulsory shift working.
Other male preserves were management posts and maintenance! technicians. Women
had the preserve of telephonists and secretaries, without fear of job competition from
men! On the line they were also almost exclusively working on the manual insertion
sections. Their direct bosses were also female, although at higher levels the bosses
were invariably male.
In jobs which were defined as 'semi-skilled' such as test and reworking, men and
women share the job, although the jobs which women did before being promoted to
test and reworking was almost always manual insertion. Thus, men have an almost
guaranteed promotion to the more interesting and varied reworking. Men also tended
to be more visible in main assembly. Although this was 'un-skilled' work, many men
worked on these lines. Tuning tended to be female and packing was more male than
female.
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In all cases the 'skilled jobs' - maintenance of the automated machines-and computers
were done on maintenance contracts by outsiders. The other maintenance jobs,
because of the nature of the basic technology, were mainly mechanically based, with
some electrical work. In all cases these jobs were the preserve of men.
Gendered definitions of skill
Sixty percent of direct workers in all the cases were women, of which most worked
on 'un-skilled' manual insertion assembly lines. The definition of skills, however,
were initially defined by men in unions and male managers, although there was a
degree of justification in some grading, by looking at the length of time it takes to
train a person to perform a task competently. Using the example of manual insertion,
it takes only a few hours to reach line speed, whereas it takes at least two weeks to
become an auto insert machine minder (Interview 1-3-90b). Moreover, the range of
tasks required for the minder is greater than for the manual inserter. However, if we
study the nature of the manual inserter's job, it is possible to see skills in precision
hand movements, concentration and speed of operation, none of which are present to
the same degree in the 'male' jobs. Moreover, whereas companies will pay for the
pre-employment training of a man's brawn, there is not a similar stance taken for the
learned dexterity of women.
The definitions of those skills were intitially produced by male trade unionists and
male managers, and, though there was a degree of justification in some grading in
terms of length of time it takes to train a person to perform a task competently, many
classifications of skilled and unskilled could not be justified. Bradley (1989;166-8)
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shows how within the history of the electrical goods industry there-was a change in
the sexual composition of employment in the early part of the twentieth century.
From the birth of the industry in 1885, only men were employed in the factories, but
with mechanisation and subdivision of labour the employment of women expanded.
Bradley explains that (1989; 167):
Women have been used for assembly tasks involving the manipulation
of tiny parts and fine wiring, and also on assembly-line production
where jobs are unskilled and repetitive.
By 1960 women constituted 40 percent of overall employment within the industry.
Beechey (1987;39-52) argues that among the advantages of employing women instead
of men are that women are paid under the value of their labour because of family
relations which assume the male is financially responsible for reproduction, women
as workers must buy products they might otherwise make themselves (so increasing
aggregate consumption), and cheaper labour undermines the power in the labour
process of male workers. To these advantages to capital, Beechey adds issues of
flexibility in that women probably cost less to make redundant under legal provisions
and are more likely to accept part-time or seasonal work than men because of their
insecurity relative to men within the labour market.
Collinson and Knights (1986; 146-50) argue that a number of factors lead to gendering
of jobs: so that jobs are designed for women through technology, their cheaper cost
than men and the historical subordination of women, in such a way that women are
largely restricted to unskilled jobs. Phillips and Taylor (1980), argue against this form
of causation by saying that it is women's inferior status within society which results
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in skills they use being interpreted as inferior to those used by men---Thus, women's
work is unskilled because it is women's work, gendering the definitions of skill, just
as sexes are ideologically ranked.
The other 'skilled' jobs, include floats and re-workers. The floats were skilled
because of the work organisation and the human content. People go to the toilet, have
problems or lapses in concentration. The floats were skilled in that they could do all
the different so-called 'un-skilled' work on their section. The re-workers must know
how to mend complex boards and the logic of the boards (the connections, parts) so
that they needed a conceptual understanding of the function of the boards. The work
was manually dextrous and also highly skilled, although it was not recognised as such
in the plants, perhaps because mainly women did it!
There is yet a third way of defining the jobs - those tied to the track and those not.
Of those tied to the track manual insertion was by far the most difficult and
exhausting work. All the others, especially those off the track had rest time. All the
off track jobs were tied to the track in some way by making them 'service' the line,
by feeding parts or minimising down time, but they were less controlled by line
speed. Women generally did jobs which were more tied to, and consequently more
controlled by, the line than men.
Differences between cases
Among regular shopfloor workers, Koburg employed a few more women in the
'male' jobs than the three Japanese plants. For example, while there were some
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women working in auto insertion on the day shifts, as mentioned-previously, there
was at least one man working on the manual insertion lines. These variations reflected
geographical differences where the Japanese were located in 'heavy' industrial areas,
with more 'machismo' communities, and Koburg's labour force was used to light
industrial work.
There was some evidence, unsubstantiated, that Kohashi employed several men
among its seasonal workers (Interview 27-11-90). This took advantage of very high
unemployment in the plant's locality, which forced men on to the peripheral labour
market, and to accept the same low paid, insecure jobs as women must endure.
Conclusion
In these case study plants, television assembly was organised in such a way that there
was a strong sexual division of labour, which both took advantage of women's
vulnerability within the labour market and re-enforced stereotypical views of skills
and gender. Even as the nature of work changed, with the implementation of new
technologies, or the tightening of labour markets, these divisions were perpetuated,
even extended.
Finally, the impact of Japanese ownership on these divisions was minimal, so that the
Japanisation debate, in itself, is independent of gender considerations. This is not to
argue that gender is not an integral consideration of the labour process within
Japanese owned companies, but such consideration relates, not to the form of
ownership, but the nature of the industrial sector in which Japanese capital invests.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
There were an array of jobs, which were mainly controlled or directed at production
line pacing. Thus, for maintenance technicians, just as for manual inserters, the line
was the focus of activities. However, there were differences in the degree of
mechanised control between jobs, so that a technician was controlled by their
manager. Thus, there was a difference in the visibility of tasks, such that a manual
inserter's quality and effort was almost immediately discovered, whereas a technician
could hide mistakes for longer or even permanently.
Within the working process the interviewees of both cases were concerned with
output and quality as competing objectives. Thus, although this supports Oliver and
Wilkinson's (1989;74) statement that quality is the concern of everyone, it is only one
concern. Moreover, when output falls, there can be demands by management for
quantity at 'acceptable' quality standards. Thus, within these cases, total quality
management or zero defects was not realistic of either workers or managers, as
Taguchi and Clausing (1990) or Schonberger (1982) would indicate. Moreover,
contrary to Sayer's (1986) argument that production systems developed in Japan
represent (1986;43):
New types of relationships among workers, between workers and
management
Within consumer electronics there was no such transformation but, rather, a shift in
emphasis between competing objectives for quality and quantity. Instead, television
assembly can be seen as being within more traditional models of Taylorism and
Fordism. In addition, the organisation employment was strongly, and continuously,
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gendered.
By concentrating on 'the new', proponents of a new form of industrial relations, and
Japanisation in particular, have tended to pay too little attention to the way in which
capital has successfully perpetuated the basic 'formula' of control over time. This
formula of continually looking to segment and de-skill to increase control over
workers, whilst at the same time, recognising the limits to which these can be done,
have not changed, at least within the consumer electronics sector.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
A FLEXIBLE ORGANISATION OF WORK?
iNTRODUCTION
The most common feature of Japanisation is seen as issues centred around flexibility.
Although it is often an assumed feature of employment and work practices in Japan,
the relevance of flexibility to the UK context is still a point of debate.
Using Atkinson's model of the flexible firm (1985) flexibility can be broken into
several categories based around numerical and functional flexibility. Numerical
flexibility refers to the ability to change the work hours done at any one time by
changing numbers of workers, hours of work for an individual (overtime) and in the
longer term changes in shifts worked. Functional flexibility refers to the ability to
change the work content of individuals (Atkinson; 1985).
The analysis if this chapter draws on observations and interviews in the four case
study plants. The simplistic Atkinson model is used to outline the main features of
flexibility although, by looking at 'cases in flexibility', at the end of the chapter some
of the complexities of flexibility can be demonstrated. In fact, some of the
contradictions of the whole flexibility debate emerged from the comments of
managers in the four case plants in the UK.
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NUMERICAL FLEXIBILITY
It has been shown in chapters Three, Four and Six that there was great seasonal
variation in the demand for and production of televisions. How labour was utilised
to respond to these requirements was limited to a number of choices, including
numerical flexibility. Alternative management options included automation, keeping
lines busy by making a second product to cover the slack season, or some kind of
functional flexibility whereby regular employees might assemble sets in the busy
season, May to October, and do design or administration in the quiet season.
Numerical flexibility may be defined as to do with changing the demand for hours
worked (length of working quantity) either through modifying the work hours of
existing labour or changing the number of workers employed in a plant or some
combination of these two measures. This section will detail the different forms of
such flexibility used in each of the cases: overtime, shift working for regular
employees and the use of peripheral workers.
Overtime
All the cases used overtime to some extent, it being the easiest form of flexibility in
working time available to an employer. Moreover, generally it increased in the
second half of the year, although there was a great deal of confusion as to its purpose
and its extent.
At Koorki the pattern of overtime worked meant that management rarely asked all the
people on a line to work on at the end of the day, but rather it selected groups to
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finish the day's target, or to prepare for the following day. Towards-the end of the
busy season there was some working every Saturday for an average of one-third of
workers at any one time, although two Saturday mornings a month of regular
overtime working were also being undertaken overall. In this period there could be
one and half hours a night, except Friday. Auto insertion of pcbs was one major
exception to non-productive (preparing for rather than making televisions) overtime.
This was because the expansion in output to cope with demand was putting heavy
demands on auto insertion machines. The solution to this was investment in new
machines, which was taking place at the time of the interviews. However, levels of
demand were still creating pressure for high rates of overtime work in the short term
(Interview 13-1 1-89).
At Kokuda in the low season there was about two percent overtime of overall hours
worked and 12 to 15 percent in high season of hours worked above normal. However,
within any individual work group of 15 or 16, two or three people work some
overtime over any particular period (Interview 1-3-90a).
At Kohashi, from September to late November there was double the overtime than
at other times. In this busy season most people worked every Saturday morning for
four or five hours and for two nights a week, each for two hours. This adds up to
eight to nine hours extra production a week in the second half of the year (Interview
27-11-89). A manager in Kohashi described how, using three month production plans,
the company balance human resources requirements between overtime work and
employment of casual workers, as will be seen later in this chapter (Interview
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15-8-90d).
Overtime serves two functions: to increase output or to undertake ancillary activities
when the lines are stopped, such as to correct quality problems built up during the
day. Koburg's management claimed that all overtime was used to prepare production
for the next day, or next week, although one said that there was some sub-assembly
work undertaken in order to build up stocks for the main lines (Interview 6-12-89c).
The production manager did indicate that there was overtime done for non-output
work related to engineering and even some reworking of output to adapt changes to
original designs on the lines. A float operator at Koburg, who did paid voluntary
overtime, explained how she tried to prepare the line with parts ready for a model
change, and so on, so that when the line started the next day all would be ready for
a quick start and a fast model change (Interview 16-8-90b). Much overtime work was
for preparation or correction rather than direct production output in all the cases.
Personnel Managers in Koburg and Koorki considered that too much overtime was
being worked and both wanted to reduce its cost. Koburg had introduced a scheme
called 'annualized hours', where more hours were worked in the busy season, and
less in the slack seasons, in an attempt to escape overtime premiums (Interview
6-12-89a). However, chapters Ten and Eleven will show that some was still being
worked, especially in the busy season, leading to very long working days (Interview
18-7-90). Koorki had also introduced annualized hours but only for the white collar
staff in the administration offices (Field notes: 21/2-3-90).
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The production manager in Koorki commented that volunteers ow-overtime were
assigned to similar jobs or lines on which they usually worked during the day, to
avoid losing time through training (Interview 21-2-90á). In some instances this meant
that lines were not able to be run because it was not possible to get all the workers
on any particular line to volunteer.
Managers interviewed said that overtime was voluntary and there were no problems
getting enough staff for the work needed. A manager in Kokuda admitted that if a
person was found not to be volunteering for overtime after a period they would be
asked about their "overtime commitment" (Interview 1-3-90). One implication is that
there was a pressure to conform to management's authority.
The general manager in Kokuda commented that sometimes there was a more relaxed
atmosphere during overtime working and productivity was higher than during the day.
The possible explanation for this is that there was less pressure on the workers
(Interview 28-6-90e).
Overtime provides the most flexible of all forms of extra work hours, so can be
increased and reduced according to how far production for the warehouse actually
matches demand. Therefore, in all cases overtime was popular with management.
Nevertheless, there was a dependency on workers to volunteer, even if this 'choice'
by workers was 'encouraged'.
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Shift working for reuIar workers
The characteristics of shift working were stability and restricted application (Interview
1-3-90). Shifts were applied to only about five percent of the workforce at Koorki,
for example (Interview 21-2-90a), and this would be proportionately similar in the
others cases, although a little higher in Kokuda. Except in Kokuda, shifts were not
used to achieve seasonal adjustments, or short term flexibility. For example, auto
insertion had shifts because the machines used were expensive so needed to be kept
running as much as possible to gain returns on capital investment. At the same time
few new machines were bought because of the expense, so that three shifts were
required in order to supply just one or one and a half shifts for the rest of the factory.
In addition, not having all the non-auto insertion lines running continuously allowed
time for maintenance of machines and tracks to be carried out. For this reason,
maintenance workers were also required to work a shift system in all the plants. As
was noted in an earlier chapter, the day shift dealt with line breakdowns, and the
night shift carried out planned or major maintenance jobs.
In all the plants there was some shift working for auto insertion. This was either a
four shift each day, as in Koorki, Kohashi and Kokuda (Interviews 21-2-90a, 15-8-
90d and 28-6-90b), or a continental system, as in Koburg (Interview 17-7-90b). In
addition, Kokuda had shift working for sub-assembly of the deflection yoke, which
required expensive specialised machinery, and therefore the lines were run for two
shifts: day and late shifts, a two shift pattern.
Referring to the existence of stocks explained in Chapter Six, it can be seen that if
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some areas were producing when others were not there must necessarily be stock
piles of work-in-progress. It may be possible to balance the production process so that
there was a constant throughput, with all lines working the same hours by using
different numbers of machines and labour in the different sections. However,
management did not organise production this way because it was not efficient to do
so1.
Because of legislation relating to women working at night, there were few women
working in areas where there were shifts. In Koburg there were examples but the
women involved worked on permanent day shifts, as was noted in the previous
chapter. This, however, was not a concession to women, as in addition to shift
working there were extra people employed in these machine areas during the day.
These issues and how they related to pay will be explored further in Chapter 10.
Priphera1 workers
The use of contract workers for short periods of time, up to six months, can be done
either by spreading them among the existing workforce, or to use them as an
additional shift. Three of the plants used the latter method, employing mainly married
'The same logic of efficiency prevails at the largest television production plant in the
world, in Japan, where there were shifts for auto insertion and maintenance supplying
a day shift for the rest of the plant (Field research 1987-9). This shows that there is
no real argument for an economies of scale in smoothing the production lines to have
shift working throughout a plant.
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mothers on what was called the twilight shift or 'baby' shift 2 , -from 6.00pm to
10.00pm, Koorki being the exception.
Koburg employed an evening shift of 100 contract workers, plus 50 to 60 on day
working contracts. Over a period of a few months it was intended that out of 800
workers 200 would be on six month contracts. Some contracts were renewed
immediately (Interview 6-12-89a), the idea was to retain a stable group of peripheral
workers 'on the books' to cope with expansion and contraction (Interview 7-12-89b).
Koorki's Personnel Director claimed there were no contract or part time workers,
except for a contract caterer and for new building projects (Interview 13-11-89). He
claimed that Koorki did not use such flexible employment practices in television
assembly but, instead, relied on labour turnover. In the slack season leavers were not
replaced and in the busy season more were employed. This seems a very
unsophisticated method of coping with the seasons, but it was made possible because
there was continuous expansion. One year's busy season turned into the next year's
slack season.
At Kokuda, management operated a four day a week twilight shift for pcb assembly
with 40 to 50 workers at the start of the year. By the end of the year the numbers
grew to 100 or 150 casual workers. Many of the workers were ex-full time employees
who had left to have children and who would return full time when the family grew
2 So called, because most of the workers on this shift were young women with children,
who went to work after their partners arrived home to look after the children.
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up. Managers in Kokuda said they also used this labour turnover to aelieve flexibility
in employment numbers (Interview 1-3-90a), reflecting to a lesser extent the same
phenomenon as in Koorki.
At Kohashi, management had a policy that 'good' (female) workers tended to get
recalled as contract workers when they leave to have families. New contract workers
got one week of training before they were assigned work, whilst returning workers
get a brief refresher. The idea was to have about 850 permanent staff with a contract
labour force that varies. At the time of the interviews there were about 210 contract
workers used in busy times, and this number was built up slowly each month to the
busiest months of the year, October to November (Interview 27-1 1-90).
Koburg and Kohashi did not rely on a form of flexibility from labour turnover. This
reflected an entirely different labour market situation from that facing Koorki and
Kokuda. Both Koburg (Interview 6- 12-89) and Kohashi (Interview 27-11-89) although
increasing in size, had a recent history of drastic contraction. It may be said that there
was a certain synergistic effect of expansion, which these later two plants had yet to
benefit from, in terms of flexibility in core worker numbers. Those plants using these
temporary workers drew on the external labour pool for recruitment. There was an
incentive for the worker to be a good contractor in order that they may be picked to
replace natural wastage (those who resigned or retired from the core), and for plant
expansion. This process contradicts Piore and Sabel's assertion that there are barriers
to transfers between the core and periphery (1984).
218
A major consideration for the success in employing such a core - periphery strategy
is the shape of the local labour market. In the case of the twilight or evening shift the
main source of supply was young women with children. More crucially there was an
incentive to get workers who would be prepared to work for periods of half a year,
and less. Kohashi was able to use some farm workers, with almost half the
contractors being male. Koburg had attracted some contractors who were encouraged
to move from another part of the country, when another factory was closed. These
contractors moved with their machines and were contracted to teach the locals
(Interview 21-2-90c). Nevertheless, this was a precarious policy since if a competitive
employer moved into the area and offered similar work on a full time basis, then the
company might lose these contractors. This might happen with Kohashi as a German
company planned a move into the same valley (Interview 15-8-90d).
The crucial factor which permits this form of seasonal and part time labour
recruitment to occur was the gender composition of the labour market. Companies
relied on two aspects of women's employment. First, women were relegated to a
reserve army of labour whereby their wages were considered supplementary to that
of their male partners, allowing them to take jobs which were low paid and non-
regular, and for which men would rarely apply. Second, the case study employers
took advantage of a typical life cycle of women within the UK, so that they initially
employed young women, retained these women as part timers when they had
children, and then re-employ them full-time when the children gained independence.
For the employer, this 'system' allowed retention of skills, provided flexibility (they
were not required to employ or re-employ these women) at each stage and keeps costs
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associated with long service down because there was not 'continuityLof employment.
There might be little wonder that these firms showed little interest in creche facilities
for their employees! The most disturbing aspect of all this was that, as will be shown
in Chapter Ten, many of the women felt grateful to their employer for 'keeping them
on' and 'taking them back' after child rearing. Kohashi provides an exception in that
several of these peripheral workers were men. The reason given by people in the
plant is that the high unemployment in the valley was forcing men to take any job
around, and at the same time they hoped this was a 'foot in the door' for a regular
job when such vacancies arose (Field notes 15-8-90).
FUNCTIONAL FLEXIBILITY
Sayer (1986) defined flexibility as filling in the porosity of the working day. By this
he meant numerical flexibility, although changing work content itself is another form
of flexibility. In reality functional flexibility is more complicated and interwoven than
either Piore and Sabel (1984) or Atkinson (1985) indicate (Elger and Fairbrother,
1992). Nor is it a simple utopia for management, as this section will show, through
identifying two aspects of this form of flexibility: job rotation and expansion.
Job rotation
Job descriptions detail what a job is, what its purpose is, what training! skills are
needed to do it, and what responsibility is involved. Job specifications describe the
type of person best suited to undertake the job and are used for recruitment. In all the
cases vague or broad job descriptions were utilised, at least initially. As the Personnel
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Director in Koburg put it "inherent within that there is a grey level of flexibility"
(Interview 24-10-89). Not only that but under these arrangements workers would have
little to cling onto in the pursuit of job protection. As the Japanese manager in Koorki
put it "there is no job demarcation" (Interview 16-8-90f). In fact, on the shopfloor
there were A and B grades in Koorki, four grades in Koburg and five grades in
Kokuda. Kohashi was an exception as it still had detailed job descriptions for the
shopfloor but their training officer complained that for white collar workers
(Interview 15-8-90e):
We don't have rigid job descriptions but it is difficult for progressing
people against formal criteria. What are the criteria based on?.
A lack in formal structures made it difficult for Personnel to match people to jobs and
to formalise promotion. Assessment of achievement had in fact moved towards line
managers and supervisors, who awarded pay and promotion based on a range of
informal criteria. However, there was a difference between gaining these
opportunities for flexibility from labour and actually being abfe to implement them
on the shopfloor.
Kokuda was the only company to claim that in one of its departments there was
organised job rotation (Interview 27-11-89). All the others said that any movement
was on an ad hoc basis determined by management within departments, or between
departments. Dealing first with movement between departments all managers agreed
that it was generally unpopular with workers because they formed social bonds with
their co-workers. The reason for movement between sections was to: (a) get the
correct mix of skills for different models of television set or, (b) to prioritise lines
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when, for example, there was a flu virus which caused mass absentee rates.
However, movement between departments on the shopfloor was not done for training
or enhancing the skill of workers; rather it was done to cope with major changes. To
this extent, it was something to be avoided if possible, not encouraged. Management
at Kokuda was thinking of trying to introduce more planned movement (Interview 1-
3-90a) but nothing had been decided at the time of this research. There was one major
exception to the rule and that was when a section was to be closed, such as a sub-
assembly. Then, rather than make people redundant, retraining was given, but again
this is quite a usual practice. Otherwise, if a person was moved it would only be for
a short time and was often referred to as 'lending-out'. The supervisor generally
would try to lend-out the least productive or socially awkward workers or, if not,
they would try to reclaim the lent-out worker as quickly as possible to maintain the
performance of their work group.
Labour imposes a restriction on capital because the socialisation process, even within
the factory, constrains managers from moving workers all around the place in the
UK. On the other hand, it gives a power to management to make the worker
responsible to the group. Even here it can backfire, if the group decides it is not in
its best interests to be highly productive for capital, as will be discussed in the next
section.
Movement of workers between different jobs in the same section is much easier than
moving workers between sections to do the same job. Within some sections, there
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were float operators. They usually provided the flexibility within the section rather
than having people move from other sections, as will be discussed below. The only
time there was movement between sections tended to be when the supervisor wished
to train up a new 'float'. The 'float' could do any job on the section and might sit in
for an operator who needed to leave the line for a short time, or fill in for an
absentee at the start of the day until a replacement worker could be taken from
another section. Kokuda had a different system, where the middle manager control
a group of 'floats' (Interview 28-6-90b). This reduced the need for movement of
operators further, but it also required the supervisor to cover for short absences from
the line. Koburg also had an additional seven percent of workers over tasks to cover
for absence. This was the only company to admit to doing this, perhaps implying
slacker labour utilisation than in the other plants (Interview 6-12-89c).
Concerning transfer between lines, the manual insert 'float' said (Interview 16-8-90b):
Flexibility doesn't come up often - only if there is abig problem.
Soldering or wrong value problem 3 get one-two people who are spare
(such as me) to help another line, but we are usually too busy on our
own line to go. This is requested through supervisors.
As one of the 'floats', she was flexible in that she could go anywhere on the line
under her supervisor. However, movement between lines, was not common practice,
except if a crisis hit. Management would never ask her to cover for an absent worker
on another line. In overtime working it was different. She had worked in auto
insertion, and the main lines on overtime before (Interview 16-8-90b).
This was an insert error, usually where the component was inserted back to front, or
in the wrong place.
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The usual comment by managers was that operators in certain sections, notably hand
insertion, stayed for years at a time, sometimes all their time, on the same job at
which they originally started. Kokuda's general manager admitted this despite
claiming that 50 percent of its female operators had competence in any job on any
line (Interview 28-6-90e).
Job rotation was not a common feature of working within the plants for most
workers. Specific examples of the complexities of managing this form of flexibility
will be shown later in this chapter, but it needs to be recognised that it is costly to
train workers for change, and often workers will resist it. Instead of a general
strategy for rotation, management created a specific job category of 'floats' for the
manual insertion lines to cover missing workers, and so avoid the need for other
workers to move jobs. Where other employees were moved it was on an ad hoc basis,
and not without problems.
Job enlar2ement
Job enlargement is a process whereby the number of tasks an employee does is
increased, thus, it can be a form of job intensification. This increase may be in terms
of extra similar tasks or qualitatively different ones. There are problems in
researching this area without looking through detailed job descriptions and comparing
those to actual activities undertaken. As the cases did not always maintain such
documents, in this research, activities undertaken for different job classifications were
used and compared between cases.
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In its broadest sense job expansion can be seen in the intriguing comment made by
a maintenance technician in Koorki where management had tried to introduce a wide
definition of tasks (Interview 17-8-90):
At one time we were required to clean the toilets but that has been
taken out ... that was really flexible!
What is more significant is that there was an almost immediate climb down by
management in the face of employee resistance, and to some degree even ridicule.
Nevertheless, the fact that Koorki's management tried to introduce such flexibility in
the first place might be construed as Japanisation, and indeed it is likely the order
came from Japanese managers. However, it did not succeed, through labour and
supervisory resistance.
At Koburg, management believed that workers' jobs had expanded to include more
issues to do with quality production as part of the overall response to the television
consumer market. However, interviewees did not seem concerned with such issues.
In the Tuner assembly area of the factory interviewees said that output was all that
mattered, not quality (Interview 17-7-90a), implying a disregard for job expansion on
the part of management. In fact, apart from a few job categories such as 'floats' and
technicians, there was little expansion in either Koburg or Koorki except in terms of
trying to get employees to think about issues of quality or safety.
Taking the example of the 'float', their ability to undertake anyone's job on their
section of the line at a moment's notice has been explained above. But in fact this job
category was designed specifically to help the supervisor by allowing workers to
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remain quite stationary, except for infrequent 'career' type moves. The 'float's' job
was, therefore designed to avoid multi-tasking of line workers. Further, it was only
possible for these 'floats' to be so versatile by continuously maintaining line jobs
which were, in essence, single repetitive tasks.
Japanisation and theories of flexibility have seen employee demarcation issues as a
common difficulty within British industry and promote the view that the new forms
of employment practices evidenced under their theoretical stances eliminate such
demarcations on the shopfloor. Looking at maintenance workers in Koorki a
technician said (Interview 17-8-90):
There is half and half of electrical and mechanical. They can do both
sides. An electrician will not do machining like I did but chains, etc,
they can do. We do look at what need done, although we don't draw
a line between them. Mine never get called on the line for insertion or
the like. Perhaps they may get called to move the line when the motor
breaks ... We do get people with a demarcation attitude, especially
among the mechanical. Mechanical because they are often afraid of the
electronics. We get a big problem with saying to people can you do
that job and they so no it is electrical without actually going out and
looking at it first.
Whereas mechanical technicians tended to stick to mechanical jobs, electrical workers
felt able to take on some mechanical work. However, there were no job descriptions
which defined these practices, rather they had grown over time as a custom and
practice on the lines, and to some extent reflected demarcation rivalries between the
two types of technician such that the electricians felt superior to mechanical men.
There was no sign of a push for job expansion, except in terms of quality. It may be
safe to say that in the days when the Japanese were not present in the UK, quality
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control was not a concern of the operator, except in as far as it was a matter of
personal pride. Maybe such pride could be identified on the main lines, but in manual
insertion, where a quality fault probably would not even be discovered, and the work,
was so devoid of intrinsic pleasure, such pride would be kept for things other than
work (Interview 16-8-90b).
Summary
Variations in seasonal demand in the case plants were dealt with by extending the
working day and employing part-time workers. Contingencies, such as repairing poor
quality parts, making up lost production and so on were catered for by overtime,
while shift working coped with production bottlenecks and machine maintenance.
Functional flexibility, on the other hand, was more limited, so that, although the
unions had agreed to complete flexibility, it was neither extensively used, nor a new
development within the plants. The next section focuses on these points looking at
specific examples.
CASE STUDIES IN FLEXIBILITY
To further illustrate the dimensions of flexibility in work organisation representative
jobs in two plants will be examined in some depth. In the following pages therefore
the complexities of these types of initiatives and practices undertaken by management
will be subjected to a considered assessment, through the perspective of workers, as
expressed in interviews.
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Auto insertion minders and loaders in Koburg
Auto insertion in Koburg had a two shift system, with an extra two people working
a third shift from 1O.00pm to 6.00am. This was a method by which management
could extend the use of capital equipment. It was not really a form of flexibility,
except in that it was an issue in work reorganisation for activities which had not used
shifts previously. Some auto insertion workers returned to Koburg after leaving the
firm, because the introduction of shifts offered increased earnings, although as will
be seen in the rest of the section there was a down side to shift working (Interview
1 7-7-90b).
Koburg's management had introduced the system of varying the hours of the working
week between the company's busy season and the slack one, under an annualized
hours contract arrangement, to reduce the overtime worked in the busy season, as has
been explained. The busy season had allowed workers to earn extra money through
working the overtime and to use this for Christmas (interview 16-12-9c). }Iowever,
in auto insertion the annualized hours system had backfired on management because
the same amount of overtime was being worked on top of the longer hours. As one
interviewee said "this is the most overtime I've done in the 24 years" (interview
17-7-90b). There was a high amount of overtime, especially when there were machine
problems during the shift. "You can work weekends, nights - there's a lot" (interview
17-7-90b). Overtime was worked on a purely voluntary basis and plenty of people
wanted to do it. The interviewees said that they wanted overtime because of the cost
of living in the area. Overtime was always offered first to the first shift, with
leftovers going to the second shift (Interview 17-7-90b):
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Most of the time you have your own machine which you run from day
to day. If your machine breaks down you can be moved to another
one.
This explanation from one of the men shows again, that the job was decided by the
machine. He moved only when the machine allowed him to do so. The supervisor
gave the order where to go but would leave him there if it was not for the machine.
Another example of this arose when auto insertion machines were moved to Koburg
from another plant. The minders at the other plant were asked if they wanted to move
with the machines. The company was saying 'you move with your machine or you
lose your job'. But there was a context to this system which denies the technological
determinism implied in the quote. The relationship was only there because
management had organised work in that particular way. Second, the minder had the
choice to stop being a minder, it was just that as a minder he was caught in a certain
situation which management had decided. One reason for this was that (Interview
17-7-90b):
They try to keep each person on their own machine because the
operator knows the sound of the machine and so on.
Management finds that by keeping a minder on the one machine they could keep it
running more efficiently than would have been the case with moving people around
constantly. Thus, productivity was not enhanced by flexibility in the job of machine
minding, or at least, that was how management in Koburg saw it. This is a rational
approach because flexibility in using labour in the auto insertion sort of environment
did not make sense when quality was only marginally effected by the worker, yet
output was largely determined by the machine. By keeping the worker at one machine
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management was able to minimise the "wasted" output hours because of the minders
tacit skill of recognising when faults were about to occur. Also, when miss-inserts did
occur, because the minder became familiar with the types of boards being produced,
they could manually insert quicker than if they were new to the machine and the types
of boards it handled (Interview 17-7-90b).
One person (a woman) was applying to move from A to grade B status and achieve
a pay increase. To do this she had to be able to work more than one machine and to
have minimum continuous service of two years. This meant that she was taken off her
machine and moved around the section to learn how to operate other machines. So,
she had no machine of her own. However, this particular woman was not able to
apply for training up to B grade status until someone was recruited for her machine.
The other minders also wanted to apply for this promotion because of the pay, though
in their eyes it was not much of an increase. The woman said "Why there is this
grading scheme, I don't know" (Interview 17-7-90b). There was no objection to the
flexibility grading, which was the only purpose of the A and B grading, yet at the
same time, workers saw it as unnecessary. As far as they could see, there was no
need to change the working arrangements. It is uncertain what would happen if a
large number of workers were granted B grade status and could work on many
machines. It is unclear whether the B graders would return to their own machines but
be able to move more readily between machines when a breakdown occurred, whether
there would be regular job rotation or whether the arrangement was just an exercise
in trying to de-couple employees from a particular job identification. More generally,
the grading practice may have been a disguised way to encourage people to stay at
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least two years in the plant (Interview 17-7-90b).
Change within the job was something which was fairly constant for television auto
insertion minders, with typical production batches numbering only around 200 boards.
Consequently, there could be one or two set-up changes per shift per person!
machine. Set-up changes were done by the minder and entailed checking of parts,
except for parts which were supplied by a designated parts feeder. In the rare cases
where there was a model change, which could occurred about every 10 months, the
technicians would be called in to help deal with the problems that occurred. At the
time of the interviews a major change was in progress for some of the machines to
accommodate a new board for a new model. The auto insertion interviewees were
critical of the technicians who they said were always re-ordering the priority of
problems in that area, over their own (Interview 17-7-90b).
One auto inserter commented on doing repairs on their own machines (Interview
17-7-90b):
We do learn to correct some things on our own machines. The longer
you operate it the more you learn about it. We have asked to learn
how to do more repairs but there don't seem to be the facilities
available to teach us. Some came down from Enfield with the
machines to teach us how to operate them. They were Setter-operators,
so could do basic maintenance. Some of us have asked to train for
this. They get paid more but that's by-the-bye. There are little jobs we
could do to keep the machines running instead of waiting an hour for
a technician to come and do it.
Koburg's management in another plant, had experience of training minders to set their
own machines, that was to do running repairs and adjustments. Thus far, the decision
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had been, not to introduce this process into the case study plant. Instead, there was
the plant-wide grading (A and B) system. Yet many workers considered that learning
basic repair skills was more important than training others to do their jobs, which was
what job rotation would require (Interview 17-7-90b). In general terms, there was a
preference for job expansion over job rotation.
Within the job there had been some task expansion from workers' main jobs (as
described above) to include cleaning the machine and its surrounding area, ready for
the next shift. This expansion, which was quite limited, was attributed to the
strategies of the new European employer who had taken over the plant (Interview
17-7-90b).
Auto insertion minclers and loaders in Koorki
The shift system in Koorki was one stage further developed than that in Koburg as
it constituted a continental system of four shifts with a rotating pattern of times every
two days. One of the interviewees who had worked to this system since the age of 18,
knew of no other system. Another said that most people preferred this system because
it gave more time off, but went on to explain how he felt sleepy around midnight and
could not settle into doubling back (i.e. where one shift starts only a few hours after
another ends, allowing only about four hours sleep). Yet he regarded it as the best
way to organise to get the most time off. Interviewees thought that the health and
safety problems which might arise from this sleepiness were up to the individual and
that, simply stated, some people could, and others could not, cope with shifts. It was
not seen as a company problem (Interview 16-8-90c).
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Koorki's management asked for lots of overtime which was always scheduled for day
time, and done by those not working days already. One of the interviewees who did
an overtime shift on the day of the interview, was staying on to do his normal shift.
However, since the continental system had been introduced this was the first time he
had done this. One other interviewee had done no overtime under this system. They
both said it was more difficult to do overtime under the new shift pattern. In the old
system one could regularly do about 40 hours overtime a month (Interview 16-8-90c).
The minders never seemed to leave their machines, either to go to another machine
in auto insertion and certainly never to go to another part of the factory (Field notes
21/22-2-90 and 16/17-8-90). Being in charge of four machines meant that it was
unlikely that all of those machines were down (broken and waiting for repair), so that
there was at least one machine to vQork on all the time jIe'umaoXy, The 'oñcti oiiii
be moved if they were all down). This is really no different to the situation in
Koburg, but because of the organisation of work, that was four machines4 instead of
one, movement was less likely. Movement to another area of the factory, as in
Koburg is unimaginable. The reason is not a lack of flexibility, it has to do with both
capital investment and skill needs. The machines were expensive and needed to be run
as continuously as possible; further, they were increasing in numbers proportionate
to other elements of the production process, with the drive for automation. Finally,
the skills in this area were different from those in other areas of the factory, and were
' As will be explained in a later paragraph, although it appeared that Koorki auto
insertion minders worked four times as hard, with four instead of one machine to
mind, this was not the case, partly because each of the four machines inserted fewer
parts than in Koburg.
233
enough to mean that there would need to be a period of training to move people
around the factory - to swap workers over between auto insertion and the rest of the
factory. When the company wanted high quality, and high output, such training is an
unnecessary cost. If the plant was to contract in size to the point where there would
be fewer auto insertion minders needed maybe it would be a different situation. But
it was not, and neither was it likely to be in the near future and neither was there any
point in asking management, or worker, 'what would happen if ...?' Koorki had no
experience of it anywhere in the world (Interview 16-8-90c)5.
Program loaders were in a different situation in that they could move without being
authorised to do so, or told to go to other parts of the auto insertion department in
order to help out with problems on other lines. It seems then that this included work
not related to program inserting and includes work similar to that which a minder did
(Interview 16-8-90c). Perhaps this was because, as part of the knowledge for the job
of program loader, it was important to know the operational tasks of minding and
loading (parts) auto insertion machines. Moreover, some of the problems on the
machines could be caused by mistakes made by the programmer.
Some flexibility was built into the job of the loaders who could move off their usual
line to help with minding work on other lines. The minders, on the other hand, stayed
on their own line all the time. Compared with Koburg it has already been shown that
(s)he had a greater job content, minding four machines. On the other hand, Koburg
In 1993 the recession in Japan has just started to result in job losses in the largest
television plant, following a 60% drop in its profits.
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workers had to load parts into their auto insert machines and work with circuit
diagrams to help check their own quality. It appears that there was very little concern
with machine problems because, when such a problem did occur, a technician was
called (Interview 16-8-90c).
The experience of shift work in Koorki and its relation to the rest of the factory can
be seen in the following statement from a maintenance technician (Interview 17-8-90):
There is not so much overtime now in the shift areas - only weekends.
This gives us more space to work. We have got big problems when
they're making them before the shift starts. They run weekends, in the
evening as well. They tell us ten minutes before. We have a major
repair on that line - we bought the materials and go there but the line
is running - no one told us. There is a lack of communication between
production and engineering.
The introduction of shifts reduced overtime availability, and an consequent loss of
earnings potential for the technicians. Moreover, this interview suggested that there
was poor communication between the lines and support functions in Koorki. This cost
the company money because the technicians were paid to do overtime, but found that
the lines were running and maintenance work was not possible. That was why
weekend overtime was most common - the chance of the lines running, except for
reworking, was low. Thus, management could avoid communication costs by avoiding
communications! The inference is that a restriction of flexibility for one group
allowed flexibility for another group. In order to allow the lines to run overtime, as
and when needed, technicians had to restrict the times they could work, so being less
flexible. There is also a much more intriguing side arising from the statement. If
technicians only got 10 minutes warning of overtime, how long did the line workers
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get? Ten minutes as well?
In general, there was much more concern for flexibility at Koburg than at Koorki,
Japanisation was reversed. There, functional flexibility was always seen as the
antithesis of productivity for auto inserters. The reasons behind this avoidance of
functional flexibility are more clearly demonstrated in the following two cases.
Manual inserters at Koburg
In manual insertion, the annualized hours arrangement meant that the hours of work
were from 7. l5am to 5. l5pm Monday to Thursday and 7. l5am to 1. l5pm on Fridays
during the busy season, July to December. In the less busy (not slack, at least in
1990) season hours were from 8. lSam to 2.00pm with Friday off. In this area of the
plant the scheme did seem to have cut down on overtime, in the busy season. The
flexibility dimension always remained in that overtime could be added to the
schedule, just as it was in the auto insertion department (Interview 17-7-90a).
In Koburg, manual inserters were moved between lines to work on other boards for
up to an hour, or for a day if there was need to balance lines and prioritise certain
boards. One of the problems of this borrowing of people was illustrated by the
interviewee who pointed out that (Interview 17-7-90a):
They do move us between boards if there is a shortage somewhere else
and spare here. At the moment we have two girls from satellite
inserting in the place of one of ours who is absent and they still cannot
keep up.
There was a difficulty in moving workers between boards because they were
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unfamiliar with the new one and therefore it took time to train up to line speed.
However, it was easier to move people between lines doing different boards, but
largely the same task, than to move people between jobs on the same line. Thus, the
latter was not done, but rather left to the float workers. On top of this, the supervisor
was loath to let workers move who were 'good' at their job and cooperative with
management. This tended to mean that 'poorer' workers were loaned to work on
another line, or transferred altogether (Interview 17-7-90a).
Flexibility, or change within given jobs, was consciously restricted. One interviewee
explained that (Interview 17-7-90a):
It stays the same all the time. If you started changing things you would
loose your speed. It took me five days to get up to line speed and that
was fast [the other interviewees indicated agreement]. Some can take
three weeks. The boards are very similar, only a few components
different. There are twelve girls so if one bit was different for each
one the board would look very different.
Even when a board was to be changed, or there was a new model to be produced, the
changes could be spread among the manual inserters so that each task changed just
a little. Nevertheless, even a small change takes time to readjust to, so where
management could, it minimised change (Interview 17-7-90a).
Koorki was organised under the same principles, with the same difficulties and same
perceived lack of necessity in moving workers around the plant. In fact, without the
A and B grades and the job movements associated with them, Koorki demonstrated
even less interest in flexible practices and attitudes among its workforce than in
Koburg.
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Maintenance Technicians at Koburg
For the previous two years in Koburg the maintenance technicians had run a three
shift system. This covered up to 1O.00pm on the first two shifts and then through the
night on planned maintenance and emergency breakdowns which could not be tackled
during working hours. The interviewees were technicians for four solder bars (manual
insertion lines) and two main lines, including a lift system for the soak (Interview
1 7-7-90c):
We get some opportunity for overtime but only when it suits them -
they won't consider if you need the overtime money or not. Seven
years ago, there was as much overtime as you individually wanted to
work. You decided how much, but now they select from us who they
want. Its got tighter now.
This quote indicates two different things: the introduction of the shift system had
reduced overtime and second, "them" (Interview 17-7-90c), management, selected
workers according to skill and, perhaps, attitude requirements. First, management
introduced a shift system to allow planned maintenance and also to reduce the high
amounts of overtime work being done. So previously when a fault came up a
technician would attract overtime to repair a machine, but planned maintenance was
introduced and a different shift did the repair in normal hours, as has already been
discussed. The result was that technicians had less time discretion and lower earnings
because their decision-making control had been removed. Instead of the worker
controlling his work, management had removed it from him in order to control costs.
Second, workers recognise that they had lost a degree of autonomy and there had
arisen an implicit divergence of interests between management and worker. Managers
wanted to have repairs completed as cheaply as possible and when they wanted them
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done. Technicians wanted to work overtime, thus do repairs. No matter how 'ioyal'
and 'conscientious' a worker is, if their interests, diverge from those of management
as the agent of capital, as they must, there will be a conflict in actions. One must win
and the other must loose. Management giving overtime when they wanted, and
workers recognised that this was discretionary power on the side of management.
A technician did not move between jobs outside technical work because this would
be a waste of their specialist skills. There was one exception however, if a conveyor
belt failed, then a technician might be required to push the chain manually in order
to keep the line running temporarily (Interview 17-7-90c).
Koburg had a maintenance technician for each line, rather than a pool, as in all the
other companies. This suggests that their technicians might become quite specialised
on their line. One interviewee complained that (Interview 17-7-90c):
We stay on the same lines all the time. Personally, I ddn't think they
swap them around as much as they should do. They keep us on the
same line but if someone is off and you have to cover their line you
are not efficient on it.
This technician wanted more flexibility, to be moved between lines, so that he could
maintain knowledge of different machines, and keep his skill up, which he would be
able to do in a labour pool structure. For the technicians it was important to maintain
the skills they gained because this effects the pay they could get in the external labour
market, which was easy for them to enter by comparison with other workers. In
general technicians were not opposed to flexibility for, like the professionals they
perceived themselves to be, it enhances their CVs.
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Thus it is not enough to say that Koburg had less flexibility than the Japanese cases
because we must ask: flexibility for who? In Koburg flexibility was for the
management. In Koorki flexibility patterns more closely resemble the custom and
practice of technicians which had value in the external labour market. In this sense,
it can be argued, that the Japanese company had less impact on flexible working
arrangements of skilled staff than was the case at Koburg.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
In the three Japanese firms and even the European plant there were union agreements
for complete flexibility. Nevertheless, flexibility agreements mean nothing in time if
they are not acted upon because of the impact of custom and practice to restrict the
room for management to introduce change without negotiation. The misconception in
consumer electronics is that workers were ever inflexible. Line balancing and
matching daily output has always been a feature of consumer electronics, which has
meant a constant moving of workers around the factory (Taylor, Elger and
Fairbrother, 1991).
Flexibility within the cases consisted of widespread and long standing use of
numerical flexibility, which if anything, looking at overtime for example, was
declining. Moreover, changes in methods of gaining flexibility had been tried more
in Koburg than in the Japanese cases, though with limited success. Functional
flexibility on the other hand did not exist in the comprehensive forms purported by
writers such as Bassett (1986;94-9), Marsden and Thomson (1990), Oliver and
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Wilkinson (1989) and Sayer (1986). The reason for the conflicting evidence is that
it is dangerous to rely on written agreements with unions and statements by
managements.
Flexibility is a long standing, but not unproblematic, feature of television production.
Television assembly plants, have been organised in such a way that work can be
arranged so as to allow the employment of temporary workers at certain times of the
year in response to consumer market demand. With increasing automation of
production, such as the development and use of auto insertion machines, flexibility
has actually declined historically. Nevertheless, with comparatively low capital
investment, compared with, for example, automobile assembly, there has never been
a necessity to run television assembly plants at full productive capacity. Instead, these
plants had always enabled seasonal variations in production, so long as a plentiful
supply of vulnerable young women could be drawn on within the local labour market.
Further, the degree to which task demarcations on the shopfloor existed, depended
upon the informal context of social relations among workers, and between workers
and their supervisors. So that, the degree to which managers at Koorki and Koburg
tried to formalise flexible work arrangements, they were in fact drawing upon those
pre-existing informal arrangements. Yet the very process of formalisation might
reduce flexibilities born out of the social relations of 'getting the job done', as will
be explored in the next Chapter.
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SECTION III
EXPERIENCES AND PERCEPTIONS
This final section explores how workers viewed their working lives - their jobs,
employers and union. Moreover, the three chapters discuss how workers established
controls on those conditions in the form of resistance, competition and escapism. The
focus of the chapters is to evaluate whether workers were happy, motivated and
'enriched' by their employment, especially if the employer was Japanese. For this
reason, and for reasons of research access, the section looks primarily, though not
exclusively, at Koburg and Koorki. A motivation for this analysis was that the
literature often argued or implied that a worker was better off working for the
Japanese than for a Western company. Moreover, it has been suggested that unions
are irrelevant because workers are not union minded in Japanese subsidiaries either
because of good treatment by employers or careful selection of recruits.
This section of the thesis provides evidence of considerable alienation and a counter
culture which is not managerially controlled as implied by 'Japanisation' theories.
This both helped workers endure their work and limited their resistance. Moreover,
the role of unions in consumer electronics had little or nothing to do with Japanese
investment but much to do with the nature of the industry. Within the section
attention is given to the differences in consciousness which existed between men and
women in the plants, although this is not developed sufficiently to provide a detailed
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feminist analysis. However, such a focus would be inappropriate, because gendered
relations within the plants are somewhat independent of the Japanisation debate. This
is not to deny the centrality of gender within an analysis of the labour process of
television assembly, but that this research is primarily concerned with whether there
is change in relations between forms of capital ownership and the labour process. As
such, this Section restricts analysis to exploring the relationship between capital
ownership and views of the experience of the labour process, including but not
restricting to gender considerations.
The first chapter in this section, "Worker attitudes to company and management',
draws out issues of employee identification with their employers, and provides a
critique of the processes and techniques of management through the eyes of workers.
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CHAPTER NINE
WORKER ATTITUDES TO COMPANY AND
MANAGEMENT
INTRODUCTION
This chapter describes what workers thought of the company for which they worked,
the management of it and management initiated schemes aimed at compliance if not
participation from workers. The meaning of 'Japanisation' will be discussed in terms
of company, management, and participation. The expectation would be that Koorki
would show more traits of Japanised consciousness than Koburg and that there should
be, either major differences between the cases, or that Koburg was following Koorki
as it adopted the Japanese model.
In a broader context, this chapter explores issues relating to employee participation
and its place within motivation and control of workers. Many protagonists of Post
Fordism claim that the new production relations also mean a new class accord, such
that labour is satisfied with capitalist political economy. Sabel (1982;230) claims that
an innovative firm depends on labour's cooperation, whereas Kenney and Florida
(1988; 122) argue that it was the triumph of labour in class struggles after the Second
World War which allowed Japanese capital to introduce new forms of technology
which in turn, boosted Japan into Post Fordist hegemony. Holloway (1987; 150)
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similarly implies that in Britain such cooperative, although subordinate, relations are
being achieved first by breaking shop steward power, then by involving the workers
directly. Holloway, at least, recognises that the relations are still inherently unequal.
Similarly Palloix, in explaining how job enrichment cancels out Taylorism and
Fordism, (1976;63) states:
Semi-autonomous groups are only an extension of the idea of job-
enrichment, in which small work-teams are free to organise and plan
their own work - free, it need hardly be said, only within the limits
established by the general production quotas.
This Chapter will analyze the relevance of such claims to these case studies, and to
this end is divided into three sections: attitudes to company, views of management
and participation initiatives, all from the perspective of some employees in two of the
case plants, Koburg and Koorki.
ATTITUDES TO COMPANY
According to sections of the literature, such as Dore (1973), Abo (1990) and Kikuno
(1985;23), a Japanese company is patemalist to its permanent employees, providing
lifetime employment, and a good working environment with a sociable atmosphere.
Moreover, a Japanese firm might be expected to be integrated into the local
community as more than only an employer paying wages. This section starts off by
examining two aspects of supposed Japanese life time employment: job security and
the employee's desire to stay with the one company. In later sub-sections interviewee
perceptions of the following issues are dealt with: job security, employee's desire to
stay with the company, factory environment, and the reputation of the company in the
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community.
Job security
One side of supposed life time employment is whether workers perceive that such
security of employment exists. If security is not offered workers are supposed to lack
motivation (Dore; 1973, Kendall; 1984).
In Koorki interviewees did discuss employment security as a benefit of the company.
This was seen as an important aspect of wishing to continue working there, although
one saw that the security of employment came from continuous expansion of the plant
and not from any promises of the management, a point confirmed by informal
discussions with management (Interview 16-8-90b).
Interviewees in Koburg had mixed thoughts about their own job security. Some
thought that the Burg takeover had iptovet securit'j (te.rvi !1-1-9	 k'&
others thought that without further productive improvements the plant might be closed
altogether (Interview 17-7-90c). One tuner assembler thought Burg intended to stop
making televisions at the plant (Interview 18-7-90). She turned out to be right'.
In Koburg the growth in employment opportunities in the company was in contrast
with the past, when many technical workers were made redundant (Interviews
6-12-89a and 17-07-90c). This would seem to demonstrate to workers the fragility of
'When a draft of this chapter in the summer of 1991, the author thought the interviewee
was wrong to predict the demise of the plant. She was right.
246
the employment relationship and so led to distrust of management. It is true that there
was little confidence in bosses (see later section), but only the technicians among all
workers interviewed commented on the periods of redundancies which occurred in the
late 1980s, especially with the closure of another Burg plant in the UK, as mentioned
in Chapter Five (Interview 17-7-90c), in contrast to many conversations with
managers about the period of decline.
The pattern of difference between Koorki and Koburg conforms to the 'Japanisation'
model. However, job security only has significance to workers if the labour market
is poor and if, without a job in a company, they might be unemployed or subject to
insecure pay generally. In Koorki such insecure experience meant that one of the
main advantages of the job was that there was high job security compared to working
in the auto parts industry, where one interviewee had previously worked and been laid
off more than once2 (Interview 16-8-90a). In the locality of Koburg the labour market
was relatively buoyant and a person could easily move between companies. Thus,
security of employment may not have been important to Koburg workers.
Employee desire to stay in the company
The other side of life time employment is the desire of workers to stay all their
working lives in the same company. The auto insertion workers in Koorki said that
they did not want to leave the company before retirement and wanted promotion.
However, even if promotions were not possible one operator said he would continue
until he retired, being in his 30s at the time of interview (Interview 16-8-90c).
2 Also refer to a later sub-section 'Ones own job compared to others'
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The illustrative case of one female manual inserter shows the contrast between men
and women. At the end of the day she saw the relation between working in Koorki
and her life in the following terms (Interview 16-8-90b):
I will stay here until I marry and then I'll leave to have children and
not come back.
Work did not fit into her long term thoughts of life, although she intended to stay
until marriage. The job was fine, she gained recognition for her skill of being able
to pick up the knowledge and concentration to do the different jobs on the line, ie to
become a 'float', but her life horizon was seen as in the home (Interview 16-8-90b).
The reason was not just within a context of subservience to "a woman's place in the
home" but that work is itself alienating and having a family would allow her to escape
the boredom of labouring. On the other hand she probably worked through economic
necessity in the first place.
In Koburg the situation was similar except that there seemed to be more opportunities
to move between companies. The only comment by interviewees was by a technician
who said that people did not leave very often and those who did leave were quickly
replaced so that work relations were quite stable (Interview 17-7-90b).
It might be assumed that workers would want to stay in the best companies.
However, in reality, the sexual division of labour was far more important in
determining how long the workers in the two case studies expected and wanted to stay
in their respective employment. The men were far more likely to expect to stay;
whereas women saw their jobs as filling-in until marriage, or as supplementing the
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husband's income.
Factory environment
One indication of views held of the company can be found in attitudes towards
physical working conditions. The television factories represented a new 'clean' type
of environment, different from the old 'smoke-stack' industries and mines (company
literature: Kokuda and Koorki).
Within Koorki the reaction of workers to the clean atmosphere was how much the
factory floor was different from other plants in the locality. One worker, a woman,
in comparing Koorki with previous employment said that (Interview 16-8-90a):
This factory is much cleaner - its not like a proper factory really.
This quote indicates just how unique the working environment of television assembly
was compared to other industries in the locality.
In Koburg the issue was also the cleanliness in the plant, but the comparison was with
10 years earlier. There were a number of factories in the locality which had roughly
equivalent working environments, being light industrial and chemical manufacturers.
One woman, remembering the old days, said (Interview 17-7-90a):
They used to have a stone floor. On hot days they would spray your
feet with a watering can.
This would not be possible in the late 1980s with legal regulations relating to working
with electricity. At the time of research there were tiles on the floor and lighting
249
similar to the Japanese case plants (Field Notes 6/7-12-89). The improvements in
conditions were seen as being instigated by the new owners, one of the benefits of the
takeover (Interview 17-7-90a).
These perceived improvements existed because of the investment made in the plant
by the new owners which also signified secure employment to workers (Interviews
17-7-90a and 18-7-90). However, having recognised that the new owners improved
the physical environment from a dirty dark factory to one which was more pleasant,
one interviewee thought that this improvement was accompanied by less desirable
management practices. Other interviewees agreed, although they did not make the
connection between the changes in the plant and management reorganisation directly
(Interview 18-7-90).
The workers in the two cases saw that their working environment was clean although
it is not clear that there was any thought that this was part of Japanisation in any way.
Instead it was seen in terms of experiences of places and times where conditions were
worse. Clearly, there did appear to be a set of practices towards the physical
environment of work commonly used in Japan, which also appeared in the UK plant.
Whether this was due to a conscious effort to transfer these practices from Japan on
the part of local UK managers is not clear. An alternative reason might be that
convergence occurs as particular types of technology become universal. This second
explanation may be confirmed by the fact that such an improvement in working
conditions did not occur in another Far Eastern branch plant, Tatung, operating in the
UK where lower levels of technology were being used (Field notes 15-3-92).
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Reputation of company in the community
When Nissan located a plant in North East England the local press and media were
full of stories about its effect on the local economy and then about the lives of the
Japanese in the area (an excellent account of this is provided in Crowther and
Garrahan; 1988). The media image was almost totally positive and those who threw
doubt on it were scorned or silenced. The reputation of these plants, with their longer
histories of operations in the UK may show whether such accolades given to Nissan
will be valid in the future.
Interviewees in Koorki generally thought that the plant had a good reputation in the
local area. The area itself was defined as extending 24 miles up a valley from the
plant and near another Japanese competitor (Interview 16-8-90c). However, the
positive reception was not universal, for one informant commented (Interview
1 6-8-90d):
When I said to people I was coming here, they would say 'Ouch, nasty
to work for'. [However] as long as you obey the rules and are on
time, there is no trouble.
This was not an isolated feeling for there were similar stories from various Japanese
plants in Britain previously studied by the author (Taylor; 1986). The central point of
the quote is that there were rumours on the outside of Koorki that workers there were
sometimes mistreated. At the same time management authority was enacted through
bureaucratic rules which allowed workers to avoid most trouble and even to play the
system to the limit of the rules. In the final analysis the rules themselves are decided
in the interests of company within the contested terrain of the labour process. What
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employees may come to see as part of the job, remain for outsiders points of
exploitation.
Koburg, on the other hand, was not seen to have a very high status in the community
or to be a better company to work for than other companies in the locality. One
interviewee said that "this company is rubbish" (Interview 18-7-90), whilst others
were less forceful in their basically negative ratings. The company was not unique in
the community, so for labour it was just a place of work to choose among several.
Koorki appears to fit the 'Japanisation' model with one or two exceptions and Koburg
to be a more 'traditional' British company. However, the distinction between the
cases may just be a feature of geographical location rather than a strategic style of
management.
Conclusion
In general, attitudes of workers towards the company seem more positive in Koorki
than in Koburg, although the basis of comparison is different. Koburg was based in
a prosperous area of the country at least up until the time of the field research,
whereas Koorki was in an area of declining traditional heavy industrial employment.
In detail, there were contradictory orientations towards the company in both cases,
as well as particular circumstances relating to sexual divisions of employment evident
in both cases.
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MANAGEMENT
Lewis (1989) argues that in a case study of a Japanese electronics company, the 'Us
and Them' barriers were confronted by developing a competitive spirit against the
'outside' (jroduct competitors), in which all employees and managers were on the
same 'side' within the company, a form of unitarism. Symbols of uniform and open
plan offices reinforced this. Such harmonisation symbols existed within the four
television assembly cases. However, Wickens (1985;5-6) was critical of seeing this
harmonisation, in Japan at least, as anything more than a myth. He had evidence of
demarcation between workers and managers, such as qualitatively different canteens
and insignia denoting status on uniforms. This section addresses whether workers
really were persuaded by these circumstances that workers and managers had the
same goals and all were 'us'.
The section first addresses general thoughts on the divisions between managers and
workers by looking at how management is described; this is followed by a
consideration of Japanese management style and autonomy. The section concludes
with a look at how competent workers thought managers were being in their jobs.
Them and us
In both cases supervisors tended to be identified by workers as their 'boss', or by
name, or more generally as individuals. Managers on the other hand were referred
to in the collective, implying 'them', although the Japanese were regarded as a bit
special in the case of Koorki, a point I will return to in the next sub-section.
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The view which one particular Koorki technician had of the company was rather
negative. Against this, however, when he was ill with cancer, he found the Personnel
Department to be very caring. Notwithstanding, when he came back to the job he had
to work much harder just to prove that he was fit enough to be able to get and retain
his old job (Interview 17-8-90).
The only difference in views of technicians in Koburg from those of the Koorki
technician, is that they saw their management as generally tight-fisted (Interview
17-7-90a). Moreover, they perceived a change in management styles from previously,
when managers were approachable and friendly. One interviewee said that there was
an atmosphere of mutual respect and a group feeling on the factory floor (Interview
18-7-90). Many of the managers were replaced with more unapproachable managers
whom workers did not know personally. One woman indicated that (Interview
18-7-90):
They are distant during the day but flirt with the young girls at the bar
in the evening. They ignore you unless you have a short skirt on.
Although workers never complained of such sexual politics in Koorki, there were
managers who spoke of flirting with the pretty women on the lines (Field notes
21/2-2-90).
Supervisors were not counted among 'them' in either company, though this attitudes
seemed stronger in Koburg. One Manual inserter in Koburg commented (Interview
17-7-90a):
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My supervisor is terrific. She has covered when a girl has had enough.
Once the supervisor took me and the other girls right through the line,
showing them what they do.
supervisors were seen as being on the side of workers, trying to get the best for them
and protecting them against higher management. Such a compliment was not given
to the 'float' workers, who were sometimes thought of as trying to be supervisors,
even though they were a type of operator (Interview 17-7-90a).
At a general level in both cases workers had similar attitudes towards their managers,
who were seen as explicitly not on the 'same side' as themselves. These attitudes
were slightly more extenuated in Koburg. However, Japanese managers were
differentiated from local managers, as the next sub-section explores.
Japanese mana2ement style
At Koorki the attitudes towards Japanese managers were based on actual experience,
whereas few of Koburg's employees had contact with any Japanese. Thus, this
sub-section explores much of the vision and reality of Japanese style management as
it concerns workers directly.
Generally, Koorki workers had little direct contact with Japanese managers at the time
of the interviews but, as one worker explained, when there was a problem with a
machine they could get the Japanese manager's help (Interview 16-8-90c). Another
interviewee thought of the company as being British because she had no contact with
Japanese and very seldom saw them. She only got to see a Japanese if they were
walking round the factory (Interview 16-8-90b).
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Among auto insertion workers there was respect for the Japanese managers
knowledge but they also saw the Japanese as 'devious', such as in "I think sometimes
they know more English than they let on" (Interview 16-8-90c). Also, there was a
view that the Japanese had a different way of controlling workers, as the following
quote (Interview 16-8-90c) shows:
With the Japanese I think, if I get on with you they move us ... that
is the way they think.
The Japanese managers were seen to be interested in work and attitudes to work. It
is implied that they thought Japanese were not interested in having friends but only
in work (Interview 16-8-90c), a racial stereotyping.
A technician interviewed was more negative in his assessment of the Japanese in the
plant. He thought that "they (Japanese) are just in a position of power" (Interview
17-8-90) and had little to do with the day to day running of the factory. This is
surprising for a technical department, where Japanese employee have often been seen
as experts in the field (eg Schonberger; 1987). Thus, the Japanese were not very
visible but were seen as controlling everything from behind the UK managers.
The technician complained that (Interview 17-8-90):
A lot of people come here and can't actually believe what is going on..
the Japanese ideas, the way they think, the way they push us.
Two auto insertion workers thought Koorki was not a sociable place to work. Partly
this was because people lived far apart. Partly because friends would be separated by
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the Japanese in case they talked during work hours and so reduce productivity. Even
so, no one seemed to care about this: "Its not a bad job" (Interview 16-8-90b).
In general the view of the Japanese managers was as quite manipulative, devious
individuals with power in and dedication to the plant. This is not at all the picture of
harmony or class accord indicated by writers such as Kenney and Florida (1988).
The common attitude toward the Japanese among manual inserters in Koburg was two
fold: Japanese were workaholics and some practices that work in Japan did not work
in Britain. The first idea was that (Interview 17-7-90a):
For a Japanese a job is everything. For me it is a means to an end.
The second focuses on management's attempts to introduce Quality Leadership
Programme (QLP) 3
 which was seen as inappropriate in Britain but suitable for the
US and Japan. The reason given for the difference was that workers in the US and
Japan were involved and appreciated by managers, not as with Koburg or Britain
(Interview 18-7-90).
Koburg had once undertaken work for JVC at which time some workers met Japanese
managers or at least experienced Japanese management practices. One result of the
JVC contract is shown in the following (Interview 17-7-90b):
This scheme will be discussed later in this chapter, under 'Initiatives on participation'.
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We had piped music; then the Japanese came. They stopped it -
thought it was bad. But when you do repetitive work all day it helps
make time happy. Then some of us brought in radios. This was OK so
long as they were not too loud. Then personal stereos were used. That
was stopped for safety reasons now. At night, and so on, the odd
person still uses them when the factory goes quiet. There are no
objections to this.
The Japanese were seen as introducing stronger management into Koburg, although
the other cases show that these particular actions were not general in Japanese
companies. Behind the views expressed it can be seen that management
experimentation with restructuring meant that there was a degree of uncertainty in
what was permitted. Further the authority of management was undermined by ad hoc
agreements between supervisors and their subordinates to allow exceptions, though
this could satisfy both sides at the local level. Japanese managers were seen as equally
meddling as their British counterparts.
As a counter to this negative attitude, the Japanese were seen as responsible for some
good production practices. For example, when work was done for JVC the line
stopped in front of each inserter and only restarted by pushing a button (Interview
18-7-90). The inserters liked this ability to control the line and regretted the Japanese
leaving the plant after the takeover (Interview 18-7-90).
Worker autonomy
Autonomy or discretion has only limited potential on the line, although Goodrich
(1975) showed that there is always room for some worker discretion in even the most
repetitive work. In both case plants no worker in manual insertion jobs talked of
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autonomy.
In auto insertion at Koorki there were set targets and procedures but little direct
control. There, the case of technicians provides the most interesting example.
Management was a resource for the technicians to use. If one boss did not know the
answer to a problem the technician would consult further up the hierarchy at his own
discretion. Nevertheless, time was controlled and technicians had to look busy,
instead of relaxing between call-outs. The traditional view of the technician as a
skilled trusted worker who organises his own work and is diligent on call outs,
counted for little - one must first look busy and keep to the three breaks a day, just
like the rest of the workers. Further, management tried to keep them continually busy
with "no slacking" (Interview 17-8-90). Most technicians seemed to find this a threat
to their status, as well as exhausting.
In Koburg the auto insertion workers had the general view that there was a high
degree of autonomy from management, so long as they get on with the job Unterview
17-7-90b). The same thoughts existed among fault finders: a sense of autonomy, in
that they controlled their own work patterns so long as rejects were detected and
rectified, and, moreover, that the problem did not recur (Interview 17-7-90d).
From these anecdotes workers felt more autonomous in Koburg and happier about
their 'freedom', than they did in Koorki. On the one hand, this tends to run counter
to conventional views of harmonious Japanese management practices, and on the
other, the Japanese did manage detail so as to intensify work. Japanese management
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of detail involved the close control of workers' labour, as they must actually Show
management how well they were doing, rather than just 'getting on with the job'!
In the auto insertion area at Koorki shift changeovers were seen as involving
unnecessary managerial control, as one worker explains (Interview 16-8-90c):
There is a problem with continuity between shifts, such as machine
problems and so on. So we were given 10 minutes of overlap to tell
the next people coming on what has happened etc. This takes two-four
minutes to do, then we left. Now they have decided that we must stay
the full 10 minutes. So we wait around for six minutes doing nothing.
Workers could not see why management insisted on 10 minutes if it only took three
minutes to pass on messages. Perhaps it was a case of mistrust. Management might
think that if the amount of time for passing on messages was flexible, workers would
not do it properly in the hurry to leave. Whatever the reason, it implies a sense of
mistrust on the part of management in their relations with workers in auto insertion
(Interview 16-8-90c).
The only complaint which the production services technical worker in Koorki had was
that management wanted to attribute every mistake to a particular person and he
found that annoying. They had big meetings for something the interviewee could
explain in three minutes - he thought the attention to detail in pinning the blame was
petty (Interview 17-8-90d). Moreover, in order not to get blamed with mistakes, each
department competed with each other to shift blame away from themselves: "this
really gets my back up" (Interview 16-8-90d). However, in general the work was
regarded as satisfactory and the company did "stick together - well sort of" (Interview
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1 6-8-90d).
In Koburg the technicians' view of management was generally that they were quite
irrelevant to the technicians' daily lives and work. One exception to this relates to the
takeover by Burg of the UK company. The technicians had a very negative view
concerning this, in contrast to workers in other parts of the plant, who, if passing
judgement, were generally positive about the new owners. One technician said
(Interview 17-7-90c):
There was a lot of influence of the Burg in the past but they have
disappeared now. Perhaps they have an influence further up but we do
not know. QLP is (an) important influence from the Burg. Burg
managers' attitude saying that if QLP failed, we failed. They force
people to go on the QLP programmes. They then only do the bare
minimum - they are not motivated.
Burg was seen to meddle in the Koburg plant and to use threats rather than
encouragement to get what it wanted. QLP was introduced with such threats, which
resulted in workers jumping through the hoops that the Burg management put up but
did not initiate change themselves. There was clearly a mistrust of the new owners
and no interest in their QLP programme (Interview 17-7-90c).
Management competence
There has been a view of industrial management in Britain which highlights its
incompetence, or at least unprofessionalism (Fox; 1966, Sisson; 1989). However the
view held of Japanese management practices has been one of practical competence
which earns respect, although not necessarily acclaim. This sub-section will look at
how far these differences are replicated in the two case plants.
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Three examples from Koorki show that there was at least some evidence that the
process of management was beset by tensions and complexities such that workers
were exposed to inconsistencies and inefficiencies in the production process.
One interviewee, a Technician, had been hassled by his bosses (Interview 17-8-90).
His immediate boss knew nothing about pcbs, according to the interviewee (Interview
17-8-90). The problem was exacerbated because local Japanese and British managers
could not settle major decisions concerning budgets between themselves, thereby
creating an atmosphere of uncertainty. This uncertainty, and an increase in
responsibility without an increase in pay, because of the bosses's lack of expertise in
the area, was so upsetting that this worker wondered if he would stay in Koorki at
all. At the same time, the interviewee felt that, if the problems were settled and
organised, he would have had more independence because of his bosses's lack of
knowledge in the area (Interview 17-8-90).
The second case concerns an alignment 'float', a woman who had gained promotion
to a float worker, and who felt that she could do all the jobs on her section of the line
(Interview 16-8-90a). At the time of the interview she also thought she did some
supervisory work because the company had put a supervisor who had no knowledge
of the alignment equipment (often referred to as jigs), in overall charge of the section.
She regretted this, saying (Interview 16-8-90a):
I think it is wrong for an outsider to come into a line because they do
not know what you're doing. They should of made me or the other
float at the time up [to supervisor] and a new one [recruit a line
worker] in from scratch to learn the way.
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Lastly, as a team leader one interviewee was concerned about training. He thought
there was little time to train and that many technicians lacked appropriate skills for
the new types of high-tech machines in the factory. This was made worse by the high
turnover, which meant that skills gained from experience were generally low
(Interview 17-8-90). Clearly workers in Koorki had some opinions as to managerial
competence, which were not always complimentary.
In Koburg there was generally a low respect for the managers and an opinion that
managers did not care about the workers as individuals, as humans. For example,
auto insertion could be very hot and stifling in a hot summer. At this time of the
year, managers were seen as stingy, passing out "orange [that] was so diluted that it
was just coloured water" (Interview 17-7-90b). Similarly, during the previous winter
it got very cold and yet there has not been a proper regulation of temperature as part
of the recent refurbishment of the factory (Interview 17-7-90b: Interview 18-7-90).
One person from the Tuner line said that QLP had introduced the idea that a worker
could and should stop the line if a problem arose. In reality, if that happened, she
said, the supervisor would be in trouble from higher management for loss of
production. Behind this is a more general statement that managers did not really know
what was going on, although they thought they did. In fact "they do not know
nothing" (Interview 18-7-90). Another interviewee went on to explain how a problem
developed on the line and graduates came down to fix it, but could not. Later a line
'float' found the problem, told the young graduate managers and it was fixed, but she
was never acknowledged (Interview 18-7-90). The same sort of disregard was shown
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in the treatment of one worker who had developed a pain in her wrist from using a
machine which cut bits of metal from the pcbs (Interview 18-7-90). Because of the
injury, the interviewee felt that none of the supervisors wanted her to work under
them, in case she took time off work if the pain returned. This led the interviewee
to feel like she was a 'leper', an untouchable, in the workplace (interview 18-7-90).
The fault finder's view of the new managers, since Burg took over the plant, was
much more positive in marked contrast to the thoughts of the workers on the Tuner
line. One said (17-7-90d):
In this company under Burg you can get on but they can be ruthless
with you. They do turn their companies around. In the old days bosses
were people you didn't talk to. Now, they are younger and come
round and ask you about your work. There is the same dinning room.
I didn't respect them [old managers], I do now.
Any of the 'old managers' that were left in the plant were slowly leaving. The
company was seen to be strict but fair. However, when it came to the QLP
programme, opinions were divided between the interviewees. One was already a
member of a QLP group, which included operators through to engineers. He thought
that membership would eventually become compulsory for all employees instead of
voluntary as it was at that time. He praised the programme but the other interviewees
were sceptical. They remembered that Koburg's last owners had introduced
'A-Teams', which had failed, and they saw QLP as just another management pioy at
getting involvement, without real commitment from managers themselves, and they
expected that the QLP scheme would die off in the same way as previous
management initiatives to encourage quality improvement (17-7-90d).
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Another line worker explained that a part of the problem was that managers and
workers did not respect each other and morale was low generally in the company
(Interview 18-7-90). She left work for hospital and had an operation to cure the acute
pain from using the machine4 . When she returned to work they put her on a job
"which they would not give to PG Tip monkeys" 5 (Interview 18-7-90). She fought
for three months to get another job but was taken round the factory, to each
supervisor, by someone in Personnel. They would ask about the wrist and shake their
heads - she said she felt like a leper. She asked the Safety Officer for help but he said
"what can I do?" (Interview 18-7-90). He thought he was powerless to help her get
a decent job again but she managed to get back on the line as a hand (manual)
inserter.
Conclusion
In general there was a more positive view held by workers of Japanese managers than
of their local equivalents. The latter were seen as relatively incompetent, although this
had advantages, such as greater freedom in work. Despite this evaluation, though,
there was no assumption of uniformity of purpose between labouring and managing,
any more than there was of complete opposition. Thus, in capitalist dominated labour
markets, individual workers had interests which resemble those of managers, in the
This example of industrial injury should not be confused with the illness of a
worker explained previously.
PG Tip monkeys were characters from a television advertisement for a brand
of Tea.
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desire for the survival and even growth of the company. They wanted what could be
termed 'fair' managers, who did not abuse their power beyond that which individual
workers saw as a reasonable degree of dominance.
INITIATIVES ON PARTICIPATION
Briefing groups, quality circles, suggestion schemes are all associated with Japanese
personnel management practices for gaining employee participation and compliance.
Within managerial literature there is much written about participation throu,h
activities such as quality circles, including the discussions of Collard (1989) and
Hayashi (1989). There is also a broader base of literature about Japanese methods of
participation where work groups are involved in decision making (Clark;1979;131),
or where workers enjoy a degree of 'responsible' autonomy organising their own
work and managing production problems (Odaka;1981). This section will explain the
participation practices which were actually used in Koburg and Koorki; suggestion
schemes, teams and quality circles.
iiggestion schemes
Only Koorki has a suggestion scheme in operation. The Personnel Director at Koburg
explained that many companies which had tried suggestion schemes found that they
failed to be effective (Interview 24-10-89). A quote from the Personnel Director at
Koorki confirms this opinion (Interview 14-11-89):
We have a suggestion scheme, we've had it for a number of years but
generally speaking the success of suggestion schemes is really for
running campaigns periodically to push people or persuade people to
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take part in it. It's not like on the Japanese scale...
In fact, from the authors experience, there was no difference in the use of such
practices in Japanese plants from that in the UK, only that some companies forced
quota of suggestions from their employees (Kamata; 1984). Thus, suggestion schemes
were on the books in Koorki but were not considered important in eliciting
participation from workers.
Team concepts
In all four cases managers talked of workers being part of teams. In fact these teams
were work groups defined by the first level of supervision. What was supposedly
special was the way these 'teams' were focused on the participation of 'members'.
In reality, in all the cases this was restricted to briefings, a one way activity, carried
out each morning prior to the start of production by supervisors talking to their
sections of the plant. The content was the previous day's output and any issues arising
from that, the target for the day and any special announcements, such as researchers
coming to interview people from the work group!
In fact, what the team concept was really about was to try to increase the role of the
supervisor within the labour process. Marchington (1982;82-93) shows how
supervisors in Britain have low power because of the role of unions and because the
personnel function deals directly with workers and their representatives, undermining
the authority of supervisors. In this context, the team concept is a statement to
supervisors that management would back their authority and that worker participation,
such as it might be, would be directed through supervisors. To this end, especially
267
in the Japanese plants, supervisors were supposed not to sit behind desks, but to
spend time at the line - supervising.
Ouality circles
In all the cases management had initiated some form of quality circle, called Quality
Leadership Process in Koburg, Small Group Activities in Kohashi, Quality Activity
Groups in Kokuda, and plain Quality Circles in Koorki.
Koburg has groups of five people which came together to solve particular problems,
meeting after work. In preparation for involvement in the groups, participants were
trained for three hours a week over a 15 week 'semester'. Once a problem was solved
the group would break up and new members form, depending on the problem to be
solved. The main reason for the scheme was to improve quality (Interview 7-12-89b).
One person involved in the scheme was interviewed, who was enthusiastic about the
scheme's success Onterview 17-7-90d). However, the lack of interest shown by other
interviewees seemed to indicate a general lack of enthusiasm among workers.
In Koorki there were seven Quality Circles started the previous year but only four
remained at the time of this research. The circles involved six to 10 workers within
sections. Many people volunteered for the circles when overtime was cut, to make
up pay (Interview 21-2-90c). Three circles were disbanded because participants either
gained promotion, became engaged in other activities (a euphemism for 'got bored
and left'), or left the company. As an encouragement, one circle leader was sent to
Japan to witness the "world meeting of quality circles" of Orki (Interview 21-2-90c).
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Kohashi's management introduced a scheme whereby groups of around 10, based in
their sections, discussed issues concerning production, including quality, for half an
hour every fortnight, finishing production work early to do so (Interview 27-11-89).
This scheme involved everyone, but apart from this one reference, no one else in the
plant, even the quality assurance manager, discussed the scheme, which suggested
that it had been of little significance.
At the Kokuda plant there were about 20 groups meeting voluntarily after work, with
pay. The purpose was seen more as developing involvement and "self-fulfilmenC than
actual improvements in production, or quality (Interview 28-6-90c). Although senior
management wished for extensive use of such groups, it depended on the motivations
of individual supervisors, who always acted as group leaders. Again, there were no
other references to these quality activity groups, other than from the quality assurance
manager.
Thus, although some form of quality circle initiative existed in all cases, their
pervasiveness was limited. Moreover, the importance attached to them by
management was only strongly in evidence in Koburg. Thus overall the contribution
of quality circles to relations between the shopfloor and management may best be
described as marginal; they were not extensive, nor did they provide a substantive
focus for such relations.
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CONCLUSION
The underlying conclusion of this chapter is that there are no grounds for supporting
arguments which state that the Japanese were more participative in their management
style than the managers of the European plant. Koorki was seen as a comparatively
better employer but comparative not to Koburg, but to jobs available in the local
labour market. It is difficult to develop strict comparisons between the case plants
because of the ambiguity of many of the relationships involved, the marginality of
some of the practices and the impact of wider environmental influence. However,
what is clear is that in both cases the relation between employer and employed was
complex. Workers wanted competent managers, clean factorIes, ob security, anti so
on. To an important extent in both factories workers expected managers to manage,
but in Koburg, this was not seen to be done particularly competently as compared
with other locally available jobs.
This desire for managers to manage should not be seen in terms of a reconciliation
between labour and capital, but rather as an issue of demarcation, whereby a worker
does not want to undertake additional tasks, in this case managerial ones. More
generally, it indicates a desire by workers that they get on with their jobs without the
commitment necessary for management activities, even if that means ceding some
control to a management elite in the process.
Another recurrent feature, also touched on elsewhere in the thesis, was the differing
consciousness and material reality of women and men in their experience of the
labour process. Women started at the lower ranking jobs and had expectations that
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they would not have permanent jobs, although they wanted job security, and good,
'fair', management. Male workers also wanted managers who would deal with them
as competent workers, prepared to recognise the complexity of their work.
It is inappropriate to view the results of these cases as anything approaching the kind
of class accord equated with Post Fordism. Instead, it would be better to think of
these workers as realising and reconciling themselves to their subordinated position
in relation to their employers. They, neither wanted to do unpaid managerial work
nor felt victors in class struggle, rather these workers 'pragmatically accepted' their
subordinated position, though within limits, which will be discussed in Chapter
Eleven.
271
CHAPTER TEN
WORKER ATTITUDES TO LAB OURING
INTRODUCTION
The chapter is based on interviews with groups of shopfloor workers in two of the
case plants; Koburg and Koorki. The aim was to try and get workers, unprompte4,
to talk about their work and through this to reveal their attitudes to various issues.
This approach has the weakness of not providing strictly comparable evidence across
cases, as Reitsperger (1982) was able to achieve, but does allow the experience of
work to be conveyed. The approach to the interviews was to ask workers to explain
their experiences in their own terms providing only generalised questions to prompt
areas of discussion. In this way the research sought to gain a depth of understanding
of their experience of factory work. This approach is carried forward to the next two
chapters.
This chapter explores differing aspects of the experience of work in Koburg and
Koorki to show how the organisation of jobs leads to variations in consciousness and
alienation. It demonstrates strong doubts as to whether work in Koorki is in itself
more intrinsically rewarding than in Koburg. Further, it will show that women
experience work differently than men, mainly because of the jobs that they do and
because their dual roles as worker and home maker differentiate their consciousness
from that of men. Although methodologically this kind of research it is very difficult
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to undertake, a picture of complex experiences and attitudes undermine any view that
Japanese capital provides a qualitatively better work environment than non-Japanese
employers, contrary to what Post Fordist or managerialist streams in Japanisation
assert.
There follows five sections to the chapter. The first section briefly introduces aspects
of the literature on the subject, starting with theoretical issues in 'Perspectives on
Labour'. The following sections look at specific issues raised in the two case studies:
'Job Mobility', 'Women's Experience of Work' and 'Views of Work and Control'.
The last of these is an extended discussion which covers a wide range of aspects of
job experience, extending from the nature of the job itself through to rewards.
Finally, a 'Review of Arguments', provides a conclusion to the discussion.
PERSPECTIVES ON LABOUR
Within the Japanisation model the implications of the new set of relations between
labour and capital have led to claims that workers will be happy and fulfilled in their
work. First, looking at perspectives of labour consciousness in Japan, it can be seen
that there are divergent opinions as to satisfaction rates. Thus Dore (1973) likened the
views of workers in Japan to foot soldiers in the army who gripe at the discipline but
are loyal, well treated and enjoy their comradeship (see also Friedman; 1986;32).
Even critical academics often see the dual industrial structure in Japan as providing
a kind of labour aristocracy in the large companies at the expense of those working
for subcontractors (Woronoff; 1986;66). The research department of Denkirouren
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(Electrical Workers Union) publishes periodic results of surveys on members'
consciousness which are used widely in discussions by Japanese academics, and which
show constantly low satisfaction rates with jobs in Japan compared to other countries
(eg Kato;1989, and Kawajima:1984;96-118).
Kamata (1984) was one of the few studies to present a detailed description of
shopfloor working experience in Japan and what peoples' attitudes to work were. He
worked in a car assembly plant of Toyota as a seasonal worker and showed how a
state of false consciousness developed among workers which suppressed the reality
of work. This repression explained the lack of conflict on the shopiloor, in which
workers took satisfaction from the most trifling things. An alternative explanation is
of subdued workers who accepted domination because they had little choice, except
to work hard and be inconspicuous (Dohse et ai;1985).
In Chapter Three it was shown that surveys have been conducted among consumer
electronics workers working in the UK subsidiaries of Japanese firms. These studies
include Reitsperger (1982), Takamiya (1981) and Thurley (1985) and generally show
mixed responses of employees, some plants with higher satisfaction than indigenous
companies, sometimes worse. What these studies cannot do, however, is indicate the
patterns of colour which make up worker consciousness.
JOB MOBILITY
Job mobility has two aspects: external to the work organisation, or internal.
274
Movement between jobs has been an important chapter in British labour history, as
illustrated by what Hobsbawn (1964;34-63) called "the tramping artisan". Although
limited to a relatively few people, tramping was replaced by stationary homes with
mobility by 'tram' (Hobsbawn; 1964;46) to different factories. Such actions by labour,
obviously show no loyalty to individual firms, in contrast to Japanese employment
patterns.
Doeringer and Piore (1971) established a detailed theory of how internal labour
markets could be used to cope with changing work requirements within organisations
using a stable group of core employees. The model of Japan's core worker internal
labour markets is seen to exemplify this rriodel, leading to high lob motivation (Dore
1973, Dore et al 1989, Pang and Oliver 1988;16-17, and McCormick 1991). Even
more critical writers, such as Whittaker (1990), reinforce this notion of strongly
segmented labour markets in which core workers have low labour turnover, partly
because the periphery is so mobile.
This section will describe the individual job histories of some of the workers in the
plants as it is necessary to study the worker's background in order to understand their
behaviour within their plants. The intention is to explain how each company moved
people around within the plant, job rotation, and what the job history is of individuals
prior to their present employment, to assess if this had any relation with the attitudes
of those individuals. BBC (1987) at Komatsu, and Garrahan and Stewart', at Nissan,
'Discussions at the 1992 Conference of Socialist Economists, London.
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explain how management engaged in careful screening to avoid 'trouble makers' in
their recruitment of shopfloor workers. However, there is little discussion of such
practices by those who study the electronics sector from the perspective of
Japanisation. This contrasts with studies such as Morgan and Sayer (1988) and Geary
(1992), who indicate that the location of factories typically corresponds to plentiful
supplies of vulnerable labour.
It is easy to forget when discussing the labour processes and jobs people do that these
same people had lives before they started work at that particular place ol production.
In some cases, workers are able to choose to do a particular job rather than be given
one. This does not mean that the working class is behaving just like managers with
a consciousness of a career. Rather, it is an indication of unevenness within the
working class in terms of choice and, more importantly, that there is a recognition
by workers that change is a part of their working lives.
The job histories of individuals help to indicate a number of things to do with the way
the company views workers. If a worker has experience of work only within the
company, it may mean that the company wants to have malleable recruits, who have
not been 'polluted' by working in another company. Lack of experience more easily
allows a company to instil its corporate culture in the recruit. On the other hand it
means that the company has to train the employee. If a person is kept in one place
on entering the company, it can be because, either the company recruited them for
a specific job, or the employee gains a skill or special ability in a particular job,
which means the company is reluctant to move them. Alongside this there is the
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question of whether the company has the right to move people around in terms of
their employment contract, and in practice, or whether the worker has an effective
veto on any unwanted movement.
From the workers' point of view, staying with one company or another could indicate
loyalty to a good employer, or it may simply indicate a lack of choice. However, this
does not necessarily indicate that any particular job or employer is desirable, but may
merely be the least worst choice rather than any positive affirmation of labour's
subordination to capital.
Koburg
There might be an expectation concerning workers in Koburg that they would drift
in and out of the company, especially as the plant was located in a fairly strong
labour market, where substitute jobs were easy to find. The expectation might also
be of short periods of stay, indicating high labour turnover.
Auto Insertion System operators and loaders
Of four Auto insert minders interviewed, one was female. She had worked in the
company for seven years. She had started on the line, manually inserting components,
then moved to solder checking and had also done some main assembly work on
cabinets and the facia. None of the men had ever worked on manual insertion, so she
had done the most common job for women in the assembly factory, but had gained
promotion off the lines (Interview 17-7-90b). None of the men had done this kind of
'dexterous' work.
277
The men had worked in Koburg for 26 years, six years and ten months respectively.
However, the one who had current service of ten months, on the same job, had
previously worked at the company for six years between 1981 and 1987. At that time
he did various jobs, including some, as he said, which no longer existed. He had
applied to go into the JVC contract work but stayed on for six months before leaving
Koburg for three years. He left because he thought employment was becoming
insecure at the plant. In the year after he left, the company went onto a three day
week, and at the time he felt vindicated in his decision to leave. The next year the
plant grew and shifts were introduced, so he applied to come back on a shift working
job. About this period he says "had I known two years ago about this, I wouldn't
have left" (Interview 17-7-90b). It is important to note that the company O1O accept
him back; the Japanese companies had a policy which prohibits returning personnel,
except in cases of pregnancy (Field Notes 2 1/22-2-90). This may also indicate the
company's need for workers with the relevant skills to operate aUto nserJ)a',
machinery (Interview 17-7-90b).
The woman interviewee described how some people left when the three day week
came and fought to return when things picked up in Koburg. She said that another
company she worked for previously payed less for longer shifts, making a 12 hour
day, and this work was also noisy. This refers to one particular company which did
assembly and required vaguely similar types of work to that done at Koburg. All the
men knew about this company and agreed with her description (Interview 17-7-90b).
Another of the men started in the plant by setting up machines for women on the line,
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"girls" as he put it. This probably meant setting up the alignment and checking
machines in the days when this job was split into setters and operators. Then he
moved to line feeding - getting parts from stores and 'feeding' them to the lines for
operators to insert in the television set. He also did some main line work, and then
packing the televisions into boxes for dispatch. From there he applied to go on to
shifts, which meant auto insertion (Interview 17-7-90b).
Manual insertion line
Here, the sample interview was with three women, aged 46, 45 and 36. One had
worked in the company for 11 months. Another had worked for eight years, 26 years
before, but left on marriage, for more pay elsewhere. She returned the previous year
after accompanying her sister to the plant. Her sister wanted a job and so both applied
together (Interview 17-7-90a). Another woman had worked in the plant for seven
years, the first four being on alignment and then she was moved to another new line
with other workers and their supervisor. She refused to continue on the same job so
was given manual insertion as the alternative choice. Since then she had not moved
from that line and job (Interview 17-7-90a). As in the case of a Koburg auto insertion
minder, this was a case of someone leaving the company for a different job, yet being
accepted back when she re-applied (Interview 17-7-90a).
Technicians
In Koburg three factory service technicians were interviewed, and they had worked
at the plant for 24 years, seven years and eight months respectively. All had been
recruited to work in technical jobs from the beginning. None of the interviewees had
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left for any period of time and all had done the same kind of job throughout their
time at the factory (Interview 17-7-90c).
Tuner assemblers
A group of four women, with various jobs on the section, were interviewed. One had
done other jobs in the plant but only after having an operation for an injury sustained
whilst doing a job in the tuner section, but she fought to get back to the tuner section.
She said she was put on ajob "which you wouldn't give to a PG Tips monkey to do",
mentioned in the last chapter (Interview 18-7-90).
Fault finders
The three interviewees concerned here had been in the plant for 27 years, 19 years
and 20 years, in turn. One, a woman, had been doing fault finding for 10 or 11
years, after being a manual insert checker, and then a float. Again, she had a Job
history which started in the manual insertion section, though at least not actually
inserting. One of the men was recruited from the army, where he had been an
engineer. He was put straight on fault finding, starting with basics to the present,
where he was the most senior fault analyst. In this job he spent six years fault finding
on the tuner lines. The other male had been a fault finder for 20 years in various
sections. Before that, it was unclear what he had done (Interview 17-7-90d). It is
worth noting that fault finding was a fairly specialised job with its own career
structure. It was also not necessary to have experience of those jobs where faults
arose.
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Conclusion
For technical grades the labour market was external. But for line working jobs, there
was some internal promotion possible to supervisory level, or to 'semi-skilled'
grades. Women, however, must persevere within the firm to slowly gain promotions
in the internal labour market to more interesting and higher paid jobs. With some of
the long serving workers, who continuously worked in the plant, there was some
evidence of loyalty, though unproven with such a small sample. This throws up
doubts as to whether the images of European, and especially British, capitalism are
any different from Japanese, a fact which Cole (1979) demonstrates in a comparison
of labour mobility between Japan and the US.
Koorki
Because of its Japanese ownership there might be an expectation of a strong internal
labour market developing, with a high degree of loyalty in terms of no external job
mobility within Koorki. Moreover, with Koorki being established for nearly a decade
at the time of the research, it might be expected that these market arrangements be
well advanced. However, the evidence suggests otherwise.
Auto Insertion System operators and loaders
In this area, two men were interviewed, one a machine minder, aged 34, and the
other, aged 42, who loaded programmes into the auto insert machines. The minder
had arrived eight months before, whilst the loader arrived, 13 months previously
(Interview 1 6-8-90c). The operator had worked at a large specialised steel plant and
then in the building trade. He applied to come to Koorki because work was not
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regular in the building trade and he knew that it was regular in Koorki. He received
an application form through a friend who already worked for Koorki and sent it in
direct (Interview 16-8-90c).
Neither of these men had worked elsewhere in the plant, but were employed directly
into auto insertion within the company. Both wanted promotion but thought of it in
terms of moving up within the auto insertion department (Interview 16-8-90c). This
way of thinking about promotion might not be so unusual, but the lack of experience
in other parts of the plant was in marked contrast to Koburg. In terms of Japanisation,
it implies that for these types of employees at least, there was no internal labour
market in the Japanese plant, but that there was in the European case. Instead the
Japanese plant recruited auto insertion workers from outside the company, specifically
to do a job within auto insertion. However, it is possible that within auto insertion
there was some movement between jobs but there was not so much difference in the
knowledge needed for each type of job, loader and minder.
Manual insertion line
Here the one interview was with a float operator, aged 23. She went from school to
the plant seven years before with no other work experience. Her first job was on
manual insertion for six years on another line after which she became a float, her
current post (Interview 16-8-90b).
This pattern of progression for women was similar to that seen for those in Koburg,
but as will be shown next, men had a different career formation.
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Techniciall
The single maintenance technician, a team leader, had left school at 16 to take an
electrical apprentice at a steel company for four years, and he gained a full City and
Guilds Certificate there. He went straight from finishing his apprenticeship to Koorki
and had been there for six years. He went to Koorki because the apprentices were to
be made redundant at the end of their four year training period at the steel works.
Many of the other apprentices went to work in companies as technicians to service
photocopy machines (Interview 21-2-90b).
This technician experienced insecure employment and saw Koorki as safe. Further,
contrary to arguments of internal labour markets in flexible models of employment,
Koorki did not mind its employees being trained outside the firm. Supposedly, in a
strait Japanisation case this would be undesirable because they would be inculcated
with the bad practices of British skilled workers. Clearly this assertion is false, or
Koorki saw contra-balancing benefits, such as cost savings in training.
Alignment
The female alignment float interviewed, had been in the company for four years.
Before that she had worked for two years making plastic parts for cars in a local
factory. When she was laid off she applied for work at Koorki. After she went she
was asked to return to the car parts plant but stayed because the job was seen as
secure, acceptable pay and a clean environment in the plant (Interview 16-8-90a).
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Conclusion
Some of the recruits went to the Koorki plant after experience of job insecurity
elsewhere. Another feature was that much of the training had been done elsewhere,
which reinforces the argument that internal markets, or skilling of workers through
job rotation, was seldom used. Finally, most of those interviewed had been with the
company for a short period of time, when compared to Koburg.
Comparison of cases
The contrast is quite marked between the two plants in terms of the age and
experience of interviewees, all the more remarkable when one considers that those
interviewed in Koorki were in grades slightly above those in Koburg, being floats
rather than operators for example.
It would appear that Koorki recruited people into specific job categories, whilst
Koburg used its own internal labour movements to fill some jobs. One reason for this
may be that Koburg has undergone large scale contraction, so requiring some
movement or loss of jobs for workers. As Koorki has been expanding it was more
able to select people for specific job categories, which by the very nature of
expansion, grow in number anyway. Significant promotions in Koburg, were possible
for women, perhaps even more than for men. But, this was merely a partial
compensation for the fact that it was the women who were initially recruited to un-
skilled and semi-skilled jobs, whilst men were recruited straight into higher positions,
and taken on apprenticeships. On the other side, most of these case histories show
that the workers interviewed had fairly long periods of time doing the same job.
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WOMEN'S EXPERIENCE OF WORK
Women's and men's experience of work was differentiated within the cases for two
main reasons. First, there were some differences in the jobs each undertook, such that
women tended to experience the more deskilled and repetitive tasks. Second, men and
women were socially conditioned to have different expectations from work, so that
often women see their working lives as subordinate in importance to men's.
There is a growing set of literature on how women's experiences of work are
different from those of men in many respects. Much of this literature makes three
points: (a) women perceive that their need to earn money is less important than
men's; (b) the jobs they do are less important; and (c) the relations between economic
and domestic labour are central to their experience of life. Pollert (1981) traces these
connections and how they become internalised within working women as 'natural'.
Martin and Wallace (1984;99-100) from a sample of 279 women of different
occupational grades and having an average of 22 years work, with one career break,
found that these women seldom had career plans, or expectations of development,
except for nurses. However, it is unclear if a majority of men have career plans,
which may be more a preoccupation of the middle classes.
In the cases, there was some discussion by women concerning their consciousness of
work and work relations, though the author's gender obviously influenced the content.
On the other hand men would talk about women more openly, perhaps again
influenced by the researcher's gender.
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Male views of female workers
As there was only one interview with a group who included men who were supervised
by a woman (Interview 17-7-90d), most comments were from male managers of
female subordinates. One supervisor, who had men and women under his control,
exclaimed (Interview 22-2-90a):
Women have to be treated differently than men. You need to be more
careful.
This was a commonly held view in the plants. The ambiguity of 'be more careful'
often had a 'negative' connotation - women, at least in collective work areas, could
not be controlled as easily as men in some ways (Interview 17-7-90c). The men
clearly felt the problems created by a dominance which has no rational basis. When
confronted with challenges to their masculinity, the men had no legitimate authority
for their power and so found the situation awkward.
Perhaps a reaction to this insecurity is a sexual difference in dicourse - males were
men, no matter what age, and often females were "girls". A justification may be that
most of the women were young, with some lines having an average age of 22
(Interview 22-2-90a). However, the term is pejorative and also implies something
about the attainment of womanhood. If there were three females of 17 and one of 40
in a group, they would still be termed 'girls', whereas this did not happen if the same
people were male.
Women's views of male employees
There were no discussions which highlighted any differences between men and
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women in their working. The only comments related to the social groupings at work
which often formed. When a man came to train on a manual insertion line one woman
noted (Interview 17-7-90):
We have a man trying out now. We have a lot to think about at home
and know what each other are thinking so it was easier [if it is only
women].
The man was thought, by the women interviewees, to be unable to understand the
social group and could never really be part of the group. This was not seen as a
criticism of the man but pity for the inevitable isolation he must have felt.
There were comments about the lecherous behaviour of certain managers to younger
women on the lines, which was confirmed by the behaviour and talk of a few
managers at one lunch break, witnessed by the researcher. At least some of the men
saw women as sexual objects inferior to themselves, a factor which found reflection
in the oppression of women.
Women's views of their own work
The difference in attitude to the value and place of work in the overall lives of male
and female workers was striking. For example, a woman working in auto insertion
said (Interview 17-7-90b):
My husband is only home at weekends and my children are grown up.
But we all have huge mortgages. It's not so bad for me as for Bill and
Ben2 , because I am not the bread winner.
2 Bill and Ben are other interviewees with whom she compared her position.
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The woman had the same physical work conditions, the same level of overtime
working and so on, even at weekends, yet she viewed work as different. Even though
she worked to help pay the mortgage (Interview 17-7-90b) she perceived that she was
less responsible and under less pressure than the male workers. She valued the
importance of her work less than theirs.
There was fairly strong bonding in women's work groups. This was not only as a
result of the common experience of work but because the common experience of
home and how the two inter-relate that kept the group strong. One person described
the situation (Interview 17-7-90a):
We feel different people inside and outside at home. You do take a lot
home to think about. It is very difficult, especially with annualized
hours, to have children. You have to make up time at weekends.
Husbands come back later but forget that there is no dinner yet
because I have just come in before. We cannot live from just my
husband's wage. When the children has gone you feel you need
something to show for your effort so you stay on.
Work was hard and the husbands did not seem to notice how hard the life was for a
woman worker. It was no wonder that the social organisation at work becomes
important for the woman worker on the assembly line. Women were conscious of
these dual pressures which men did not have, and yet they still subordinated their own
position within work.
Conclusion
Women aided and abetted in their own subordination in many respects but also
constructed a frontier of control. Women prescribed limits to the overt display of
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male oppressiveness through social relations which excluded men. The women felt
they lived in two worlds, which reflected a societal image of women as home makers,
and hid their economic importance. Economists, such as Koike (1988) and Piore and
Sabel (1984), argue that these women exist within secondary labour markets.
Although, often these wages are integral to the family wage, women conspire with
this language of secondary labour - less essential than men's labour power. Further,
although in the case plants these 'women's' jobs are integral to television production,
this production relies on women's complicity in their own subordination within the
labour process in order for the companies to turr a p'ot.
VIEWS OF WORK AND CONTROL
This section studies attitudes towards the job and motivation to work. First, 'Views
of Work', looks at workers' views of their work, using job categories. Second, 'The
Work Group' examines the social relations of working by looking at group formations
and attitudes to them. Third, 'Job Comparisons', provides examples of how workers
related their own jobs with others. The remaining two sections look at 'Perceptions
of Pay' and 'Promotion' in turn to explore workers' views of their reward for labour.
Views of work
This sub-section separates out three kinds of jobs: line, minder and technical. The
first was strongly controlled and paced minute by minute by the assembly line,
minding jobs were partially controlled and technical activities were remotely paced.
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Line jQb
These jobs include manual insertion and quality control. The most graphic
descriptions of alienation in the work process were given by interviewees in Koburg.
A good example was given by a woman manual insertion worker (Interview
1 7-7-90a):
I've spent £75,000 and been round the world, I don't know how many
times. We used to have a walkman. When they said you could - we all
went out and bought one. Then they said "no" one day - its dangerous.
It was brilliant. You can't hear the piped radio. If you are close to a
person - they still have to shout. If someone, such as the supervisor
talks to you, you always say pardon because it is such a shock to have
your (world) disturbed.
In order to cope with the boring repetitiveness the worker fell into a day dream, in
the case of the interviewee spending a 'Pools' win and travelling round the world.
There was a tendency for the noise in the plant to isolate a person into their own
world of fantasy and work action (Interview 17-7-90a, Field notes 17-7-90).
Another said (Interview 18-7-90):
We have no loyalty to the company. I know I shouldn't but I don't
care what happens how they (televisions) go out. They (management)
don't care so why should I. I wouldn't like to buy a television set like
that but I cannot be bothered.
Another piece of evidence of the routine was that there were complaints about certain
individuals who caused the interviewees extra work because these 'selfish individuals'
would take a week off or be careless in work so stopping the line. This shows a sense
of a need for conformity and sharing of work burdens, as well as demonstrating how
routine work patterns were not only part of the day, but preferred. Workers want to
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sink into the predictable numb routine of the day, the alienation, in order for time to
go quickly (Interview 17-7-90a). If they could automate themselves and have nothing
interfere to make them human, thinking, independent people again, they could cope
with the boredom. The group spirit which understood this 'pain avoidance' grew out
of the common experience of work.
An interviewee from a Koorki manual insertion line also saw that a strong group bond
existed among the women, based on a sense of shared social relations. She also
thought that these friendships extended between workers on the different lines
(Interview 16-8-90b).
Tuner assembly work was seen as tedious especially because the same design was
made year in, year out (Interview 18-7-90). However, workers had to concentrate on
the job because as one said the line moved so fast that she could not sit down but had
to walk with the line to get enough time to insert all the components she was
supposed to. These interviewees agreed that sometimes there was not time to insert
all the components so some were missed causing quality problems. One explained a
well known case of a woman who passed-out and collapsed on the insertion line.
Instead of the supervisor checking to see if she was OK, she stepped over the body
and arms outstretched, and continued to manually insert whilst calling for help. The
line did not stop. However, they did not blame the supervisor, who was under
pressure from above (Interview 18-7-90). In this case the supervisor was not
considered one of 'them', management, as was discussed in the previous chapter.
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The high pressure of work was also seen as reducing group spirit on the lines to the
point where one said (Interview 18-7-90):
Now, there is no commitment. The wasted part of my life is at work.
There is no life for free time.
Not only is life at work 'worthless' it is also the only thing the worker has time for
- 'worthless work'. She felt worn out and wanted to retire once she was 60 or
younger if the official age changed (Interview 18-7-90).
However, among fault finders, at least some found the work less tedious. One of the
interviewees seemed to enjoy the work, solving problems and saw himself as a kind
of manager, looking to improve production and helping to shape a new type of QLP
based company. The other two were less enthusiastic, seeing problem solving as a
necessary fact of the job. However, they all considered that they were highly skilled
in that they needed to understand circuit diagrams and to work out what faults were
caused by what defective, or missing part. They were also critical that management
did not support them, expecting them to work on new designs with no technical
manuals (17-7-90d).
Minding jobs
These jobs include auto insertion machine minding and float workers on the lines.
The auto insert workers were disappointed in the isolation of their section from the
rest of the plant. They thought they should be shown round the whole factory, to see
what happens to the boards (Interview 16-8-90c). One also saw that she was part of
the group, although, as a float worker, she had some responsibility over and above
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that of ordinary line workers. This meant that her job was not as repetitious as was
the case for the line workers (Interview 16-8-90b).
There seemed only one major down side to the job for auto insert workers in Koorki,
which was that "it can be a bit tedious" (Interview 16-8-90c). Another interviewee
from auto insert said (Interview 16-8-90c):
Time goes slowly unless you are busy so if machines go down we
concentrate on those that are going. This way time goes quickly.
On the other side of the tedium, the quote shows that the biggest punishment was no
work. When a machine would break down, or if for some other reason there was no
work to occupy the worker, they were exposed to the ticking of time. There were two
clocks on opposite walls which the workers stared at if they were not kept busy. They
did paper work, tidied the work area, anything to stop their eyes wandering to the
clocks. Nevertheless work was not considered arduous (Interview 16-8-90c).
In Koburg, to help with the tedium there was a period when personal stereos were
allowed on the shopfloor by management. In this case a worker added that radios
were tried previously and that it was because of noise that these alternative ways of
keeping workers happy were tried (Interview 17-7-90b).
Tchnical jobs
The job of technical maintenance in Koorki was fraught with pressures and 'let
downs'. New systems (machines) were introduced without adequate training. At the
same time, the pressure of work associated with just maintaining the lines and in
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servicing new machines meant that even junior managers worked "with tools"
constantly (Interview 21-2-90b). Moreover, when some machines were to be repaired
or maintained, technicians found the line being used when they were supposed to be
left for the technicians. Priority was always given to production, not maintenance,
and that frustrated the work of the technicians. Whereas when a mistake was made
by a technical worker there were detailed inquiries to find out what went wrong, and
technicians felt, to apportion blame among them.
In Koburg, technicians talked of pressure from managers where there was a lack of
production. Moreover, as with Koorki, new macines and sD51war were ^ethg
constantly developed, creating pressure to adapt to new conditions (Interview 17-7-
90c). These changes were not seen as enriching, as one maintenance technician
exclaimed (Interview 17-7-90c):
When we work on one system [part of the plant] all the time, it gets
boring. Also, we can get several problems at the same time and are
expected to be a genius and correct them all at once.
He went on to note how the off-line game of work was played to avoid being given
extra work (Interview 187-7-90c):
At times you have to look busy and at other times you are busy.
The maintenance job was one where a person waited for problems to occur but
management hated to see idle labour, so technicians had to pretend to management
they were always busy in order to keep free to work when a crisis occurred. As was
indicated previously, they were the first to be blamed for lost production if the line
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stopped.
The technical jobs were characterised by change but without a sense of variety, only
the occasional pressure to learn a procedure or tool, with no time to study. Thus, this
form of change was a form of work intensification. In character, this was male skilled
work with at atmosphere of masculinity as strong as the feminine ambience of the
manual insertion interviews, which echoes the findings of Bradley (1989). Without
over-stating the point, there was the sense that the uniform, the overalls, was a status
symbol for which they had trained. Workers failing to come to work in the company
prescribed uniform was not a problem here!
Conclusion
Workers were highly conscious of the nature of their own work. Moreover, this
immediate experience was the most important part of the overall experience of work.
There was little difference in determining issues towards tedium and repetitiveness -
if it was the same work each hour and each day the work was considered bad. Thus,
the potential advantage of working away from the line, was that it tended to be less
repetitious.
There was a strong similarity between the cases, which shows that for labour there
was little choice between, at least these two, employers. Thus, choice of employment
may well be based on criteria other than the job itself, something quite different from
choices facing managers and professional workers. Also, it is clear that working for
a Japanese company makes little or no difference to the boredom and repetitiveness
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of line working. In fact the evidence here shows that the company in question tended
to extend this type of experience to technical workers as well.
The Work Group
In Koburg attitudes towards the work group were generally positive among the
interviewees. As one manual inserter said: "Its the people who keep me here"
(Interview 17-7-90a). The work group sat together and even when some were sent to
'help out' on another line, they returned to their normal group at breaks. Labour
turnover meant that some did come and go, but as most stayed a long time, the group
became a strong community (Interview 17-7-90a). One woman said (Interview
1 6-8-90a):
You can talk to others on other machines so long as your machine is
going. This place has always had a good atmosphere, on the lines and
so on. Families come here. We all live in the same area.
Clearly, whatever the relationships with managers, there were positive attitudes to the
'community' of labour in Koburg among many women.
In Japanese companies the connotation of the work group not only includes
management but is 'professional' in that it is work-centred during the day and, in
Japan at least, social in the evening. In Koorki, workers spoke more dispassionately
about their workplace, one saying that it was not a very social place because workers
came from a wide geographical area (Interview 16-8-90c).
Groups existed within the case plants but they were not the 'teams' of managerial
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literature, or the social groupings associated with pleasure. Instead, friendships were
made out of the common experience of work, its boring repetitiveness. Women were
more talkative about their experience of groups than the men because they had more
experience of line work, where groups bonded strongly, and with in-fighting and all
the other features of oppressed conditions within the labour process. Men had
continual contact with each other and less commonality of experience.
Job Comparisons
Jobs can be compared with others within the factory and others within the locality,
including previous jobs. Related to this question of comparison is the range of jobs
available in the area. Thus, around Koorki the major employers were white collar and
retailing jobs, steel and mining. Around Koburg the main employers were in Naval
dockyards and factories in light assembly, similar to Koburg itself.
In Koburg, although there were frequent comparisons with other light industrial plants
in the locality, some good and others bad, the main comparison was made with the
manual insertion job within the plant. As an auto insert worker said, their job was
"easier for us than those on the line, at least we are mobile in AIS" (Interview
17-7-90b). This was not an isolated feeling of superiority in auto insert, as the elite
of the manual jobs. A woman fault finder thought that she was lucky not to be on the
line doing manual insertion, explaining how hard that job was and how they could not
leave the line easily (17-7-90).
In Koorki, one put it that auto insert work was not so hard compared to being a
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bricky (Interview 16-8-90c). Another explained (Interview 16-8-90c):
In the coal board I remember being dirty before I start - here I am not
dirty going home from work. You could come to work in a suit. You
have got to keep your wits aboit you, you cannot just walk about but
there is no hard work here.
The auto insert interviewees saw their present work and work environment as a
progression from their previous employment. To them Koorki was a new kind of
workplace in the area, which was dominated by declining heavy industry. The
interviewees seemed surprised at just how different it was at the factory (Interview
16-8-90).
Not everybody saw Koorki as the pinnacle of their work chances, as one alignment
float indicated: she would rather have joined the police force, or been a driving
instructor, than have her current job and career path. She intended to stay in Koorki,
nonetheless, and hoped for promotion to charge-hand within another four or five
years. The pay was 'okay' and the particular line she was on interested her, although
she would probably leave if moved onto some of the other lines (Interview 16-8-90a).
In conclusion, there were some differences between the two cases in that Koorki was
seen as being clearly better than alternative employers in the locality. However, it
was not possible to associate this with being Japanese because in the vicinity of
Koburg the comparable plants were similar to Koburg itself, but Koorki was seen as
locally unique in its bright, clean - light industrial - atmosphere.
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Perceptions of Pay
This section first sets out the pay system for each case, then within each case,
compares high skilled and low skilled pay. The intention is to show demarcations in
pay between the two levels and how these were perceived by the earners.
In all the cases a basic salary was paid with supplements for shifts, overtime and the
like, without bonuses. However, in Hashi there was an annual assessment which
could add a small supplement to pay (Interview 27-11-89, and Kohut%, wa x
process of introducing a similar scheme, the A and B grading. The main determinant
of differences in a person's pay was still the opportunity for overtime and shifts, and
the job grades. Except in Koorki, a supplement was paid to workers who temporarily
did a job which was usually paid at a higher grade rate.
Perceptions of pay in Koburg
In Koburg the debate was mainly about comparing with like factories in the area.
There was some debate among workers over whether Koburg was a good 'payer'
compared to other factories in the area.
One Manual inserter said, her daughter had been a qualified hairdresser but could get
double the money at Koburg. Some recognised that they were without any formal
qualifications and they were unlikely to obtain this money elsewhere (Interview
1 7-7-90b).
Another manual insertion worker thought that the new owner provided more money
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so Koburg was becoming more competitive for manual workers. On the other side a
transformer assembly worker thought it had declined in relation to other large
companies in the area. Part of the problem was that no bonuses were paid but
"instead of bonuses they bring us ice blues!" (Interview 18-7-90). Yet the money was
not so poor as to cause the interviewees to look for alternative employers.
Koburg's management had introduced some sort of new pay assessments by which
workers could get paid at an A or a B grade. One of the fault finders interviewed
supported the new pay assessments, but the others did not, except grudgingly. The
older one, who supported the scheme, thought that the younger workers were less
committed and got everything from the beginning that he had to work for over the
years (Interview 17-7-90d).
As in all cases, but perhaps more obviously with technicians, the main motivation was
money. The shift money was seen as good for the geographical locality and one said
he would leave if shifts ended (Interview 17-7-90c). The technicians saw one
advantage they had, which helped them in the external labour market if pay ever
became comparatively unfavourable in Koburg (Interview 17-7-90):
We who have had a training have something to fall back on but the
pay is good so I wouldn't move.
Technicians had a transferable skill and they knew it. This meant that in this case
there had been no structural change in the labour market which had existed for skilled
people for over 100 years. If they got fed up with the company they could move
easily so the company had to try to attract and retain skilled workers, such as
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technicians. The technicians' attitude to the company was instrumental in that they
were only concerned with receiving high pay. The fact that none wanted to leave in
the foreseeable future was due to management's ability to still make pay appear
attractive to the technicians (Interview 17-7-90c). On the other side, the longer these
technicians stayed the less their skill would be transferable because they did not use
and extend their full range of skills.
Perceptions of pay in Koorki
For non 'skilled' workers pay was competitive relative to retailing and other service
sector jobs in the nearby city centre. Thus, KoorkI was a popular place to apply for
school leavers. A manual insert float at Koorki, a grade C float, woxkl ha''e ikcd the
pay of a grade D senior float but that was the limit. She enjoyed "going fast and so
on" to relieve boredom, but the basic motivation was still money (Interview 16-8-90).
Technicians saw the issue of pay from two standpoints. One engineer who had been
to college and applied for work in several companies, chose Koorki because it paid
more money than the others, and for no other reason (Interview 16-8-90d). On the
other hand, half the technicians had left in two years (25 percent a year). One major
reason seems to be pay; two people could be working on the same job with the same
skills but be paid at different levels because of the grading system. This problem was
made more acute and immediate because the traditional views of technicians was not
affirmed. The interviewee said that two or three people would start one week and
leave the next, thereby maintaining an instability (Interview 17-8-90).
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Again a major motivation to work was seen as pay. In Koburg, pay was seen as
equitable, in relation to the opportunity costs of jobs in the locality. Moreover, there
were no complaints about differentials within the plant. Koorki on the other hand had
problems. Pay was satisfactory compared to other employers in the locality for most
interviewees. Further, it was relatively secure pay, in that the company would not
close in the short term. However pay differentials did cause discontent among
technical workers.
Promotion
Promotion attitudes are concerne1 both with what wotke.t etce.i Is theix
opportunity for career progression and their desire to climb the available ladder. One
would expect both the availability and desire to be high in the Japanese case (eg.
Dore;1973, Kendall;1984, and Koike;1988), but the reality was different.
In Koburg, among manual insertion workers, none wanted to be promoted up to
either the float, or supervisor level (Interview 17-7-90a):
None of us want to be floats - you have to know all the jobs for an
extra seven pounds a week, a stupid amount. We don't get paid
enough for what we do. Its too difficult to be bothered. The supervisor
has to be really tough - she is in the middle between us and
management. If you are career minded its OK - I just come here for
the money.
It was a rational decision not to be career minded when the compensation for the
extra stress and effort was not perceived as enough. Thus, for women, even where
there were opportunities to gain more money, it was not seen as due compensation
for the extra hassle.
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In Koorki, one auto insert interviewee did believe that any ability for promotion
would be recognised and used by management (Interview 16-8-90). However, a
manual insertion float interviewee was not career minded as she did not want to
become a supervisor because there was too much pressure with that job. Therefore,
it was reasonable to assume that her consciousness was as a worker, and not a
would-be manager.
There are very few conclusions that can be drawn from this information, except that
there was no clear evidence of a strong desire on the part of interviewees to progress
into managerial positions. Technicians, with their higher education, might perhaps be
aware that the opportunity existed for them to become managers, whilst all manual
workers knew supervisory grades were as high as they were ever likely to reach, and
few wanted the pressure associated with such jobs.
Conclusion
In this section, it was clear that those who did repetitive work could have positive
attitudes towards those who exploited them. The reason was that they were conscious
that they had little option to leave for they either could not find a more
psychologically rewarding job for their level of education, or one which was not as
highly paid. However, it was not possible to see money alone as adequate
compensation for their toil as few wanted promotion and the money that went with
it. They seemed happy to remain in their social groups formed at the workplace.
Technicians seemed to be the exception to this rule, with little social cohesion in the
workplace, money considerations and independence to compensate for their years of
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training were paramount for them.
REVIEW OF ARGUMENTS
A major feature of the cases was the different perceptions of their work and labour
market position women and men had. The women constantly have low expectations
of themselves and reinforced their own subservience at work. They, also saw their
work as non-essential, but instead, as a top-up to the family wage. This was despite
having jobs the same as men, holding semi-managerial positions, and sometimes being
highly skilled (though not recognised as such). Men either saw their jobs as forming
careers, especially if they had some training which they considered set them apart
from the average working class male. Or, they saw themselves as moving between
jobs and employers for money, without necessarily climbing the promotional ladder.
Some men admired the stamina of the women on manual insertion, and recognised
that they would not be able to cope easily with such a job.
The findings in this chapter do not fall into the neat categories of the surveys
reviewed in Chapter 3, but the set of illustrative case studies shows that workers are
quite capable of expressing in their own words their conscious experience of
exploitation. It is clear that the Japanese companies do not necessarily inculcate an
attitude of loyalty, harmony and unitarism that might be expected. Instead there were
both differences between Japanese companies, and between sections within such
companies. Further, the problems managers have with technicians in Koorki, indicate
that Japanese attempts to reduce differences of status and power within the labouring
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class is not without its difficulties.
With the possible exception of the rather inconclusive references to job security and
life time employment opportunities in the Japanese case, Koburg showed more signs
of being 'Japanese' than Koorki. This shows similar findings to that obtained by
Reitsperger (1982) although a more complex picture is painted. Some sections of
Koburg's workforce were highly critical of the company, whilst others, doing similar
work were more positive. There was also evidence of change within the cases.
Koburg had become a tighter managed organisation with less room for worker
autonomy which appealed to some, but not to most workers, despite a decrease in size
over the previous 10 years. On the other hand, as Koorki grew, it too was becoming
more bureaucratic and less popular among workers. Such issues require further
research in the future.
On the issue of Japanisation the evidence is contradictory. On the one hand, once
people arrived at Koorki, they tended not to leave, which indicates something of life
time employment loyalties except in the high turnover of technicians. However, this
reflected labour market conditions and may also be a result of managers deliberately
recruiting people who had experience of job insecurity elsewhere. On the other hand,
Koburg had more internal promotions and, from a managerial perspective, a 'better'
age profile (workers at different ages in the plant, having worked for a long time
there). These issues will be developed further in looking at labour turnover in the
next Chapter.
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A final point to note was that there was evidence of the social context in which the
choice of employment, obviously conditioned if not encouraged by employers, took
place. In at least two cases friends of existing employees were introduced to the
company when job vacancies occurred. The companies encouraged this form of
recruitment because then these non-work relations were then introduced onto the
factory floor where introducer became, at least morally, responsible for the conduct
of their friend. This allows the employer to exploit private social relations within an
economic context.
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CHAPTER ELEVEN
EMPLOYEE RESISTANCE AND THE ROLE
OF THE UNIONS
INTRODUCTION
According to Clegg (1979) the union is the formal structure through which employee
interests have been expressed in Britain. Others, such as Brown ()988) see Eke
declining role of unions as resulting from their inability to represent the changing
aspirations and circumstances of workers. Bassett (1987) in turn demonstrates how
some unions, particularly in Japanese plants and especially the EETPU, are trying to
increase their popularity and role, in line with a shift within the union movements
towards a "new realism" (1987;44-64). The EETPU was at the vanguard of this "new
unionism" (1987), providing a package of attractions to both employees and
employers to boost membership. Benefits, such as training, have been strongly
promoted among workers, whilst no strike agreements were offered to employers.
Right wing leaders of the EETPU championed single union deals, claiming that union
mergers made single unions more logical (1987;91). In exchange for this the EETPU
wanted participation and single status within agreements, which would allow limited
forms of flexibility. Bassett (1987) argues that it was the EETPU which led the way
towards new forms of industrial relations, most of which can be seen operating in
Toshiba, Plymouth, which many others have followed. Toshiba has company boards,
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single status, flexibility, a "no strike" clause and a single union within the agreement.
One point to make is that this definition of the union as the sole representative of
labour limits the choices of actions open to labour. Hyman writes (1975; 159): that:
Only by a readiness to act 'unofficially' and 'unconstitutionally' can
workers maintain a balance of power at all favourable to their own
interests, and hence sustain an effective measure of job control.
As the union legitimizes the existence of management and the dominance of
capitalism, so labour sometimes challenges the existence of all three, union,
management and capital. Labour may challenge the mutually legitimating relationships
of the three through both collective action and individual resistances. Thus, although
labour demonstrates resistance to capitalist relations through unions in the UK, and
unions often form the focal point of collective relations, labour is not dependent on
unions as the only means by which grievances can be expressed. Individual workers
can for example leave their jobs, go sick, sabotage their machines, although for
collective demonstrations of grievance against employers, unions are, or often
become, a focal point. However, it is fair to say that in reverse, the union is
dependent on the worker, as member, for its very existence.
The purpose of this chapter is to compare the different cases to ascertain whether the
Japanese were establishing a different form of relation with unions from that in
Koburg. Further, this chapter aims to examine the nature of this relationship, to
indicate whether it was harmonious or whether the union was externalised to the point
where workers had to deal directly with managers without the help of a union. The
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chapter will show that whilst on the surface Japanese employer - union - employee
relations demonstrated 'new realism', in substantive terms this was a mirage.
Traditional tensions between consent and control lurked beneath the surface of
agreements in complex ways which had more to do with personalities and the nature
of the industry than the form of ownership of capital.
This chapter will first outline the structure of the union within the plant, then
secondly, deal with the relationship between union and management. The chapter will
look at the relationship between the union and workers in the factory. Finally, it
examines the issue of worker responses to management in ways that did not direct'y
involve the union. The conclusion will assess how far relations could be seen within
a unitarist framework1.
UMON STRUCTURE AND DENSITY
In all four case plants independent unions were present, although only in Koburg was
more than one union recognised by management for negotiation purposes. This
section will deal with each case in turn.
The term of a unitary frame of reference for industrial relations was developed by Fox
(1966; 10-15). The basic argument is that the objectives and interests of labour and
capital are the same, notwithstanding the historical despotism of management at some
vague time before. Any union or 'third party' intervention in this direct relationship
is considered counter-productive and against the interests of both capital and labour.
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Koburg
Originally there were six unions at the present plant of Koburg but, through
amalgamation, this had been reduced to four: Electrical, Electronic,
Telecommunication and Plumbers Union (EETPU), the dominant union, Transport
and General Workers' Union (TGWU) with few members, Manufacturing, Scientific
and Financial (MSF) and Engineering and Clerical Staff Association (ECSA', with
about 50 members.
At the time of this study the EETPU had a shopfloor membership of 370 members
out of 780, shared between six stewards. MSF (Manufacturing, Scientific and
Financial workers union) represented the white collar workers and engineers with
three stewards for 50 members out of 400 indirect employees. Each steward was
assigned a section of the factory but a decline in white collar jobs meant a
corresponding decline in membership from 250 to 50 and also meant that MSF
members were represented by a disproportionately high number of stewards
(Interview 6-12-89d).
In the plant, membership density amounted to 40 percent. This contrasted strongly
with a then closed production site in a large city, also owned by Burg which had over
90 percent density. The studied plant was located in a part of the country which has
had a traditionally low union membership. Moreover, as a senior manager argued,
the plant had originally been part of a small family firm, before a large UK
corporation took it over in the 1960s (Interview 24-10-89). The implication is that this
plant had a tradition of paternalism, so negating the need for a union. There were,
310
however, areas of the plant, such as fault finders on manual assembly lines, where
union density was 100 percent membership.
A recent recruitment drive by the dominant union had improved union density from
a previous rate of 34 percent to the present 40 percent. The senior steward for the
union expressed his pleasure with this growth (Interview 6-12-89d), although much
of the credit for the growth can be attributed to management acquiescence. Personnel
Department support such as providing room for displays in the canteen, allowing a
disco and giving access to new recruits during induction training illustrates this point.
These practices resulted from ar agreemeflt twe tt vcv	 EETiS i
personnel, whereby membership of the main union would be officially encouraged
and sanctioned (Interview 6-12-89a).
The stewards reflected the gender composition of the membership of the EETPU,
with mainly female members represented by female stewards (Interview 6-12-89d,
and Field Notes 6-12-89 and 17-7-90). MSF had a female steward for the secretarial
staff and a male for engineers. One distortion to sexual representativeness resulted
from the male stewards representing each of the three almost exclusively male
maintenance shifts, with much lower steward to membership ratios than for the day
shift of mainly women line workers. Overall, there was no area of the shopfloor that
was not covered by a steward, although this was not always the case. Indirect jobs
sometimes were not covered by stewards because new departments were created more
often and the unions were slow to extend steward responsibility into these new areas
(Interview 6-12-89d).
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While the unions in the factory were formally able to represent their members in an
unrestricted way, there was evidence of managerial attempts to sponsor arrangements
which by-passed unions or which encouraged 'acceptable' unions (Interview 6- 12-89).
For example, there was a policy of direct communication by managers with workers
which reduced the role of the union as the link between workers and managers.
However, this did not impede negotiation and consultation. Another change had
occurred with managers encouraging the growth of a single favoured union, although
this had been a 'guiding hand' rather than a requirement (IMerriew 6-12-9.
The senior personnel manager at Koburg found no problems with a multi-union plant,
saying that the unions were ureasonable and not involved in inter union arguments
(Interview 6-12-89a). An indication of this, despite MSF national policy of non
cooperation with the EETPU, was that the relations between respective senior
stewards were seen as very friendly and cooperative (Interview 6-12-89d). Even so,
it should be noted that a regular joint shop stewards committee had been disbanded,
with inter-union meetings taking place only on an ad hoc basis. In spite of this two
stewards were confident that a common approach was sought between unions prior
to negotiating with management (Interview 6-12-89d). There appeared to be a
tendency for the combine to meet only when the unions deemed issues serious enough
to warrant a joint meeting (Interview 6-12-89d). In this way, these developments
seem to re-affirm management's preferred policy of quiescent forms of unionism.
Koorki
In Koorki, a single union agreement had been reached with the General, Municipal
312
and Boilermakers Union (GMB). Even so, the union comprised separate sections, for
staff and shopfloor, with two separate bargaining units. The significance of the
agreement was that there was no difference, as far as representation was concerned,
between craft and non-craft members on the shopfloor (Interview 13-11-89).
Union membership at the plant was 95 percent of eligible workers, with almost 100
percent on the shopfloor. Membership coverage included chargehands and group
leaders up to, but excluding, supervisors, although at least one supervisor was a
member of the staff side of the union. The main teason ,ien lot th hSX 'union
density in Koorki was that in the past there had been a closed shop agreemeM and,
although a closed shop ballot under the provisions of the Employment Act, 1980 had
not taken place, high union membership was strongly encouraged among workers by
management and union within three months of joining the plant (Interview 13-11-89
and 22-2-90c). The union had been provided with time to recruit new members during
the induction training course (Interview 22-2-90). The size of the plant and the high
density of membership made this plant the biggest branch in the region for the 0MB.
In the past, stewards did not have fixed areas which they represented. This meant that
there was a tendency for some managers to choose stewards who would most likely
not argue with them when a dispute arose. The new convenor 2 stopped this and,
contrary to what people thought possible, achieved demarcations so that each steward
2 Although referred to as a convener he was not officially recognised as such by
management, which wished to play down the role of the union as a traditional
instrument of collective employee resistance. Recognising a person with the title of
'convenor' would tend to reinforce an identity of this 'traditional' role.
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acquired a specific area of the plant to cover, as is common practice elsewhere. The
stewards covered about 150 workers and around six supervisors. The new fixed
boundaries allowed the stewards to get to know their members and supervisors
(Interview 22-2-90c).
A further demonstration of convener effectiveness came from his efforts in recruiting
women to become stewards. Originally, there had been no women stewards but at the
time of this study three out of eight union representatives were women, one being an
equality officer. When elections were to be held the convener asked for women to put
their names down on a list on the union notice board. The woman senior steward
interviewed, who was one of the first women stewards, wanted to see more women
stand for election (Interview 16-8-90e). However, she thought that having women
stewards did not effect the issues discussed at the shop stewards' meetings. In terms
of overall control it appeared that the convener, with a highly charismatic character,
was quite paternalistic towards his members and his stewards (Interviews 22-2-90c
and 16-8-90e).
The stewards tended to be young and to lack the experience of stewards in other
companies examined in the study. The convener said that "it is frightening"
(Interview 22-2-90c), meaning that he himself seemed to be the only one with outside
experience to show what the potential power of a well organised and run union shop
could be. However, as some compensation, the Personnel Department supported the
attendance of elected stewards on two day courses, and then one week courses, for
union training. They were also taken round their section by the convener and
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introduced to supervisors and members who could be unfamiliar to them because they
worked on different lines and areas of the factory (Interview 22-2-90c).
Every month a shop stewards' meeting was held, and when necessary a mass meeting
of members. Management gave time off for these members and there did not seem
to be problems for line workers in getting time off for such union duties. The
convener worked on a job which was not tied to the line but which was regarded as
the worst job in the factory, in both the convenor's opinion and the researchers, and
could be construed as victimisation on the part of production management (Interview
22-2-90c). The senior steward had been moved from a line ob to one which allowed
her to leave the job more easily, but this job was considered as boring as the one she
held previously (Interview 16-8-90e). Although there was a young manager
responsible for industrial relations, the convener tended to deal direct with the
Personnel Director. In terms of facilities, there was no union office and instead the
convener had been given a couple of benches in the 'test room'. This was neither
private or quiet (Field Notes 15/16-8-90). Further, as there was no cover for absence
from the job the convener had to seek special permission to leave his job for extended
periods (Interview 22-2-90c).
Management and union met once a month, although there was also weekly direct
contact by management to workers at a regular mass meeting held in the canteen on
Friday afternoons (Field notes 22-2-90), as well as daily briefings undertaken by
supervisors (Interview 22-2-90t). A joint agreement between the union and
management provided for complete worker flexibility, although some workers were
315
unaware of its existence. Beyond this there seemed to be few agreements. For
example, there was no agreement over the introduction of new technology, although
such an agreement did exist with the Orki union in Japan (Interview 17-3-89).
Instead, there was consultation but within a framework of expansion of jobs, rather
than contraction.
Kohashi
Here there was about 75 percent membership in the plant, on the shopfloor, for the
EETPU, including both permanent and seasonal workers, or roughly 60 percent of
all employees and managers. However, among permanent empXoyees, iric'ruñng
managers and office staff, only about 40 percent were rnion rnem'oer. P\xx Ti
percent of the 400 temporary workers held membership. Overall, half were male
members, despite high interest shown among women during sessions when the
EETPU was given access to new recruits during induction training (Interview
27-11-89).
Behind these figures there were a few complications, such that in Kohashi, of the
total 75 percent of potential members, 65 percent were in the single recognised union,
the EETPU, and the remainder belonged to unions not recognised by management,
There exist a range of agreements and policies for agreements covering most aspects
of industrial relations from treatment of older workers to treatment of workers being
posted overseas. It is often difficult to find out what the actual agreements are
between company and union although the union federations publish policy guidelines.
These are generally applied in the large member unions. The newly formed Rengo
has a comprehensive guide to such policies, including for new technology
(1988; 160-2).
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such as the T&G and GMB. These non recognised unions were de-recognised when
Hashi took over sole ownership of the plant (Interview 27-11-89). These other unions
still maintained their own stewards but there was no recognition given to them by
management and considerable rivalry existed between them and the EETPU
(Interview 15-8-90d). Inter-union communication between unions did not exist and
poaching occurred as the Bridlington rules do not cover non-TUC affiliated unions.
In addition, some workers did not wish to belong to any union. Some evidence of
poaching away from the EETPU existed which could indicate some dissatisfaction
with that union (Interview 15-8-90d).
Paradoxically, when compared with Koorki, there had been a reduction in the
participation of women in the role of stewards at the plant. When the plant opened,
there were 12 women out of 14 stewards, but only four remained. The convener
could not account for this decline (Interview 15-8-901). Compared to the other cases,
however, the general number of stewards was high in relation to total membership
and this appeared to be a left-over from the pre-Hashi days though it may have
reflected a management backed strategy to head off the growth in membership of non-
recognised unions. However, there were areas of the plant where there was no
representation, such as parts of assembly (likely to be covered by stewards from other
unions) and sections of white collar staff. Nevertheless, the union organisation
covered supervisors, which presented a potential problem when it came to
determining loyalties, especially considering that the deputy convener worked on their
line. The convener was the boss of the steward supervisor in the union but the
steward supervisor was the boss of the convener in the company. This created a
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dilemma for members who could have to decide which boss to follow and so failed
to undertake the duties demanded by the other boss (Interview 15-8-90c). The
convenor's position within the union remained important, in that he would normally
be the person to go to management on issues in dispute. If the convenor wanted his
deputy to take a dispute to management it would be his boss, a supervisor who had
to do it (Interview 15-8-90f).
In total there were six kinds of meetings in which stewards were involved. First,
there were weekly stewards' committee meetings. From the stewards' committee
came the monthly health and safety committee meeting. Meetings with management
occurred on an ad hoc basis, and these were preceded by a special additional
stewards' meeting if needed. Finally, there was a monthly CMB (Company Members'
Board) meetings, with additional ones called when required. The convener and his
deputy, recognised by management as such, gained automatic election to the CMB.
Five senior managers sat on the board with more than that coming from the workers
side, though discourse did not contain anything so vulgar as 'sides'. All the workers'
representatives were stewards, though not all were from the EETPU. The stewards
were not recognised at the meeting as union representatives, but as company
members. The outcomes of the CMB discussions were subsequently regarded as
recommendations for union negotiation, or management decisions (Interview 15-8-90).
Communications procedures which avoided the unions and operated directly between
worker and management also existed. Once a month information was provided to
workers on rejects, output and other production related issues. Daily team briefings
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were given by supervisors, and the personnel office operated an open door approach
towards workers' personal problems (Interview 27-11-89).
The single union agreement contained a no strike clause and provision for pendulum
arbitration, though this form of 'Pendulum' arbitration4
 had not been used thus far.
According to the convenor, there was in reality, a further limitation on the scope of
union activities in the functioning of the CMB, in that the union tended to be faced
with a take it or leave it recommendation on issues it would otherwise negotiate as
a functioning union (interview 15-8-90f3. Howevec, Qther evklece gge& thai the
issues which were negotiated or consulted between management and union at Kohashi
were no different than those at any other company in similar light industrial product
sectors, with which the EETPU had recognition rights (Interview 16-10-90). This is
significant in that publicly the union presented its relationship with Kohashi as
special, with the Japanese company depicted as managed fairly, unlike indigenously
owned firms (Interview 16-10-90). This suggests that what Bassett (1986; 134) called
"a radical labour relations agreement" has not delivered anything particularly radical,
or different, in practice.
Pendulum arbitration is an agreement whereby on failure to agree the union and
management refer settlement of the dispute to a mutually agreed person or body,
often ACAS. The third party then must make a decision which goes in favour of
either management's or union's original claims with no compromise in-between. The
object is to encourage both sides to start with claims which are 'reasonable' in the
first place.
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K!1iu da
The Amalgamated Engineering Union (AEU) gained a single union agreement when
the plant opened on a greenfield site. Membership numbered around 65 to 70 percent
of those eligible to join, and was represented by five stewards in one (main) plant,
and four in another plant on the same site (for tube manufacture), with one overall
convener. Of the four stewards at the second plant there were three men, with one
woman covering all clerical workers. In the main plant there were two male stewards
for the four different shifts of automatic insertion, another for the warehouse and two
female stewards for the production lines, including the deputy convener. Thus, the
women's jobs were greatly under represented in comparison to men. The union had
access to starters to encourage them to join the union, as with the other three cases.
A stewards' meeting was held each week, but because of different shifts not all
stewards could attend. Ad hoc mass meetings with members were held but there was
little other scope for union activity beyond negotiations with management. In fact, the
deputy convener seemed to know little about the union, its history in the plant and its
relation to the overall AEU (Interview 28-6-90d). In sum, the structure of the union
inside Kokuda appeared very weak, and, in the light of this, it was quite surprising
that membership was so high.
Nevertheless, although there had been no official disputes, some sections, such as the
predominantly male auto insertion section had been on strike (Interview 28-6-90e).
Moreover, unlike the other cases, the AEU in the plant managed to have the six
monthly assessments of workers done jointly by an engineer, the supervisor and the
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steward (Interview 28-6-90d). At the plant there was also a practice of defining a
number of negotiated issues as "failures to agree". But since a failure to agree usually
favours the more powerful, the union was at a disadvantage in relation to the more
powerful company. On the other hand, the union did have a set of principles which
meant that it would not agree to whatever management put up as its final offer.
Summary
Single union agreements were the norm in the Japanese cases though only Kohashi
had a no strike agreement. Union density varied depending on whether management
supported membership, such that Koorki was the only case which had almost total
membership on the shopfloor. Meetings and contacts between stewards were common
in all cases, although no plant had regular open meetings for workers to attend.
UNION - MANAGEMENT RELATiONS
This section explores the formal and informal relations between management and
union representatives. Attention is given to attitudes, power alliances and events
which historically shaped relations. It is important to note the role of the union
towards management, as well as the unions' need to work with management, at times.
Koburg
The pattern of relations between management and unions at the Koburg plant was a
complicated one. Most contact was between the Personnel Department and the
convener, or between stewards and the line supervisors, but there was also evidence
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that some managers, including British, were opposed to the union presence. For
unions, there was a necessary acceptance of the terrain of negotiation set by
management (Interview 6-12-89d).
Management's view of the unions was generally, either very positive, or distant,
depending on the position of the manager. The Personnel Manager claimed to have
open relations, regretting that with 40 percent membership the union was not truly
representative of workers (Interview 6-12-89). By the same token, the union could not
provide the benefits to management of disciplining members and of acting as a
channel for communication. For management's part good relations were seen in terms
of a lack of strikes over the previous 40 years. The production manager cou'ii no list
the names of the unions, nor the up-to-date membership rates, suggesting that unions
did not cause problems to production in ways other than strikes. He stated that the
only direct contact he had with the unions was over discipline arid, even 'nero, t wa
infrequent because most discipline cases were dealt with lower down the management
hierarchy (Interview 6-12-89). Lower level managers had become practised in dealing
with discipline so that redress to more senior management occurred infrequently.
The Personnel Director saw the move in the plant towards 'harmonisation', ahead of
other employers, as the main reason for the lack of conflict. Open communications
was also seen as important. When a plant was to be closed, management claimed to
provide open information to show that there was no alternative action. However, the
Personnel Director was still surprised at the passiveness of the main union, which
took no industrial action and restricted negotiations to terms of redundancy, after a
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vain attempt at arguing against closure. This was despite much of the work being
moved to the Koburg plant and a history of at least two strikes over the previous 10
years at the plant which had been closed (Interview 24-10-89).
The union stewards saw relations as cooperative but in some senses problematical.
The EETPU steward complained that the company refused to appoint an industrial
relations officer with whom she could deal on a daily basis (Interview 6-12-89d). This
indicates either that management did not think it worth paying a manager to deal with
so few issues, or that it had a policy to contain the union's sense of self importance.
Another problem was seen in management deciding issues without adequate
consultation. For example, a holiday system was changed substantially against union
petition that it was undesirable and unworkable (Interview 6-12-89d). The following
year management reverted to the old system, indicating a lack of consultation and
poor decision-making.
There was some ambiguity expressed about the trend of management's relation with
the unions, such that one worker said it was getting better and "managers listen to the
union more now" (Interview 17-7-90), than previously. But on the other hand, one
steward thought that many of the younger managers entering the company were more
'macho'. She put it in the following words (Interview 6-12-89d):-
Now some of the managers coming in with restructuring at quite high
levels they would like to get rid of the unions. Different from the older
type of manager here.
On the other hand the Personnel Manager saw unions becoming more reasonable, not
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just in terms of the decline in union strength from the 1970s but in relation to
inter-union rivalry (Interview 6-12-89a). This had been solved in part, at least,
through the removal of separate negotiating rights for technicians and shopfloor
workers.
The major development in union - management relations came with the introduction
of direct balloting of workers on issues which would normally be handled through the
union. The union representatives helped in this process according to management, but
it meant marginalising their own representative role. When the union objected to the
annualized hours schedule 5 management put it to a ballot of the complete factory
(Interview 6-12-89d). This procedure was adopted under the guise that it was an
important issue and because it was argued, the union was not wholly representative
having less than 50 percent density, so direct consultation was more appropriate.
Despite this action the most senior manager in the plant admitted that his open door
policy only extended to union representatives. As in most paternalistic regimes, his
direct contact with workers was limited to wandering around the factory floor
disturbing workers by asking them inane questions, or by being approached by a
worker, who 'collars' him without the supervisor spotting (Interview 7-12-89a).
Shop stewards' contact with managers was predominantly at the level of supervisor,
and concerned daily issues of victimisation, discipline and the steward asking for time
Annualized hours is a system of working where, over the year the hours worked
add up to an average of 39 hours, but are adjusted seasonally. For Koburg,
this was explained in Chapter Eight.
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away from their job to attend to union duties elsewhere. The EETPU representative
found it difficult to get permission to leave her job, especially when it was the busy
season. In one case, a steward who was consistently refused leave over a three week
period contacted the senior steward who asked the personnel manager to "sort it out".
The problem was especially acute when the job had to be covered by a float who was
herself busy (Interview 6-12-89d). The MSF representative found few problems in
leaving the job, as was common for white collar jobs. He would say "we are as much
a part of the organisation as anybody else" (Interview 6-12-89d); union work is
crucial to the well being of the company. However, the EETPU steward thought that
some of the younger managers would not care - wishing to rid the plant of unions.
Further, a fault finder thought the union wou(d disappear, as subae pressures
resulting from management's introduction of twice yearly assessments of individual
workers grew in significance (Interview 17-7-90d). These pay related assessments
worked both to make workers more selfish, and less collectively conscious, and to
allow management to reinforce the view that a 'model self motivated employee'
would 'succeed' in the firm. Finally, a technician thought that stewards who stuck up
for their members were being victimised through these assessments (Interview
17-7-90c). Thus, several workers were conscious that their union was under different
kinds of pressures to be 'cooperative' with management.
In the previous 24 years at Koburg there had been some disputes: one of 10 minutes
by technical workers was mentioned, and another, by shopfloor workers, reputedly
collapsed through lack of support, despite union leadership (Interview 6-12-89d). As
the next section shows, this left a bitter memory for many members. However,
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despite management claims that multi-unionism had no effect on relations, both they,
and the unions, agreed that it was a problem in the past (Interview 6-12-89d). The
technical workers had separate negotiating rights and so refused to help the line
workers in their strike. The inter-sectional rivalry was dissipated, partly because of
the abolition of separate negotiating rights but also because the technicians were
joining more than one union, so dissipating their power (Interview 17-7-90).
The prevailing situation was one of no overt conflict but of persistent differences of
interest. Against this there was a common conception that, with market competition
and pressure from the headquarters for cost control, local managers achieved changes
in working arrangements without difficulty, without many written agreements, and
provided no guarantees to workers, while refusing relations with third parties, such
as ACAS (Interviews of 6-12-89).
Koorki
Management union relations at Koorki had become quite complicated in that the union
came to be seen as a broker between management and workers, but in a context
where the union was seen as unable to initiate collective action, although there had
been some collective disputes in the past. Instead, the union turned its focus on to the
union convener who had been able to negotiate a range of agreements with
management, particularly with personnel management.
Managers made reference to a single wage dispute in 1982, when there was a 'token'
strike (Interview 21-2-90c). The strike involved the whole plant for a few hours, in
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order to demonstrate to management the extent of worker solidarity (Interview
13-11-89). However, since a shake up in the union extending over the previous three
years there had been other disputes, one involving an overtime ban in the lead up to
Christmas (Interview 22-2-90c). However, it is fair to say that relations were not
considered poor by either management or the union.
The Personnel Director (British) characterised relations with the union in the
following way (Interview 13-11-89):
I think the main reason for having a trade union was from a collective
bargaining point of view. The company was in a better position to
bargain with a representative than you trying to negotiate with different
groups of people, whether it be operators or engineers or managers,
or any level. My belief is that you have a more effective organisation
when you can discuss cooperatively with worker representatives. We
have a very good relationship with them. Certainly the trade union
movement as a whole has recognised that. Part of the Japanese culture
also recognises unions in their own environment, as you're aware.
Maybe on a different level than we in western Europe but
nevertheless, they work with us as opposed to working against us and
I believe that has made a major contribution and bearing in mind that
we've got a young workforce, the union representatives and the
national trade union being more progressive than they have been in the
past. I believe also that because they've been more progressive they
tend to be given more information by us about the financial situation
of the company. Instead of a conflict situation, its more of an open
discussion. And I think that has a big effect on a young workforce who
look up to someone who was a little older than themselves and (are)
more likely to take advice and their word for it than if we try to deal
with small groups of young people who have got their own mind
anyway. I am not trying to decry young people, either. I think its quite
noticeable that young employees (are) generally influenced by what
they see on the media, what they've learned perhaps from their parents
who worked for other industries. And we try to create a culture here
that we're all working together as a team of people and everybody's
contribution, whatever level they be, is valuable to us as a human
resource.
Like Bassett (1987) the Personnel Manager saw a changing style of union, a more
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'realistic' style of union leader. However, the manager also shows not only that it
was still beneficial to management to recognise a union but that recognition of a
'cooperative one' was itself no guarantee of 'harmony'. There was still the problem
of controlling young workers into the subservience of waged labour, which he implied
was achieved through patriarchy. He added that he thought that a single union helped
the situation. Other managers, including the Japanese, agreed that relations were
generally good (Interview 17-4-90).
As far as the union was concerned the picture was more complex. Prior to the arrival
of the present convener the union was seen as weak. One member even thought the
union was being paid off by management because the stewards were on top scale, top
paying jobs, such as charge-hands, which would still allow union membership
(Interview 16-8-90d). The existing convener was in fact on a lowest pay rate. From
the time he came to the job he had gradually extended negotiating and representation
rights for the union. For example, a "no talking rule" was introduced on the lines.
The convener went to the Personnel Director to complain that they should have
negotiated this matter with the union, and that it was no way to run a factory. His
argument was that the union did not know of the rule until members asked the
stewards about it. As they did not know, they looked stupid, and thus could not
function as the representative of members, as management wished. He argued that "I
want the same respect from the company I will give to them" (Interview 22-2-90c).
As a result, the rule was repealed. Two years previously a worker was dismissed for
union activities after the probation period had expired. Again the convener
complained. The outcome was that when anyone was not taken on after probation an
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(Interview 22-2-90c). With the exception of supervisors, production management was
far more antagonistic in relations with the union than personnel (Interview 22-2-90c).
In fact it would appear that the increased role of the union had provided personnel
with an opportunity to become established as a more powerful function within the
plant. Personnel had become involved in issues which had previously been the domain
of the production function, such as flexibility and issues of participation. Moreover,
both management and workers became conscious that union power was also
determined by environmental factors. One line worker explained how the media had
put unions in a bad light. Another, in the same section, said thaC sCrike airly led &i
redundancies as the company would lose competitiveness within the market (Interview
16-8-90c). However, even within this context, stewards were sometimes seen by
workers as lazy, or not helping to meet union demands, which were not life
threatening to the company. For example, the shift workers complained that the
vending machines were always empty at a weekend, and the union did nothing
(Interview 16-8-90c). Another worker, who had suffered an industrial injury,
complained that the union would not go against management's wish to sack the
woman if she had signs of the same injury when she returned from three months sick
leave (Interview 16-8-90c). There were also other complaints about union protection
in cases of industrial injury.
One woman summed up the relevance of the union in terms of "whatever is going to
happen will happen" (Interview 16-8-90b) and the union could not or would not do
anything about it. Yet a woman in another section explained that for young workers
entering in to the factory the union proved useful as a "buffer" (Interview 16-8-90b)
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against management excesses.
Kohashi
The union at Kohashi was relatively weak, and unable to act in any particularly
effective way. Unlike the previous case, the convener at Kohashi did not generate
support from among his membership. Part of the reason for this was due to the
insecurity of employment at the plant in the past (Interview 15-8-901).
Assessments, where the supervisor awarded money for different grades on the same
job had given rise to conflict. This was referred to ACAS but seemed still to be
against what the union would have wished. This example shows both a potential
weakness in the structure of relations between management and union and a low
strength of the union itself. There is also an indication that management had not found
it difficult to get rid of some of the more radical or active stewards. Given the fact
that there remained stewards for unions other than the EETP1J, the power of
management over who could be a union representative and remain an employee was
not absolute. It was also the case that, at times, supervisors sometimes did not allow
stewards to leave the line on union business, especially during the busy season
(Interview 15-8-901).
Thus union weakness is no surprise. A spate of redundancies had occurred at the time
of the takeover, and at the same time the single union agreement was being arranged.
It is also significant that the company had decided to build up an array of
management communication structures. Finally, although according to management
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and union at the plant there had been no strikes, or other industriataction, full time
officials indicated otherwise (Interview 16-10-90). To what extent these actions took
place regularly and whether they were sanctioned by the union or not was unclear.
Kokuda
The union (AEU) at Kokuda found it hard to operate, facing difficulty in obtaining
time-off for union duties. At the same time production management tended to see the
union as having a helpful role to play in resolving production problems and it was this
view which set the terrain for union activities in the plant.
The production mana,er said that he had a ood reAationship with the union and that
"I find the union representatives very good for helping us solve problems" (Interview
28-6-90e), implying highly cooperative relations. Nevertheless, management still
communicated directly with workers in the plant, allowing only an informal role in
communications for the union.
As mentioned earlier, the stewards sometimes found difficulty in leaving their
workplaces to undertake union duties. The deputy convener found that her supervisor
objected to her leaving at first. This situation had imposed a self control by which,
if say five other workers were absent, the deputy convener did not bother to ask to
leave her post (Interview 28-6-90d). In pursuing claims it was also difficult for the
union. The AEU campaigned nationally for a reduction in work hours but this goal
was not considered worth pursuing in Kokuda as management had informed the union
that they would not give in to such a request and the stewards seemed powerless to
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go against this edict (Interview 28-6-90c)
Among the recruits the average age was increasing as the labour market tightened
slightly. As a result, many of there recruits were knowledgeable about unions, unlike
in the past. The Deputy Convener, for example, was amazed to learn that at another
plant there were 15 minute washing up times agreed instead of a packet of hand wipes
being sent down the line as the bell rang for the end of the shift. She felt that such
union gains would never occur in Kokuda. The steward thought that management had
decided that the union in the plant was a special branch of the union, which would
not follow the national policies of the AEU. However, as the steward increased her
exposure to practices in other companies in the area, and as more companies moved
into the area which were operationally similar (light industrial) the greater the
pressure for parity with other firms would build up within Kokuda.
Conclusion
In Koburg and Koorki the relations between the unions and management appears to
be positive, in that each side recognised the importance of the other and the union
was allowed a 'legitimate' role in representing employee interests to management. In
the other two Japanese cases union weakness in power relations seems to have meant
that severe restrictions curbed the ability of the union to function. In the first two,
relations were not so good with production managers, but power came from support
by the Personnel Departments, sometimes together in conflict with the production
department. However, overall the unions appeared fairly docile, simply undertaking
policing roles and monitoring changes which affected members.
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UNION - WORKER RELATIONS
This section discusses the relation between the union and workers both as members
and non-members. The main issue is how much workers thought the union or unions
in the plant represented worker interests to management and how powerful they were
in this process. The section relies on evidence from two of the case studies, Koburg
and Koorki, to illustrate the differences, using information from both stewards and
members.
Koburg
As indicated above, there was a low level of membership at the Koburg plant. This
clearly created problems for the union in arguing representativeness. This particular
relation will be considered in some detail.
The MSF steward thought that the low rate of membership was due to the poor
performance of the company overall as evidenced in redundancies, and to the
difficulty of recruiting for white collar jobs (Interview 6-12-89). Both these arguments
show considerable naivety when compared to other situations. White collar
membership of unions is possible as Mallet (1975) shows with reference to
professional workers in France, and Hyman and Price (1983) explain, using the
changing historical class position of white collar workers in Britain. Moreover,
although union density at a national level declines in parallel with economic
performance, membership rates in individual companies may increase as fears of the
potential for redundancy grow. The EETPU steward thought that women were less
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'union minded' than men and that with the predominance of femaleemployment in
the factory the ratio of members was, therefore, low (Interview 6-12-89d).
Membership figures themselves are not the sole guide to the relation between union
and member! worker. It is possible to have pockets of high union density which have
great power in deciding how potential conflicts with management will end. The MSF
steward put it that "it [membership rate] is low but we still get the job done"
(Interview 6-12-89d). Nevertheless, some of the technicians thought that there had
been a loss of power recently in the section beca'vise thete 'a 'rio o'ci1
	 t'rc,tt
membership. Further, the problem with sectional differences in densiiy is that theie
were divisions created on the shopfloor so that technicians would not support others
in their strike endeavour (Interview 17-7-90c).
All the workers talked about a decline in the power of unions in the plant and some
even dismissed the union as useless altogether. One line worker said "the union is a
load of rubbish" (Interview 17-7-90a). Many of the shopfloor interviewees had once
been in the EETPU but had left after a strike, called by the union, collapsed. Those
who left felt cheated by the union, which had failed to gain sufficient support before
calling the strike to make it effective. Instead, a few women struck, no one else came
out, the union then called off the strike and did not protect the few strikers from
manager victimisation (Interview 17-7-90a). One woman said that the then steward
told her that she "was on her own" (Interview 17-7-90a). Some women did drift back
to the union, although with much lower expectations of what a union could provide
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members6 . Overall, many thought the union important only fcrprotection and
representation against unfair dismissal and accidents (Interview 17-7-90b).
Workers were aware of difficulties for union representatives to represent them fully,
but at the same time they conflated unions' need to work with management, to
'workingfor management'. Thus, this made the job of union stewards more difficult
and perhaps even pushed them to work closer with personnel management.
Koorki
Koorki had a high union density, as previously shown, quite unlike Koburg.
Therefore, the issues of union - worker re1aions were primarily those of union -
member relations.
The male convener was conscious that he acted like a father to mans of the members.,
who by age, could have been young enough to be his real children. He also thought
that he had to be more sensitive to the "unpredictable" feelings of the women, than
when he was at BSC (British Steel Corporation). However it appeared that women
members did not present different substantive issues than the men. For example, the
idea of a creche was suggested by a woman steward but it met with little enthusiasm
6 This experience provides a different explanation of the women's lack of 'union
mindedness' mentioned by the EETPU steward previously. Thus, although
there may be a gendered explanation for low union activity on the part of
women, this arose from the union's poor treatment of them. The question is,
had any of the men struck, would the union have supported them? If the
reason for calling off the strike was a lack of numbers, it still does not explain
why no men struck.
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from other women members (Interview 15-8-90f).
As in Koburg, there were mixed views about the union in the plant. The manual
insertion float thought the union was quite strong and that it fought for its members,
including herself (Interview 16-8-90b). Other interviewees were more disparaging,
one saying "what union" (Interview 16-8-90c) and another commented "I'm in the
union, Its a joke" (Interview 17-8-90). I gained a sense that line workers were more
positively disposed to the union though, without further evidence, interviews with
about one percent of the workforce are not enough to substantiate this claim. The rest
of the section will try to explain this divergent pattern between line and non-line
workers.
The auto insertion workers complained that there was not a steward for each shift.
The continental shift pattern had been forced on them against their will, and the union
had not helped their cause against management. Still further, they grumbled that the
union did not support their appeal to management for adequate food facilities for
those working on other than day shifts (Interview 16-8-90c). The maintenance
technicians were also unhappy over shift arrangements. As the interviewee explained,
they told their steward what they wanted but the steward took this to management and
returned with a signed agreement that they did not want. They complained to a higher
official in the union but to no avail (Interview 16-8-90c). The maintenance technician
also thought the union on site had behaved in an underhand way in that in the
negotiations for the year's pay increases a ballot was taken on whether to accept a 10
percent increase. When it was rejected a re-ballot was called when 13 people were
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off site, but they were refused a vote and the ballot accepted thepay offer from
management by a margin of seven votes (Interview 17-8-90). There was, however,
some difference of opinion, with one man saying that things had improved with the
new convener (Interview 16-8-90c) but other technicians said that union power was
declining. One technician said that "the GMB members have a lower IQ and tend to
vote for anything" (Interview 21-2-90b), he being in the APEX section of the union.
He went on to say (Interview 17-8-90):
I think they (management) have a special relationship with the union
that we don't know about.
This was a strong accusation which showed not only a mistrust of the union but that
this was a special plant, unlike others in which the 0MB had recogniton agreemert's.
The convener was more explicit (Interview 22-8-90c):
It was a known fact and a sad fact that the union was paid by the
company.
He went on to say that this was done by giving top pay scales to stewards and he
defended himself on the grounds of what he thought was his discriminatory low pay.
There are then clearly material grounds for being sceptical about the union, at least
historically. At the same time the comments of the female Senior Steward (Interview
16-8-90e) and observations around the plant (Field notes 13-11-89 and 16/7-8-90)
indicated that the male convener was respected by many and was working hard.
The same steward (Interview 16-8-90e) and the convener (Interview 22-2-90c) agreed
that most of the women had little or no experience of unions prior to coming to the
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plant, whereas many of the men did have, especially at the British Steel Corporation.
This suggests that the experience of unions led men to expect certain conditions and
power in the union which were not evident in a light industrial factory. Compared to
check-out work in a supermarket, or manual work in a school, however, the factory
may have seemed to many women to have a strong union. However, this is only a
partial explanation because the union did make some gains which were novel in the
area, such as sick pay schemes. At the same time one male worker said that he would
not mind if there was no union in the plant after a loss of two years work through
unsuccessful strikes at BSC, for which he seemed to blame the union and not the
corporation (Interview 21-2-90b).
Assessment
The unions were not generally popular among workers and members, especially
among those working shifts. The enthusiastic new convener in Koorki may have been
starting to change industrial relations in the plant but there was much scepticism for
him to overcome in the meantime.
There was a dual consciousness evident among many workers. Several workers with
working class roots, showed a belief in unions, collectivism and wished there was a
stronger union in their plant. These same people often criticised the union in the plant
but rather than becoming militant just appeared cynical, blaming a change in the
economy for their own powerlessness while remembering the past, when all was
different. Countering this was a group with the same working class consciousness but
a cynicism about all unions because they lost their job 'through' striking. Thus,
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consciousness only goes so far - often the unions are seen as- at fault, not
management, or their own collective will. Thus, the 'logic' of capitalism becomes
justified, often because opposition to it seems futile for the individual worker.
CONCLUSION
It is very difficult to draw a conclusion from this chapter that there was a new kind
of trade unionism which came either from the new economic environment under
Thatcherism or as a part of a process of Japanisation. It is also suspect to think that
multi-unionism necessarily causes problems for management, so the desire of
Japanese managers to have a single union agreement was perhaps an irrational
preoccupation. It is also wrong to think that a greenfield location is a panacea for the
creation of a unitarist industrial relations environment, although a non city location
may be an advantage (Interview 24-10-89). Finally, it is not possible to gauge union
strength simply in terms of union density, as encouragement to join a particular union
may be just as important to management as to the union concerned. The picture is far
more complex than these catch phrases suggest.
Garrahan and Stewart (1991) argue that union consciousness is largely formed prior
to entering Nissan, so that careful screening can greatly assist the company in shaping
the form of industrial relations which will grow within the car plant. There is some
evidence to support this viewpoint in these cases in that had the convener not been
so astute he could have been screened out along with how many in the past? The
selection of women, often straight from school, also supports their thesis. It may
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tentatively be possible to say that the selection of people who had—worked in the
Naval dockyard near Koburg and recruitment of ex-BSC workers, who were
disillusioned with unions after failed strikes, was a policy which reinforced a type of
consciousness which management wanted. However, with shortages of relevantly
skilled labour, it is also possible to argue that, with few alternative sources for
'appropriate' labour, management had increasingly less choice in selection. Thus the
processes highlighted by Garrahan and Stewart (1991) cannot explain how the union
had such patchy successes, especially in Koorki, or how relations within the plant can
change, often quite dramatically.
The unions were independent of management but at the same time the stewards see
themselves as in a non-conflictual relation with management, especially with the
personnel departments. The basic rationale of management prerogative was accepted
and the union role was in trying to have that prerogative applied fairly and to ensure
that any rewards from competitive success in capitalist terms were shared with labour
in some way. The problem is that once the capitalist imperative is accepted the
union's hands become tied and that may have led to much of their lack of popularity.
Workers, as the previous chapter showed, tend to find work mundane and intrinsically
unrewarding. They react by taking time off and leaving the job or settle into a form
of psychological escapism. When the union is not a focus of resistance the workers
can undertake industrial action of their own but, if the cause is of general concern and
large enough, this puts individuals at risk of being picked out and victimised by
management, or union. If this is used as a measure of industrial relations, it can be
341
seen that Koorki was more conflictual. This would not be a godTheasurement if
management in Koburg was more apt to give the union what it wanted than at Koorki,
so avoiding conflict by capitulation. However, if anything, the union in Koorki had
been more successful in gaining benefits for workers than Koburg, while the physical
conditions of work were little different between the plants.
On the surface, it is possible to conclude that these companies did have industrial
relations which emulate what is shown in the media as a 'new realism' by trade
unions, especially in Koburg. However, tkis o\3scure
electronics has always been relatively strike free. Further, it ignores the complexity
of relations between unions, workers and managers, which are based on both
cooperating and conflicting interests within a capitalist mode of production.
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CHAPTER TWELVE
CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION
This conclusion to the thesis draws out issues raised through the preceding chapters
in an attempt to redirect current debate on Japanisation and flexibility in ways which
incorporate the salient points derived from this study. Thus this chapter reflects
arguments made through out the thesis for the continuity of the fundamental relations
within the labour process, reflecting a set of literature which pre-dates the more lately
fashionable notions of 'new realism', Japanisation, flexible firms and Post Fordism.
Moreover, it provides insights into the gendered relations of work and the labour
market, which reaffirm earlier case studies of womens' experiences of the labour
process.
The chapter is divided into five sections. The first, deals with the 'Main Arguments'
drawn from the thesis. The second, 'A Re-examination of theory', articulates an
alternative theoretical framework to understand the findings of this thesis from those
presented in Chapter Two. This alternative approach takes account of the
multinational nature of the corporations to which these case plants formed a part.
Third, wider debates, of which this thesis can contribute in a limited way, are briefly
explored. Fourth, under 'Concluding Remarks', a general conclusion to the thesis is
offered. Finally, a set of 'Implications for Research' is provided, in a desire to
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influence future research in the field, both in terms of methodologies used and the
types of research cases explored.
MAIN ARGUMENTS
There are three conclusions to be drawn from the findings. First, work and
employment practices may be characterised as traditional rather than pertaining to any
new agenda. Second, there is diversity of employment strategies and practices within
industrial sectors. Third, the frontier of contested control within the consumer
electronics industry at present favours the power of management.
In an industrial sector dominated by Japanese capital, and which represents an
important international trading area of Japanese capital, it would be reasonable to
expect that the 'Japanisation' of work relations would be highly developed. Although
there is evidence of some practices which are not commonly discussed in the
literature until the past fifteen years, the organisation of employment relations in the
Japanese cases may best be described as that of straightforward, even Fordist, type
of mass production assembly line working. The 'new' practices were those of a high
degree of management of detail through endless meetings and continual quality
monitoring. Against this, there was a managerial preoccupation with maintaining line
speed and minimising both change itself, and the effects of any change which could
not be avoided. The result for labour was an intensification of the same kind of
experience as under 'slacker' managed environments, yet whether it was considered
any worse a situation by workers was inconclusive.
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Elger (1990) argues against a holistic analysis of changing employment relations in
the UK by pointing out that there is variation between industrial sectors both in
degree and form of change. This study allows this idea to be developed so that,
although there are characteristics which show commonality within any given sector,
there are differences within a sector between enterprises. In many respects, these
differences within sectors are as important as the differences between sectors. The
reasons for such internal variation relate both to differing environmental
circumstances requiring specific strategic responses, and differing strategic decisions
to exploit and develop the shared sectoral environment in different ways. An example
of the former, is the differing locations which JJashi was faced with compared to the
other two Japanese companies because of British government policy to protect jobs
in existing British owned factories. An example of the latter was Kuda's emphasis on
technical innovation, whilst Hashi approached the consumer electronics market as a
lower price competitor. As a result corporate strategies towards the market are
distinct between the cases, as was described in Chapter Three.
The thesis, therefore, addresses the complex and contradictory nature of relations
between capital and labour in these circumstances. The impact of new practices on
labour control had led to some intensification of labour, but because the fundamental
nature of production, as dictated by the market, had not changed, the nature of the
relationship between capital and labour had not changed either in any substantial or
meaningful way.
Trade unionism in consumer electronics has always been weak on the whole. This
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thesis has explained why this is so and why it is difficult to see any-ehange in union
power in the future (cf. Fairbrother; 1991). Management in these plants encouraged
large single unions, and dominant unions in the cases of Koburg and Hashi, to
represent the mass of workers, at the expense of skilled sections of the labour force.
Union members on the other hand, although desiring more 'responsible'
(Bassett; 1986) trade unionism, changed little in terms of their own direct action. The
frontier of control on the mass production line, with absenteeism, labour turnover and
alienated attitudes, did not coincide with managerial interests. It was as if workers
demanded of their unions that which they refused to do themselves.
A RE-EXAMINATION OF THEORY
Within the thesis, models of the new style labour process evoked by Post Fordism,
flexible firms and Japanisation have been critically analyzed. In this section these
theories are re-evaluated in the light of the case study evidence, and alternative
theoretical positions examined. The argument is that Japanisation and flexible notions
of Post Fordism mislead because they shift attention away from the multinational
nature of Japanese capital. This argument will be developed through two sub-sections,
dealing with Japanisation and flexibility.
Japanisation
Oliver and Wilkinson (1992; 15-7) list five types of objections to 'Japanisation', which
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they dismiss through restating their typology', rather than addressingthese criticisms
directly. These objections range from over homogenising Japanese management and
changes in the UK, through to either no change in the UK or change occurring in
directions other than towards the Japanese capitalist system. Objections to
'Japanisation' within this thesis incorporate aspects of these criticisms, such that
Japanese capitalism is over homogenised, Japanisation is obscuring the realities of
consent and control within labour processes, and more generally, the nature of
capitalism is contradictory and complex, leading to differentiated strategies by
managers depending on circumstances, such as time, location, markets for products
and labour, and customs and practices grown up through historical struggle. Specific
components or dependencies within Japanisation typologies will be examined next, to
identify whether they actually exist, and if so, are they new.
Under whatever definition used, just-in-time practices did not exist within any of the
plants. Using definitions common among Japanese managers and academics, which
see JIT as achieving low stock holding and frequent supplies, mass produced
televisions do not need such tight materials control. If we use definitions of JIT
developed by these Japanese writers, such as Shingo (1989) and Taguchi et al (1990),
that JIT is small batch production, this not only did not exist, but in the case studies,
managerial strategies were trying to ever increase batch sizes. Burg was the only one
This typology explains how Japanese managerial competency is based on the integration
of production and worker controls. The central features of this amalgamation are that
workers gain from security in employment and that despotic forms of management,
as typified by the case studies, are impossible because tight integration forces
management to become dependent on labour.
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with small production runs compared to the other cases, so that under-such definitions
of JIT, a European multinational was more 'Japanised' than the Japanese, which is
not supposed to be possible under Japanisation typologies.
The supposed Japanese intemalisation of employment relations, marginalising trade
unions through direct participation within plants at home and in Europe, seem on the
surface to be true. The Japanese had single unions, few industrial disputes, and there
was much show of participation and communication schemes, whereas Burg was a
multi-union plant. However this obscures much more complex relations of conflict
and cooperation on the one hand, while on the other, it has to be remembered that the
historical nature of the industry is not one of active collective labour. Thus, the single
union deals and supervisory 'team' briefings did not change worker consciousness but
reinforced managerial prerogatives, especially for Japanese expatriates, who, in
general, were educated to think of Western capitalism as inferior, and UK labour as
some what anarchistic. Where real attacks were made on union representation, as in
Koorki, shopfloor union leadership was able to redress the 'infringements' on union
power within their modest limits.
These findings are in line with Abo's (1990;97-120) research on the Japanese
consumer electronics industry in the US, from which he concludes that (IYYQ; I [7
The consumer electronics industry, as a whole, does not make
strenuous attempts to introduce Japanese-style methods relating to work
organisation and operations, production control, or systems and
devices to enhance a group atmosphere.
Abo concluded that Japanese managerial techniques were not used because they were
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not needed in order for the branch plants to achieve production and efficiency targets
set by the Japanese. This would indicate that there is nothing particularly unique or
superior about Japanese manufacturing techniques or Personnel practices. One can go
further, and say that the whole preoccupation with the mystique of Japanese
management misdirects research away from the realities of the labour process in
Japan and within Japanese multinationals.
Abo's research looked at three forms of ownership, of which the first were by-ovts
of existing US plants, similar to Hashi in Britain. About these buy-outs, he states
(1990119):
The fundamental competitive edge of both companies rests heavily on
being able to apply the "results" of the workplace-orientated operations
in Japan, namely product design, process technology and components.
Another two companies tried to introduce more involvement practices, whilst the final
type tried to introduce both 'adaptive' and 'adoptive.' p ctcce.s - getting cSS sppu
and engineers to adopt Japanese practices. However, one could add that this last type
may merely reveal the limitations of the research methodology used2.
When it comes to evaluating the use of Japanese managers Abo (1990;116-7)
concludes that:
Our studies did not reveal a clear correlation between the ratio of
Japanese expatriates and the extent of application and/or adaption.
2 For example there was no research conducted within the supplier companies.
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and:
In general, Japanese expatriates are in charge of technology and
financial divisions and Americans are in charge of production and
human relations. There are, however, many cases where Japanese
expatriates assist, or act as advisers for direct American superiors (the
"sandwich" structure).
This discussion by Abo (1990) is almost unique in its denial of transfer of substantive
Japanese practices to the West. Moreover, one can go further and say that Japan is
still being mystified by over-simple or clear-cut models. The simple connections and
foci of Post Fordists and many in the Cardiff Business School, with their competing
explanations, over simplify complex issues. klthough they correctly deny cultural
explanations for Japanese business prowess, in order to achieve this they select a
collection of features from existing literature and construct a new theory, backed by
some highly suspect surveys and biased (managerialist) literature.
An example of how too much can be assumed to be Japanese can be seen by looking
at plant locations and the resourcing of new factories. The situation within Japan is
one where new plants are built and workers are moved into them from other plants,
or increasingly, old plants change round production to accommodate new products
while only a few workers move between plants. The reshuffle depends on the
product, but normally involves seconding workers familiar with the relevant
technology and product production methods. Often these seconded workers stay at the
new plant permanently, forming a core of supervisors, technicians! engineers and
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managers3.
In outline, this is not dissimilar to how other countries' large corporations and
multinationals work, and how the Japanese operate overseas (though with a more
limited group because of language barriers). But what is new is the feeling that the
plants opened, or bought-out, by Japanese in Europe and the US are permanent
overheads for the Japanese corporations; they will not be closed in the short or
medium term (eg. Williamson 1989;6). This is related to the reasons for the initial
investment, especially access to protected markets and the fear of trade. 	 'j
contrast, in cases where mere cost minimisation is the incentive for investment, plants
have been closed in Far East Asia (Interview 28-04-90a). Further, in the case of
Toshiba - Rank, rationalisation was undertaken resulting in plant closures and a
relocation to a greenfield site in Plymouth, just as Toshiba took complete control
(Trevor;1988)4 . Thus, any given worker in any given branch plant of a Japanese
multinational is not in guaranteed employment. This will become more likely as
Britain slips into a cheap labour sector of the European economy, in what amounts
to the only "free trade zone" of the European Community. Moreover, relocations are
increasingly likely in the long term, as more branch plants are established in the
European Community, providing a growing opportunity for the Japanese to undertake
These conclusions are based on observations at various plants in Japan 1987-90, and
from discussions held with senior managers in Matsushita Denki and Sanyo Denki,
Professors Abo Tetsuo and Totsuka Hideo of Todai Shaken, and Ishigaki Tatsuo of
Denkirouren.
"This is similar to the historical actions of management at Burg and Kohashi.
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production substitution strategies.
This thesis does not argue that Japanese capital operates in the same way as does
Western capital, just as it would be inappropriate to view a peculiarly Western form
of capitalism. There are differences between functions of capital in each country,
between each industry and within industries. Moreover, as the power of international
capital increases, changes within countries may become more pronounced, but in
forms which further complicate labour processes, rather than being merely attempts
to mimic dominant states, such as Japan.
Although Japanese capital, within certain industrial sectors, dominates world
capitalism, 'Japanisation' of employment relations should not be seen as anything
more than attempts by capital and revisionist academics to 'sell' a new managerial
utopia, in the same way as 'performance related pay' or 'management by objectives'
has been. The nature of capitalism is too complex and contradictory to contain one
universal set of managerial techniques. Moreover, labour's consciousness of their
subordinated position cannot be 'participated' away in a con-trick.
In summary, the Japanisation debate is obscuring the realities of changing patterns of
political economy and the labour process in particular. Therefore, 'Japanisation' as
a typology, theory or even philosophy of management is inappropriate to
understanding the consumer electronics sector.
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flexibility
Much of the debate around flexibility has been a concern to see whether employment
practices are changing in the UK in a way which mirrors those existing in Japan. The
nature of this flexibility itself is defined within each model. However, it is common
not just to explain flexibility in terms of changing the routine of work but that work
itself is somehow qualitatively different in terms of skill, or enrichment (Elger;
1990;68). Against this background a crucial issue within the case studies is to
consider how these companies dealt with seasonal demand for television sets. The
television assembly industry would appear to have high degrees of flexible working
practices as exemplified by Japanese employers. Indeed, Japanese capitalist
dominance of the consumer electronics market is frequently put down to their ability
to more flexibly respond to the market, whilst simultaneously minimising costs,
through flexible work practices (Dore et al;1989, Kenney and Florida; 1988;140).
The evidence from the case studies was that, although there. s coaidecaLile numcrca)
flexibility through the use of overtime, part-time and temporary labour, these were
part of long standing sets of arrangements to cope with seasonal variations in
consumer demand for televisions. Functional flexibility, analyzed by compañng the
range of tasks undertaken by workers under the same job titles in different companies,
existed to a very limited extent in the plants. Moreover, the Japanese plants were no
more functionally flexible than the European plant, such that, whereas Koorki had
auto insert machine minders, who monitored more machines, in Koburg, technicians
maintained a greater range of equipment than their counterparts in Koorki.
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Although Hyman and Pollert outline more reasonable explanations for-current changes
in the nature of jobs and employment than does Atkinson, the cases discussed in this
thesis may provide qualifications and elaborations to these positions. First, even
where industries have long standing peripheral labour pools, technological change can
impact upon these arrangements. Instead of Atkinson's move to increased flexibility
with new technology, there are reduced requirements in terms of labour replaced by
machines. Yet at the same time, skills become polarised so that women's jobs become
increasingly deskilled and thus open to numerical flexibility, whereas men's become
re-skilled and internalised because of the costs of training, though not necessarily to
the point of functional flexibility. Second, consumer market competition does not
encourage increased production flexibility, but quite the reverse - it increases price
competition, which in turn forces down unit costs, which can only be achieved
through reducing change. Reduction of change is achieved through increased control
of labour activity, such as going to the toilet, and increasing the sizes of batch
production. These are the antitheses of flexibility.
It is commonly seen that an important way in which the Japanese cope with such
differences when investing in the UK is to appoint local senior managers for their
Personnel functions. Another is to try to remove trade union influence over
demarcation by gaining agreements over flexibility and job grading definitions.
Finally, through careful selection and recruitment of people who are more glad to get
a job than to defend their apprenticed skills. In fact, due to the historical bases of
skill definitions and the consciousness of those recruited, job demarcation is
maintained on the shopfloor by individuals to the same extent at Koorki, as at
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Koburg. Moreover, whereas screening recruits to a greenfield site-helps control
labour entering the plant, customs and practices quickly become established to create
the terms on which conflict occurs.
Conclusion
Research which has focused on the multinational nature of the Japanese electronics
industry has tended to focus on different issues and come to different conclusions
about the general nature of the industry and Japanese capitalism within it than those
who have gone down the parallel roads of Post Fordism and 'Japanisation'. The
question is, which is the more fruitful theoretical focus?
This thesis tends to concur with the multinational capital arguments, though not
uncritically. For example, the impact of the location of plants within the world has
a potentially larger impact on labour in the UK than functional flexibility within the
plants. The degree to which multinational capital is flexible to locate and withdraw
investments in the UK as elsewhere depends wholly on those circumstances which
drove the capital to become multinational in the first place. Thus, if television sales
markets in Europe, coupled with UK government incentives and low labour costs
encouraged Japanese inward investment, it is those issues which are more important
to Koorki than replicating industrial relations practices from 'home'.
One argument remains against this position, that of competitive advantage. The
Japanisation and Post Fordist schools have tended to research in such a way as to see
how Japanese competitive advantage is maintained in overseas operations. The
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implication is that the initial competitive advantage comes purely from the location
specific advantages of the Japanese socio-economic system. By being obsessed with
explaining, as a point of contrast with the UK and the US, the lack of Japanese labour
militancy they have missed the importance of the power structures which underpin
Japanese capitalist hegemony. This economic power stems not from the creation of
markets, but through financing arrangements and inter-firm collaboration, which can
extinguish competition, in limited industrial sectors, Koburg being a case in point.
Hegemony spreads, within these limited industrial sectors through a process of
extending Japanese indigenous market competition globally. First by iestioying
firms then, as the market becomes dominated by only Japanese firms, they compete
against each other. This picture is perhaps oversimplified, as in the process of
destroying the local firms individual Japanese multinationals can try to extend market
share over competitors. An example of this is that of Kohashi; being late into the
market, a joint venture with a local firm for a few years let Kohashi gain a foothold
on the UK market. Once the foothold was established the joint venture could be
destroyed, leaving the Japanese with the whole plant.
ISSUES OF WIDER DEBATE
From the research in this thesis there is some evidence which may contribute to
important wider current debates within the academic community. The issue of gender
has formed a part of the discussion within previous chapters but, as was indicated in
Chapter One, there is not sufficient focus to expand understanding of gendered
employment and work relations at anything more than a rudimentary level. This will
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be done in the first sub-section, leaving the second to look at current-discussions as
to whether the role of management, and more specifically Personnel Management, is
changing.
Gendered Labour Process
Within the labour process of each case plant women were disadvantaged relative to
their male counterparts on the shopfloor at a material level. Jobs were designed in
such a way as to take advantage of women's place within the labour market, so that
manual assembly was women's work and woricing with macliine wash r,elj tnen's
work. Male jobs accrued overtime and shift premium opportunities, within a context
of stable employment patterns. Women, though gaining overtime, also had significant
numbers of casual and part time jobs. The numbers of non-regular women employees
depended on managerial requirements, indicating a degree of substitutability and
casualised employment patterns for all women in the plants. Contingent upon this
differentiation were the definitions of what constituted skill: women's dexterity was
treated as a feminine 'natural trait', whereas male machine minding was a 'learned
skill'.
Moreover, the experience of the labour process was also gendered, so that these
working class women in the plants talked in ways similar to those in studies of 10
years previous; Pollert (1981) and Beechey (1982). Women recognised their alienated
position within capitalism, just as male interviewees, but in addition they were
conscious of, and even agreed to, their subordinated position in relation to men within
the workplace. This subordination was expressed through a belief that their major
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contribution to life was within the home.
Within this context, issues of gender within the plants were not seen as contentious,
were not even seen as problematical, by those employed. However, this terrain of
consent does not mean that women were any less union minded or ready to engage
in collective struggle than men within the cases. Instead, the general lack of collective
struggle within the plants may be attributed to high labour turnover, historical
experiences of insecurity in the company or previous jobs, and a general perception
that these were comparatively decent jobs, given the local labour market conditions.
Finally, it is worth noting that the gendering of work is independent of the nature of
ownership, Japanese or European: companies from each area were just as exploitative
as each other,
Management as 'strategic'
Although this thesis was not written with the specific intention of addressing the
debates formed around Human Resource Management, and whether Personnel
Managers are becoming more strategically focused within organisations, as discussed
by people such as Storey (1992) and Sissons (1989), a small contribution can be
made. The issue of debate is two fold: first whether there are transformations or
continuity in personnel management of employees, and second, whether any such
changes are enriching and involving employees or extending the parameters of
exploitation. Storey (1992 ;263-4) writes:
Among a number of problems in trying to unravel this debate was the lack of
methodological comparability. The 'change thesis' largely rested on a few
clearly exceptional 'non-standard' cases such as Nissan and Toshiba. The
'continuity thesis', conversely, rested on large-scale questionnaire surveys.
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These 'non standard' cases are both Japanese subsidiaries, whereas the surveys
involve UK owned firms. However, Storey, through looking at a number of case
studies within the auto industry indicates large-scale change, though not
unproblematically.
The cases in this thesis indicate changing personnel practices, such as the A and B
grades in Koburg and the six monthly assessments in Koorki. These 'innovations' in
management run in such close parallel between companies and mirror the interests of
'professional' journals that one might almost be forgiven for thinking that
managerialist literature does impact upon managers' thoughts and actions. However,
although these changes may incrementally build one on another to result in significant
change, there was no transformation in relations or role of different functions of
management. In fact, major change would likely be considered undesirable by
managers, as well as union representatives, yet it might provide avenues for
radicalism among workers.
Instead of the more focused arguments for change in management actions towards a
strategic role in managing workers, this thesis has indicated a more contradictory
picture. For example, the way Personnel Managers in Koorki 'sponsored' the union
indicated internal politics within management. By promoting formalised relations with
the union, Personnel hoped to increase its sphere of influence on the shopfioor at the
expense of the 'Production' function. In this way, management itself should not be
seen as holistic or internally cohesive. This is especially true when the organisation
employs expatriates, who often have conflicting interests between functioning in the
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present job and personal careers to be developed elsewhere in the- organisation.
These arguments are wider than just a critique on Japanisation, they reinforce the
fundamental problems of managing the labour process. Thus, not only are the
Japanese little better at gaining control of the labour process than their UK counter-
parts, they too are caught-up in faddism of 'new' techniques and the realities of
internal politics.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The thesis is able to provide some concrete evidence, vQitr1in tie limits of case study
research, to challenge the existence of laige parts of s'pposed Japanese production
practices, especially 'just-in-time' as described by people such as Oliver (1991).
Moreover, the restricted occurrence of other 9ractices, such as flexibility and low
union consciousness is explained in terms of the importance of specific contexts.
At the level of contributing to theories of change in capitalist - labour relations, the
research has tended to deny both those who argue that nothing has changed much, and
those who present new paradigms5 . Elger (1990) argues a middle ground where
developments of change are occurring sporadically in different industries, with some
changing significantly and other almost not at all. This analysis may be extended by
arguing that within consumer electronics, at least, there are differences between
companies within one industry. Moreover, the country of origin of multinationals
5 For a useful critique of these perspectives, see Elger (1990).
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within the sector is not an adequate description of such differences. Within an
industry, there are characteristics which are uniform for all capitals, such as product
markets and fellow competitors. Moreover, because of the nature of the market and
available production technology, it is highly likely that skill requirements, technology,
and even production methods will be largely similar.
Differences tend to arise from how managers seek to gain their competitive edge over
others. This impacts on the continuity of employment, size and some features of the
types of workers employed. Another feature which differentiates complexities within
an industry, is the historical, social and environmental characteristics of both the local
labour market and the customs and practices within plants. Although it is clear that
working for Koorki is much the same as working for Kokuda, the above mentioned
differences do create both actual and potential differences in employment.
IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH
This thesis is different to the mainstream research findings on Japanese
multinationals, and its value should be in making researchers review their assumptions
and methodologies especially when looking at Japanese multinationals.
First, there needs to be a clearer conceptualisation of theories such as Japanisation
and flexibility. Without this shared understanding and thorough empirical grounding
of such theories confusion and reification will persist. Moreover, it is important to
change the focus of research on Japanese companies, and industrial sectors dominated
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by Japanese capital, away from discussions of 'Japanisation' towards-analysis of both
the context of organisation, and the choice of practices, which capital undertakes in
relation to the organisation of the labour process.
Second, research into Japanese inward investment would benefit by concentrating on
either (a) comparative research with Japan and other countries receiving Japanese
direct investment, or (b) the extension of research to other industrial sectors, using
methodologies which take account of differences within sectors.
Finally, the whole area of business and management orientated research wou'd benefit
from a more rigorous historical understanding of capitalist development with countries
being studied. Ronald Dore has been one of the few protagonists of Japanese business
success who gave historical explanations for his findings, especially in 'British
Factory - Japanese Factory' (1973), without relying on culturalist simplifications. The
historical circumstances through which labour markets formed, the movement from
heavy to a lighter industrial base, educational principles, and the changing pattern of
earnings within family structures, all help to explain the nature of modem Japanese
capitalism. Further, we may learn more about Japanese multinationals through reading
development studies literature on China, Taiwan, Korea, Singapore or Hong Kong,
than managerial literature on the intricacies of Japanese management, because the
former facilitates reflection on the political economy of Japanese capital. Management
literature on Japan pretends to be about process, but in fact is merely concerned with
the inputs and outputs of management in Japan. On the left, we must stop letting the
business school environment obscure the realities of brutal capitalism. We must stop
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allowing managerialist literature determine the terrajn of debate, and-even the form
of analysis.
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APPENDIX
STORY OF THE RESEARCH PROCESS
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STORY OF THE RESEARCH PROCESS
INTRODUCTION.
In reading for this Appendix, I did not find a strict methodology textbook, what
Burgess called "standard methodology texts" (1984; 101) very useful or revealing.
Instead, by comparing and reflecting on my own desires and actions, I will attempt
to show the strength and weaknesses of my research. This Appendix starts by taking
a brief journey through the issues which led me to undertake a Doctorate. Second,
I look at the method of research, the Case methodology. Third, I outline the way of
interviews were done and how I used them in the analysis of the cases. Finally, I
record some of the pains of the write-up.
This appendix will attempt to show that because I consider social studies research as
an art rather than a science 'validity' is based on trust and 'reasonableness' of
arguments. Within this I will try to justify the choice of case study methodology
through which the Doctorate research is seen as an interactive process between me,
interviewees and informants, the literature, and my supervisor.
HISTORICAL PATH TO ENLIGHTENMENT
It seems worthwhile explaining the way I ended up doing a Doctorate on this topic.
While much is missing, my aim has been to recover the salient points which explain
why I have come to ask the research questions which inform the thesis.
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Pre academk.
I have had a strong interest in social issues since childhood. I came from a traditional
middle class family, my mother staying at home and Father going out to work. My
father lived a conflict, being a manager in a nationalised industry! public sector.
Further, he had particular difficulty in reconciling "service to the public" with
financial constraints that became more pressing as time progressed. This question
shaped the subjects I studied at school, politics, social and economic history,
sociology, law, and economics.
I was not a 'natural learner', somebody who found academic disciplines easy to
comprehend. I enjoyed arguing with teachers and trying to understand what life was
like in the real world, where my father worked. This may also have been because I
felt it unfair that I saw little of him as he always seemed be working. I flunked
school, gaining entry to an HND at a polytechnic. Here I found arguing with the
teacher was meritable (well often, anyway) and I began to do well in subjects to do
with money and control, ie financial management and industrial relations. At this time
I felt all problems were solvable by knowledge itself. Thus, if you know what the
problem is, you can solve it; knowledge is enough in itself. I had yet to understand
power.
I was developing a somewhat pragmatic view of the world. I could do accounts. I
could understand my father. I could help my brother's business and I could progress
my own life. I stayed on to do professional qualifications and having decided to learn
as much as possible, went to night school at the same time. I was going to be a
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manager; there was nothing else for me. To do otherwise was stupid- i yet I enjoyed
learning and thought more knowledge would make me better at what ever I did.
However, when I hit the job scene I found work boring, tiring arid with not much
relation to my knowledge - but at least I could do the company accounts! I persisted
for a year and a half before applying to do an MA course which would 'train' me to
be at the sharp-end of personnel management. I applied to Warwick among other
places.
Academic life
Going to Warwick was intended to be an exercise in becoming an enlightened
manager. However, by the end of the first term, the debates and readings started to
provide a theoretical set of tools to understand previous experiences. This came as a
surprise and disorientated me. By the second term I had decided "to live a false
consciousness but retain a conscious mind". I would be a manager as that was the
side with power at present, yet would retain the knowledge about class and power
relations. The second term was spent learning an alternative path from this
unhappiness - to live a lie. Finally, I turned to trying to become an academic,
although I never considered myself as one, and still do not. I applied for a Doctorate
grant at several Universities and for a Japanese Government (Monbusho) Scholarship
to enable me go to Japan. In each case, I wanted more time to catch up the missed
undergraduate years. I applied for and gained a two year research scholarship to
Japan and a three year SERC (Science and Engineering Research Scholarship) award
for Doctorate research. The implications of these lucky breaks was to shape the
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Doctorate research and future career plans, the former of which isdiscussed below.
The 1eacy.
The result of this experience has been three fold. I have a lack of confidence that I
am what is deemed to be of the 'right stuff' for an academic career. This is
significant because it causes a reaction against some of the confines of academia - the
logical, compartmentalised arguments. If I am going to feel an equal with academic
peers, I must deny as relevant some of that which I lack. One of these areas is
arguments over methodology. When I read a piece of work - I look for a) does it look
as if (s)he had a personal 'truth' and then looked for results to fil it. Trñs does 'hOt
in itself invalidate the research but restricts what I can use it for. Thus, Beynon's
Working for Ford (1973) is limited to telling me the views the stewards had as to
what was going on in Ford at the time. And, 'o) does The aiment s see<
plausible and well thought out. So, in the case cf Beynon's Wor)thng 5oi krd
I believe it is a true reflection of what the stewards think is going on because I
believe it is honestly written. Implied in the above thought is that there is more than
one way at looking at a situation. This brings me to the third legacy - a moralistic
view. I have said that I believe in a single truth.
IMPLICATIONS
Because of these views I was almost bound to continue with industrial relations but
maintain a strong interest in the management of control. What was surprising is that
I concentrated on the private sector, never getting into or having much of an interest
368
in public sector work.
When I started the Doctorate, at Brunel University and Henley Management College,
I concentrated on the topic of supervisors in companies because they were considered
to have an ambiguous role as manager or worker. My choice of academic supervisor
- Sheila Rothwell - was influenced by this. I spent six months doing a very traditional
Doctorate programme - reading about methodology, supervisors and culture. Towards
the end of this six months I heard I had won the scholarship to go to Japan. But it
was only confirmed two weeks before the flight date.
After studying the Japanese language for six months in Osaka, I moved to
Hitotsubashi University in Tokyo to study wage systems with Ono Akin. This
research would look at the extent of seniority wages and differentials by company
size. I soon changed the focus of study to undertake more basic research on issues of
trade union history, collective struggle, labour markets and skill formation, through
reading materials not readily available in Britain, attending conferences and seminars,
meeting activists and officials in trade unions, Japan's peace movement, and
academics from different institutions. In addition, I travelled to different places in
Japan, cities, countryside, north and south, and met all kinds of people. The purpose
was to develop an understanding of diversity within the country, as well as enjoy
myself. During the two years I took opportunities to visit factories, which included
Mitsubishi Steel, the electronics factories of Mitsubishi, Sanyo, Orki, Hashi, soya
source producers and a Toshiba power generation plant.
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When in Japan, I did nothing for the Doctorate and almost stayed on for a further two
or more years. It was only when a previous lecturer came to Tokyo that he persuaded
me to return to the UK and complete the Doctorate. But he, Ian Gow, had moved
from Warwick to Stirling as a Professor. He was only one of three people at Warwick
who thought I had potential. Soon after that I was having dinner with a Professor
from Tokyo University. He asked why I was not going back to Warwick - the centre
for industrial relations. He advised me to go where the debate was most stimulating.
1 returned to the UK wondering where to go: Japanese studies at Stirling or the IROB
(Industrial Relations Organisational Behaviour) Department at Warwick. I went to see
my old tutor, Richard }Iyman, at Warwick. He assumed I would want to transfer
back to Warwick, as we had vaguely discussed when I left. But I wondered whether
I wanted to be a Japanologist, specialising in Industrial Relations or an Industrial
Relations academic specialising in Japan.
Then, it turned out that my first choice of supervisor in the Industrial Relations
Department would not supervise my thesis, which was all based around Japan.
However, I had decided that first and foremost I was in Industrial Relations. I was
then very lucky to find out about my present supervisor, based in the Sociology
Department. I made an appointment to see him. He was radical, interested in issues
around Japanisation and above all keen on case study methodology and in the
interview, he asked me a lot about the methodology of case study research. Finding
a supervisor took from April, when I returned from Japan, to July 1989. I only had
two years to do my Doctorate from scratch again.
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Now I was into the Doctorate, but, I was worried. I was taught that a Doctorate was
done in a certain way and I felt I was not doing it that way. Because I only had two
years grant left we (Peter Fairbrother and I) had decided to move into field work
quickly. At this time I relied on my Supervisor - he said do not worry, I worried, but
went along with his recommendation. I had not realised that I had accumulated a fair
bit of background knowledge already, from the MA, work experience and my time
in Japan. I also produced two theoretical essays during that summer.
The subject we decided on, early on, was to do with not Japan but foreign
multinationals and flexibility. Obviously some cases would be Japanese. Access would
be easier and I could weave in some of my knowledge on Japan but not become a
comparative or Japanology student. Flexibility came out as an issue from the first
essay. I planned to return to Japan after the Doctorate and do a comparative study
with the Doctorate study. However, I was still unsure what the product of the study
would be. Partly the experience of the European case and the fact that I failed to get
into a Taiwanese plant had pushed me by weight of case material (one European -
three Japanese) back to Japanisation, and partly because that is all that other people
ask me about. Then it appeared that I would use the tool of flexibility to discuss
Japanisation and other models of change, in particular questions relating to the labour
process.
When I started the research topic, I thought I was dealing with certain issues and
deliberately, by way of defining what I was doing, saying I was not doing others. I
was looking at work relationships. However, although I knew many (about 60
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percent) of the case plants were made up of women employees, I was not intending
to do feminist analysis. I did, however, look at feminist views of methodology with
regard to interviews (Oaldey; 1981) and methodologies used by authors of feminist
research (Cavendish, 1982, Pollert, 1981, Phillips and Taylor, 1980).
In conclusion, what I am saying is that the subject is basically the same but the
interpretation has changed subsequently. This is not just because of findings in the
cases. This after all is largely determined by the theoretical stance taken when I ask
certain questions as well as 'discover' unexpected 'evidence', but also through the
process of thinking about and talking with others about what I was doing. The worry
in this process, for me, was that as time went on and I discovered what I was doing
my ability to change my questions in the case plants became less. So in the end, I
might find that I was trying to do something which was no longer possible to do. It
was at these times that I returned to basic theoretical issues to reassure myself. I must
ask was I getting answers to the basic questions - where's the flexibility and where
is it not? What's the control relationship? So long as I could answer these, I thought
in the end we should be able to see what theories are driving these relations. I set out
with a theoretical framework but the 'evidence' should decide the application of
individual theories within that framework.
The central research question is what are the conditions and experience of factory
work in assembly type environments, and are these changing or different under the
influence of Japanese direct investment capital into Britain. This drew together the
strands of interest, experiences in Japan and allowed me to focus on an issue which
372
I felt was important. On returning to the UK from Japan, I found much of the
literature on what is assumed to be practices in Japan within the Japanisation debate
were inaccurate. By concentrating on comparisons within the UK my results could be
compared with other peoples research. Moreover, I worried that comparing between
the UK and Japan would take additional time and may appeal to jingoism. My
intention is to explore what I see as the truth about Japanese capitalist relations, and
this PhD research is the first stage.
CASE METHODOLOGY.
The research I most liked was by Burawoy (1979), which was based on his o'n
participant observation and also his experience with the Doctoral thesis of a
participant observer who worked in the same company ten years before. Such a
methodology appealed to me, but severe time constraints and potential problems in
gaining the high degree of access needed to undertake such detailed observation, made
this option difficult. Case study method more generally, using observations and
interviews, such as by Beynon (1973), Nichols and Beynon (1977), and Pollert
(1981), could reveal the rich depth of experience of labour and life so difficult to gain
from a questionnaire. I therefore sought to adopt such an approach for my own
research objectives.
Although I was fairly sure of the approach to the research I wished to use, a number
of alternatives need to be discussed. The section will then go on to look at the type
of industry and factories to be studied, how access was gained and then the methods
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of gaining information. A questionnaire was tried, but interviewing was the main
method used.
Alternative methods of research.
The approach to selecting a method or methods for research occurred as an
interaction between personal preference and the constraints imposed by the research
funding body, the Science and Engineering Research Council, and the organisational
gate-keepers, ie the Personnel executives of the companies. My own preference was
for a research style which would allow me to talk to people and gain an understanding
of their experience of work. I wanted as much time as possible talking to, observing
and questioning individuals and groups of people in the four plants. However, with
only two years of research money left and Research Council pressure on academic
institutions to attain results within four years, a prolonged period in the field was
impossible. This limitation was echoed by the gate-keepers, who wanted their
commitment to me to be contained within a set time frame. Trieir reasons 'were
articulated in terms of the time I would take out of the workers and managers
productive time in talking to me and the general disruption I would cause in terms of
my physical presence within the plants. I suppose the 'need' by some managers for
me to be accompanied by people at all times or shut in a room showed a desire to
contain my access so as to avoid industrial espionage, or to avoid me finding the
deeper realities of labouring and worker struggle.
These practical considerations reduced the range of options in research methods, such
that participant observation or observation methods would not be possible with the
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number of jobs I wanted to see and people to meet. Moreover, some areas of research
could not easily be covered, such as aspects of historical data and some documentary
information, from an observation based methodology.
Survey techniques based around some form of questionnaire were a practical
alternative to interviews. The advantages would have been that I could have increased
the 'validity' of my findings by increasing the sample size to cover all the television
plants in the UK. The process would have been quick, especially if I adopted a postal
or group method. There are also ways of reducing the bias of gate-keeper selectivity
by handing out questionnaires personally to respondents, or from motivated responses
by assuring high return rates. As discussed below, I did attempt a questionnaire
survey, when access to the shopfloor was being denied by some gate-keepers.
However, one form of questionnaire, completed in direct contact with the respondent,
like structured interviewing, contains all the disadvantages of needing access to a
large number of respondents in order to gain statistically sIgnIficant data, the time \rñs
takes and the formality of the interview process, without the benefits accruing to so
called Un- or semi- structured interviews, which include flexibility in issues explored
as well as the order things are discussed. The iiusration y l< Neb&t oz the front
cover of Roberts (1981) comically signifies the process. Questionnaire interviews with
women and labouring men appear especially inappropriate given the formality of the
situation which arises. However, as Oakley (1981;58) states:
A feminist methodology of social science requires that [a] rationale of
research be described and discussed not only in feminist research but
in social science research in general. It requires further that the
mythology of 'hygienic' research with its accompanying mystification
of the researcher and the researched as objective instruments of data
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production be replaced by the recognition that personal involvement is
more than dangerous bias - it is the condition under which people
come to know each other and admit others into their lives.
This process of involvement between researcher and researched is termed feminist
methodology by A Oakley (1981) but "Interviews as Conversations" by R Burgess
(1984). Characteristics of such involvement may be seen as the way the interviewee
becomes the interviewer at times as 'counter' questions flow and personalities are
relayed openly. This is more difficult in group interviews but the way interviewees
discuss with each other relays the same kind of openness (Burgess; 1984;117-9).
I went into interviews with a list of question areas in order to compensate for my
poor memory and to make sure certain areas were covered. The strategy was to list
the questions in topic areas, in a sequence which I thought would form a structured
progression to focus on more sensitive areas or introduce complex subjects gradually.
The 'must' areas were marked with a asterisk for my easy reference. I made few
notes, relying on tape recordings. In the interviews, I let the conversation flow around
subjects much more flexibly than a look at the topic sheets would signify. I would
mark areas covered, explain why I wanted to know something and try as far as
possible, given the time constraints imposed by the companies, to share the process
with the interviewees. However, I rarely reached the point of 'conversation', as
defined by Burgess (1984). With senior managers the interviewing process did
become highly formalised, in what may be termed a 'business-like' manner. If I tried
otherwise, it would not have met their expectations. Even in the less formal
surroundings of the dinner table this formality was replaced with an implied ban on
issues raised in the formal interviews.
376
Selecting the cases
I had decided the type of plants I wanted to study when still in Japan - television
assembly within the consumer electronics industry. The reasons were firstly, that the
technology was fairly standard so I could avoid the issue of comparability and,
secondly, I wanted to avoid the car making industry because of its over-researched
nature. Consumer electronics, Japanese style, was often researched by non-radicals
and so I wanted to contribute a radical perspective. Finally, I became interested in
this sector through friends in the labour movement in Japan and they thought few
Westerners had done much in-depth study in this area. In this, I ird. R Dor's
over simplification of industrial relations in GEC (1974), where to prove the superior
labour management techniques in Hitachi, he had to 'rubbish' everything in GEC'.
In fact it was Dore who first encouraged me. I had met him in 1986 and he was
dismissive of such a study, retorting that there was nothing more to learn about
industrial relations within Japanese multinationals based in the UK. When I was in
Japan, his book was put on sale in Japanese for the first tine, and thinking that
Japanese may think this was representative of all European academics, this further
encouraged me.
Next, I had to choose the plants where I wished to study. I was advised to choose
four. I tried one European, one Taiwanese and two Japanese. The idea was to
compare between plants. My supervisor thought it important to have at least one
Much of his comments on GEC were correct, especially as GEC closed its plant soon
afterwards. However, he ignored much of the complexity of historical relations in the
UK and dismissed how the history almost repeated itself in Japan in the radical
movements of pre and post Second World War labour movements.
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European - there was only one European left. I wanted the Taiwanese to separate
Western from Asian from Japanese. I felt that writers in Japan and the West often
over stereo-type all aspects of Japan and confuse this with orientalism (and still do).
The reason for two Japanese was to compare between Japanese, because, again, there
are differences. I experienced some of these differences when studying and working
in Japan and in dealing with Taiwanese, so that the choice of cases was based on
assumptions drawn from these experiences.
After contacting the target plants in October 1989, 1 gained access to all except one
case, the Taiwanese company, and I arranged the first interviews iii November, 19%9.
By the end of February 1990, with a change of Personnel Manager and later her
assistant in the Taiwanese plant, the company finally denied me access. Ironically,
it was not until March 1992 that I gained access to the Taiwanese plant, through an
introduction by a student at Nottingham Trent University. The lack of a fourth case
in late 1989 made me anxious, and I quickly applied for access and got into a third
Japanese company. This seemed all the more important to me because in one of the
Japanese cases my level of access was restricted (see below). This change had the
effect of limiting the type of comparative work I could do as I could no longer
compare West with East to any degree; it was straight Japan .v. Europe. It also led
me to the view that, as a student at least, once you fail to gain access give up - do
not waste time! If they say 'maybe' it means 'no' - it is not worthwhile waiting for
a 'yes'. It is worthwhile if I had more time - like five years, but I only had two years
of research scholarship money left.
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Gaininz access
I now wish to discuss in more detail how I negotiated access. My supervisor
suggested a cascade approach where I negotiate different levels of access, one after
another. I wrote a letter asking for a concrete interview and plant tour. Additionally,
I wrote a vague sentence about further interviews in the future. Also, in the letter I
said I would phone about a week later. When I went to those interviews, I was
supposed to ask for the next stage only. However, having attended a seminar in
Warwick Business School on research methodology, Paul K Edwards advised me to
be more open in case they think I am being dishonest in my original intention. I asked
for all the research access, though, as was true (because I was still unsure), I did not
specify names and numbers of desired interviewees.
The levels of access were originally defined at three levels: one, Senior Personnel
Executive and plant tour; two, about seven interviews with nine people from stewards
and supervisors to production directors; and three, shopfloor interviews. However,
after returning from Japan, I decided to insert a fourth type - with expatriate
managers. One Japanese case refused access to the shopfloor, which disappointed me
- but I suppose I was lucky to get any. Later, in June, a second Japanese firm
withdrew access on the grounds of being too busy. Pure circumstance had halved my
shopfloor access. Again, my supervisor seemed satisfied2 but I was worried that the
whole research access would collapse, but it did not.
2 Either that or he is a good actor.
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The questionnaire experiment
At one point I decided to resort to the use of questionnaires, and although in the end
I did not, the reasoning deserves discussion. I decided to beat the work pressure issue
by submitting two types of questionnaire to the gate keepers (senior personnel
executives). The idea was that the company distributed them, to be filled in by certain
shopfloor workers and sent back to me directly. This would have maintained secrecy.
To help avoid bias in the company distribution, I proposed that line one and shift A
in each work group all get them. I would have liked all shopfloor workers to get them
but this would have meant over two thousand four-sided questionnaires. I did not have
the time or the money for such a project.
The questionnaire was designed over two weeks and took four drafts before my
supervisor and I were happy with it. The questionnaire was long and quite difficult
to complete, but anything less, I thought, would have been pointless for my research.
However, this left a problem of return rates. On the one side, the higher the number
returned the better, though maximising returns was not essential. On the other side,
there were some ethical issues. I wanted the questionnaires completed but I would
have been asking workers, who are over-worked anyway, to do more overtime. This
was especially true because the questionnaire would have come via management, so
even if the process of completion was voluntary it was possible that they feel it is like
doing unpaid overtime. But I could find no alternative method of distribution. Union
stewards were inappropriate, direct mailing would not be possible and any other
method I could think of came up against the same ethical problem. In practice this
process and obligation may have increased the response rate. By direct return to me
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I hoped to avoid bias away from writing to an audience, especially management. In
the end no questionnaires were issued. The reason was mainly that as the interviews
progressed, the data seemed to be rich enough, without the need for additional
sources of information. Other considerations affecting the decision not to issue,
included prioritising requests from management for the extension of interviews and
second plant tours, and a desire not to replicate work done by other researchers.
Much of my findings from interviews contradict a number of MBA theses and
surveys of Cardiff Business School, based largely on this type of data collection and
I did not wish to replicate, this. Finally, there sie tnaor qu.e..tcns c	 Idty, 'i.cli.
comparing my data with the Cardiff findings, which are explained within the thesis.
The implication is that often responses to questions are normative, if to do otherwise,
is considered to fail. If you ask a manager in a Japanese company "do you have A
(for example just-in-time manufacturing)?" and all the literature, press and so on says
they do, they are unlikely to say no we do not have A. This is true especially with
Japanese, who see inter-company competition as so fierce thatthey lose if they say
'no' and the managers in other companies respond with 'yes'. There is an added
difficulty with Japanese managers, which is that, when asking a question, even in
Japanese, they will say yes to a question to signify yes they understand the question,
rather than as an affirmative answer. Only through exploring questions of how and
why can you get beyond this normative type of response.
Back to interviewin2
The method of interviewing which I adopted is termed 'semi-structured'. What it
meant in practice was that a list of questions were written on two or three pages,
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broken into topic areas. For each topic area there were one or two key questions,
(typed in bold for easy reference) which were quite general. If I had difficulties (eg
the interviewee(s) were shy, withholding, or I got sidetracked into an issue) I had
several supplementary questions. Hopefully this method allowed me to cover all the
issues I wanted, which is very important for comparative analysis, and yet provided
scope for the interviewee to talk freely within the confines of a general question.
Each question sheet was customised for the job-holder and by company, yet many
questions were common to all. A word processor has been invaluable here! At times
it became difficult to think beyond the individvaJ section! topic to vieis1and Jow it
fitted into the overall research after the nth draft and the nth time of questioning.
Because of time and through the suggestion of my supervisor, I arranged group
interviews for some mainly shopfloor workers. This created a new set of dynamics.
On the down side, less got covered, but on the upside, the time turned from an
interview, to discussion between group members. Methodological advantages have
been that my white coat image was reduced because interviewees gave each other
confidence, and I learned much which I could not have known to ask. A problem
might have been that a dominant individual controlled the discussion. I did not find
this a problem because, (a) they checked with me that I was happy with the
discussion, and (b) to some extent shopfloor social relations were being replicated -
there were dominant, outspoken people and timid people. If they are dominant in
front of me - I expect they are dominant in front of others around the workplace.
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INTERVIEW HISTORY
There were five stages or parts within the interviewing process: background in Japan,
UK plant personnel executives, other plant managers, headquarters in Japan, and
shopfloor workers. Opportunities were taken to interview others, such as union
officials and, in one case a European regional headquarters.
During the final month of my stay in Japan (1987-9) I conducted interviews with
Personnel, Engineering and Production Managers in three companies. In one of these
cases, I also interviewed the head of the company union, in the presence of the
Personnel Manager. In all cases I was also given a tour of the factory, and only in
one case was I restricted to a 'set' tour, which restricted my degree of exploration of
issues and procedures. These tours became important features of my research, both
in terms of providing a picture of the assembly processes and as a basis to ask more
searching questions in the interviews. Another type of background information
gathering were a series of meetings, usually over dinner with Jeftist trade unionists
and the centre confederation, Denkirouren (Electrical Workers Union Confederation).
These interviews and meetings formed a set of background material to the Doctorate
research which helped develop the critical focus.
In the UK, as already indicated, I decided to gain access to the companies through
approaching Personnel Managers, first by sending a letter in which I said I would
phone after a week. The letter explained my wish to interview the Personnel
Manager, gain a tour of the plant, and made a vague request for further access. After
the experience of the first two cases, I included question areas with the remaining
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letters. I had several hours in each plant, with usually a two hour interview with the
senior Personnel Manager, with some less formal time over lunch. These interviews
provided much information as well as providing an opportunity to discuss my desire
for further access.
In all the cases I returned to the factory after a few months to interview line
managers, supervisors and union representatives, as well as sometimes re-interviewing
the Personnel Manager or their assistant. Sometimes, 1 was able to see parts of the
factory again. In the Japanese cases interviews were scheduled by the Personnel
Department in a single room, to which each interviewee came in turn. This
formalised the process and cocooned us away from the factory. However, in one
case, Koburg, I was taken to the various offices for the interviewees.
In mid April 1990 I conducted a number of interviews in the headquarters of the three
case plants in Tokyo. This was arranged by Abo Tetsuo, Tokyo University, after my
approaches via previous contacts and through the case plants failed. A copy of the list
of question areas was faxed to the companies and I was asked to take an American
scholar as a kind of under-study. Although a sequenced interview schedule was
designed, in practice the answers to some questions caused me to change the order,
and ask many supplementary questions. Also, in the case of Hashi, due to it being a
takeover rather than a set up, there were specific questions I wanted answered in this
area. Moreover, the initial sections related to background! context information on
operations, company history, and technological sourcing in Japan.
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Within two companies, Koburg and Koorki, I was able to interview shopfloor
workers. This meant another trip to the factories and another opportunity to see
changes and parts of the plant. The interviewee(s) always came to a central
'interviewing' room, which did influence the behaviour of individuals at first. On the
one hand they welcomed the relief to leave the line, but on the other, they felt they
were being interrogated.
In conclusion, there were no major problems in conducting the interviews, I was able
to see what and who I wanted. The time given, usually 45 minutes was adequate and
everybody seemed to be frank and reasonably open in response to questions.
However, I would have liked to interview workers in the other two plants and to have
re-interviewed some individuals for a second or even third time.
PROBLEMS OF 1INTERVIEW TECHNIQUE
My supervisor discussed with me several times during the interviewing period about
problems and biases both possible and those being encountered, and analyzing
techniques to cope with them. These techniques were then supplemented with a few
I developed myself.
The questions
There were three basic types of question. First there were questions asking for
information, which were asked very directly, often with an explanation as to why I
wanted the information. I learned this need for an explanation, especially from senior
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managers, in the first interview, when I was asked why I wanted information which
was sensitive. The second type of question asked for opinions, which enabled issues
of analysis to be raised. The emphasis in questioning was for personal rather than
generalised opinions, although, sometimes I felt it appropriate to ask if the personal
opinion was generally held. The third style of question was one to confirm my
understanding, such that I would make a statement and ask either if the interviewee
thought I was correct, would elaborate on my statement, or provide an impetus for
the interviewee to portray another statement. This allowed me to check whether my
own interpretations of issues or information given was valid, show the interviewee
areas of practical knowledge I gained so as to build trust and empathy, or! and to
develop questioning into complex areas which direct questioning may not have
broached.
Tapin2 interviews
In all cases the interviews were taped. I knew this would cause some bias in the
interviewing but tried to minimise this by first asking for permission to tape and
suggesting that the interviewee(s) could ask me to switch the tape off if required due
to the sensitivity of information being given, which was sometimes done. I also
positioned the recorder at arms length from me, towards the side of the table and
within reach of the interviewee(s). Senior union and management officials found no
difficulty with this process, having been exposed to the taped interview several times
before. Among the others, some ignored the tape from the beginning, while others
were nervous at first, but relaxed after a few minutes. In one or two cases, the click
of the tape as it finished one side jolted the interviewee back into self consciousness
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and the flow of discussion had to be built up again. In one case, an interviewee
developed a habit of speaking to the tape deliberately at times in order to extenuate
a point she was making. This amused the others and relaxed a fairly tense situation,
where line workers were brought in for interview without really knowing why they
were taken off the line.
The untaped periods provided some rich anecdotal data but caused problems for
recording. I took opportunities, such as waiting for documents, in-between interviews,
going to the toilet to write notes; and when I left the factory 1 would park the car 117
a layby and make notes or scribble on the train going home. However, I lost much
to half-memories as the rush of experiences challenged my brain from start to finish.
The process of interviewing was enjoyable and interesting. I learned something about
my own behaviour as well as those I interviewed. If I were doing these interviews
again, I would like to talk at the workplace and be able to soclalise with some
individuals.
ThE PAINS OF ThE WRITE-UP
It is not until I started to write the chapters of the thesis that I really evaluated and
understood the focus and substance of the research. This section first describes the
process of the write-up and then evaluates the relationship between the thesis and me.
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The process.
During the field research a series of papers were written comparing results from
interviews and linking these with theoretical issues. This process encouraged my
transcription of tapes and provided questions for later interviews. Towards the end
of the research period, I started to produce draft chapters. Initially, these chapters
were based around the interviews so that there were chapters on managers, workers
and unions. However, this layout would not allow me to focus on central issues to do
with current debates around Japanisation. Therefore, much of the material already
written was reworked into new chapters on production, flexibIlity, and attitudes o
workers. This focus formed the basis for the present structure. Each chapter was split
and re-formed, separated as a new chapter emerged and other chapters written from
scratch.
This process was halted in late August 1991 by my gaining employment at
Nottingham Trent University. For six months, I did no work on the thesis, despite
requests from my supervisor, Peter Fairbrother, and attempts at restarting myself. In
March 1992, I started to work partially on the write-up and submitted in May 1992
the first 'almost' complete draft since July 1991. However, it was not until July 1992
that the complete thesis was ready for a final check by my supervisor, three years
after starting in the Sociology Department at Warwick University. Corrections after
the viva took another 10 months because of delays due to my taking up a lectureship
at the City Polytechnic of Hong Kong from January, 1993.
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Evaluating the process.
At times the writing of the thesis was interesting but mainly it was a necessary chore,
devoid of pleasure except that of the expectation of completion. Without the
encouragement and sometimes pressure of Peter Fairbrother, Tony Elger and Vic
Taylor, I do not think I could have completed this part of the Doctorate.
The process of the final write-up was eased by being able to draw on essays and
papers written before and during the data collection stages. Moreover, attending
conferences and occasionally giving papers at them or for publication provided
stimulation to incorporate new ideas and confirm old ones. Feedback from my
supervisor, colleagues in Japan and conferences adapted and encouraged this lonely
endeavour. Writing a paper with Tony Elger and Peter Fairbrother had a major
impact in realising that there was a point to this research - I had something new to
say - and in developing theoretical ideas.
Finally, the writing process helped me mature academically. At the start of the
process, I was driven by a negative desire to attack that which I thought was wrong
and tell the truth about the 'Japanised' labour process. By the end I became more
critical of my own interpretation of the truth and more accepting of a complex
interpretation of such realities.
CONCLUSION
Methodology is as much a product of circumstance as intention. Once the method of
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research was decided, it was just a question of minimising the shortcomings and
playing with ways of getting the most from it.
Behind this process lies a theoretical construct of the world. It is theoretical but one
comes to the theory through experience. The choice of theory determines what is
interesting and that determines what is read and done academically. This determines
not whether you do case studies, questionnaires or observation, but the sort of issues
to be dealt with within the theoretical framework. The choice between, or in
combination of, the three basic types, perhaps should be a pragmatic choice based on
appropriateness. However, in the case of Japanisation debates, I think I have been
able to show that the methodological focus for my research has been the main reason
for this thesis being divergent from previous studies.
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First Supervisor
Second Supervisor
GMB Convenor
Human Resources Manager
Engineering Training Officer
Public Relations HQ, Osaka
Public Relations and Engineering, Tokyo
Overseas Office, Tokyo
International Department Chief, Tokyo
International Department Chief, Tokyo
Main Line Supervisor
Quality Assurance Manager
AEU Representatives
General\ Production Manager
Production Engineer (Japanese)
Manual Insertion
Auto Insertion System Operators
Service Technicians
Fault Finders
Tuner Assemblers
Production Engineer
Quality Assurance Manager
Supervisor
Colour Television Works Manager
Training Manager
EEPTU Convenor
VTR Works Manager
Alignment Float
Manual Insertion Float
Auto Insertion System Operator & loader
Denkirouren
Mitsubishi
Orki
Koburg
Koorki
Kohashi
Koburg
Koburg
Koburg
Koburg
Koburg
Koburg
Koburg
Koorki
Koorki
Koorki
Koorki
Koorki
Koorki
Kokuda
Kokuda
Orki
Kuda
Hashi
Rengo
Denkirouren
Kokuda
Kokuda
Kokuda
Kokuda
Kokuda
Koburg
Koburg
Koburg
Koburg
Koburg
Kohashi
Kohashi
Kohashi
Kohashi
Kohashi
Kohashi
Kohashi
Koorki
Koorki
Koorki
403
	1 6-08-90d	 Design Specifications Engineer
	
16-08-90e	 Senior GMB Steward
	
1 6-08-90f	 Colour Television Senior Manager
	
17-08-90	 Maintenance Manager
	
16-10-90	 Regional Officer
	
24-10-90	 Sales Managers, European HQ
	
10-03-92	 Marketing manager (Taiwanese)
Koorki
Koorki
Koorki
Koorki
EEPTU
Kuda
Tatung
404
